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ABSTRACT
THE HARD-TO-MEASURE ASPECTS OF FIRMS
Jason Sockin
Ioana Marinescu

This dissertation explores the aspects of firms that are hard-to-measure, hardto-observe, and hard-to-quantify.
Chapter 1 investigates amenities of work that go beyond a wage. Using matched
employee-employer data for the United States, this chapter estimates the joint distribution of wages, amenities, and job satisfaction across firms. There are three
main findings. First, high-paying firms are high-satisfaction firms because they offer better amenities. Second, workers, especially high-earners, are willing to pay for
job satisfaction, gaining in amenity value at least 50 percent of the average wage
when moving from the worst- to the best-amenity firms. Third, since the elasticity
of total compensation inclusive of amenity value to wages across firms exceeds one,
incorporating non-wage amenities raises total compensation variance across firms
by at least 52 percent.
Chapter 2 investigates firm reputation. Using workers’ volunteered reviews on
the platform Glassdoor, we find that the content most valuable to jobseekers (negative information) is the kind most risky to supply, pointing to a Catch-22. Higher
ratings increase labor supply to less well-known firms, creating an incentive for
smaller firms to discourage negative reviews. Concerns about employer retaliation
iii

discourage negative reviews and motivate employees who do disclose to conceal aspects of their identity, degrading the information’s value. Reputation institutions
provide valuable but partial solutions to workers’ information problems.
Chapter 3 investigates firm culture. Using a sample of corporate scandals and
data from the website Glassdoor, we study how negative reputation shocks affect the
relationship between firms and their employees. Worker sentiment declines sharply
and persistently following scandals, driven by diminished perceptions of management and culture. While base earnings and fringe benefits remain unchanged, variable compensation falls 10 percent. Our results demonstrate that rank-and-file
employees are adversely impacted by corporate misconduct.
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Chapter 1 Show Me the Amenity: Are High-Wage
Firms Better All Around?

1.1

Introduction

Jobs are inherently complex, reflecting “many margins” beyond just a wage (Clemens,
2021). Whether these many margins, i.e. job amenities, complement or substitute
for wages remains empirically unanswered, despite the growing consensus that workers value non-pecuniary aspects of work (Akerlof et al., 1988; Mas and Pallais, 2017;
Maestas et al., 2018). Do higher-paying firms offer more favorable work, or compensate for offering less favorable work? Since either is theoretically possible (Sorkin,
2018), data on firm-level amenities should offer the best opportunity to settle this
debate.1 Obtaining such data, however, has proven difficult. Current wage levels
are easily observed and abundantly available, non-wage attributes are not. For
one, it is not obvious what non-wage aspects would be included or even how to go
about measuring them. In addition, workers may have heterogeneous experiences
1

On one hand, Rosen (1986a) motives push wages and job attributes to move inversely, depending on firms’ marginal costs of providing amenities: Among firms of similar productivity
levels, those with a comparative advantage in amenity provision provide better amenities but
lower wages. On the other hand, Mortensen (2003) motives push wages and job attributes to comove, as amenities are an alternative medium by which to compensate workers: More-productive
firms can afford greater wages and more amenity value than less-productive ones. While some
have presented evidence that the labor market operates within a compensating differential framework (Eriksson and Kristensen, 2014; Sorkin, 2018; Jäger et al., 2021), others have documented
the absence of such differentials (Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009; Maestas et al., 2018).

1

with amenities, meaning objective measures alone may not fully capture amenity
quality.2 Determining how firms’ amenities correlate with wages would require new
data on amenities for workers and firms over time. With the advent of online labor
market platforms, in this case Glassdoor, such an exercise is now feasible.
This paper estimates which job amenities workers value, which firms offer more
favorable amenities, and the aggregate importance of amenities as compared with
wages. The building block for this analysis is workers’ free response descriptions
of the positive and negative aspects of their jobs on the website Glassdoor. To
extract nuanced amenities from these unstructured but meaningful texts, I apply
the semi-supervised topic modeling approach of Gallagher et al. (2017). Topic
modeling allows researchers to capture hard-to-define themes in text that humans
may be unable to detect themselves. A semi-supervised approach allows researchers
to further guide the model to help ensure the outputted themes are interpretable.
Applying this model to workers’ reviews on Glassdoor, I summarize the quality of
fifty amenities workers detail about their employers. The fifty amenities capture
the multidimensional nature of different characteristics of work, including pecuniary
traits related to wages and fringe benefits, as well as non-pecuniary traits related
to working conditions, human capital investments, and interpersonal relationships.
Since each employee review constitutes an employee-employer match where I can
2

Suppose, for instance, coworker quality has value to workers (Jäger et al., 2021) and is a
function of both ability and friendliness. While the former can be proxied for using coworkers’
wages, the latter reflects a degree of sentiment that requires individuals’ own perceptions of their
workplaces.

2

identify the worker and the firm, by using data on job switchers who leave multiple
reviews, I can capture firm-level differences in job satisfaction and the quality of
each amenity vis-à-vis the firm fixed effects from the canonical two-way fixed effects
model of Abowd et al. (1999), hereafter AKM.
This first main contribution of this paper fills a gap in our understanding of
firms by first developing measures of job satisfaction and non-wage amenities that
are firm-specific. Previous empirical work has established differences in amenity
evaluations (Maestas et al., 2018) and job satisfaction (Jäger et al., 2021) between
differently-paid workers, but has not been able to speak to the effects attributable
directly to firms. Estimating each firm’s relative premium for wages and for job
satisfaction, I find that higher-paying firms provide a higher degree of job satisfaction: a one-standard-deviation increase in the wage premium a firm offers its
workers (compared with other firms) is associated with 0.10 standard deviations
improved job satisfaction. As such, workers who transition to a higher-paying firm
tend to enjoy not only greater wage growth on average, but also an associated increase in job satisfaction. This increase in satisfaction is broad-based, with workers
reporting improved sentiment along dimensions of work at best indirectly related to
wages, including career opportunities, culture and values, senior management, and
work-life balance. This pattern is evident within and across industries, suggesting
that inter-industry wage differentials do not fundamentally reflect equalizing compensation for unfavorable work (Krueger and Summers, 1988). Even when looking

3

within the same firm, workers’ job satisfaction levels improve when the firm raises
pay though the relation attenuates by three-quarters.
In capturing job amenities directly, my analysis does not rely upon the commonly used assumption that moves to lower-wage firms can be rationalized by unobserved, positive changes in amenities (Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009; Sullivan and
To, 2014; Sorkin, 2018; Lamadon et al., 2019; Taber and Vejlin, 2020). In fact, I
find little empirical evidence validating this assumption: pay cuts in my data are
more frequent when moving to lower-satisfaction firms, not higher-satisfaction ones.
Rather, most job amenities improve with pay. While high-paying firms offer worse
job security, they provide better interpersonal relationships, invest more in human
capital, supply more favorable fringe benefits, and offer superior working conditions. This finding runs counter to the notion that firms’ wage premia primarily
compensate for unfavorable job characteristics (Rosen, 1986a; Sorkin, 2018), and
instead supports more-productive firms offering improved amenities (Mortensen,
2003; Lamadon et al., 2019). Decomposing job satisfaction into these fifty amenities reveals that only 8–12 percent of workers’ job satisfaction ratings relate to pay
satisfaction — in part reflecting how one-third of non-wage amenities have a more
pronounced effect on job satisfaction than does satisfaction with pay.
The second main contribution estimates the value workers place on job satisfaction. Non-wage amenities, e.g. one’s coworkers, managers, autonomy, and respect,
are non-pecuniary in nature and as such, not explicitly priced. In the spirit of

4

Gronberg and Reed (1994), I estimate how long workers remain with an employer
(job tenure) as a function of both wages and job satisfaction. If the utility a worker
derives from her employment rises with her wage and satisfaction with the job, then
both should positively influence whether she remains longer in the match. The resulting estimates can be used to provide a dollar-equivalent of job satisfaction in
terms of its ability to attract and retain workers. Looking at workers’ completed
job spells, since greater wages and improved job satisfaction each elongate firm
tenure, workers exhibit a positive willingness to pay for job satisfaction. Even after
removing the portion of job satisfaction attributable to pay satisfaction, there are
stark disparities in non-wage amenity value between firms: workers gain in amenity
value at least 50 percent of the average wage when moving from the first to the
ninety-ninth percentile of firms.
The third main contribution of this paper examines whether amenities amplify
or attenuate firm-level inequality in total compensation (wages plus amenity value).
Settling this debate remains an ongoing issue: While Lamadon et al. (2019) find
that more-productive firms offer better amenities, Sorkin (2018) concludes that
three-quarters of the wage premia firms offer reflect compensating differentials. If
high-wage firms offer less favorable non-wage amenities, then the disparity in total compensation will be thinner than the disparity in wages. The reverse is true
if high-wage firms offer more favorable amenities. Since relating firms’ total compensation premia to their wage premia reveals an elasticity above one, amenities

5

amplify inequality across firms. Incorporating non-wage amenities raises compensation variance across firms by 50–65 percent and widens the compensation gap
between the tenth and ninetieth percentiles of firms by 10–15 log points. Job satisfaction data thus reveal that wages understate inequality between firms in the U.S.
labor market. Improved amenities may therefore also help explain the high degree
to which high-wage workers sort into high-paying firms (Card et al., 2013; Song
et al., 2019; Bonhomme et al., 2020)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.1 discusses the relevant
literature, Section 1.3 describes and validates the Glassdoor data, Section 1.4 investigates the relation between wages and job satisfaction across firms, Section 1.5 introduces fifty job amenities extracted from workers’ descriptions of their employers,
Section 1.6 quantifies how workers are willing to pay for job satisfaction, Section 1.7
estimates firm-level dispersion when amenity value is considered alongside wages,
Section 1.8 investigates the robustness of the results to alternative modeling decisions, Section 1.9 highlights implications of the results while mentioning limitations,
and Section 1.10 concludes.

1.2

Relevant Literature

In uncovering disparities in amenity quality across firms, this work relates to a
number of important strands of the literature. First is a budding literature on
the importance of the non-wage aspect(s) of jobs for understanding labor market
6

dynamics. Non-wage characteristics of jobs have been found to be valued enough to
affect workers’ preferences for jobs and labor market sorting (Sullivan and To, 2014;
Hall and Mueller, 2018).3 Examples include occupational fatality risk (DeLeire and
Levy, 2004), the degree of social interaction (Krueger and Schkade, 2008), and
flexibility with respect to time and location (He et al., 2021). Non-wage attributes
have also been found to be especially important in understanding differences in
jobseeker behavior by gender.4
Since non-wage amenities vary between jobs, there is dispersion that wages alone
may fail to capture. Taber and Vejlin (2020) estimate that the variance of wages plus
non-pecuniary aspects is more than twice as large as the variance of wages alone —
through the lens of a Roy model with compensating differentials (i.e., omitting the
Mortensen (2003) channel), search frictions, and human capital. From omitting job
characteristics, such as workplace safety (Park et al., 2021), working at convenient
times of the day (Hamermesh, 1999), fringe benefits (Piketty et al., 2017), sexual
harassment (Folke and Rickne, 2020), or labor rights violations (Marinescu et al.,
2020), we may understate total inequality between workers of different education
levels (Duncan, 1976) or wages (Maestas et al., 2018).
Second is a literature characterizing workers’ willingness to pay for non-wage
3
Improved signals of employer quality that reflect the non-wage aspects work have been shown
to increase labor supply: Turban and Cable (2003) using “the best companies to work for” lists
published by various media outlets and Sockin and Sojourner (2020) using Glassdoor employer
ratings.
4
Examples include the provision of parental leave benefits (Liu et al., 2019; Fluchtmann et al.,
2020), commuting length (Herzog and Schlottmann, 1990; Le Barbanchon et al., 2020), competition
(Sockin and Sockin, 2019b), and workplace flexibility (Bender et al., 2005; Goldin and Katz, 2011).
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attributes. Workers will accept lower wages to avoid bad working conditions and
frequent physical activity (Gronberg and Reed, 1994), enjoy reduced workplace hazards and a flexible work schedule (Felfe, 2012), have job security (Bonhomme and
Jolivet, 2009), avoid unanticipated work schedules (Mas and Pallais, 2017), receive
faster earnings growth (Wiswall and Zafar, 2017), have a flexible work arrangement
(Chen et al., 2019), conduct more meaningful work, experience less work-related
stress and have job autonomy, teamwork, job training, and paid time off (Maestas et al., 2018). Willingness-to-pay estimates can also be quite large: Maestas
et al. (2018) estimate that transitioning from the worst-amenity job to the best (as
characterized by their set of nine amenities) would be valued at a 56 percent wage
increase.
Third is a literature related to the determinants and implications of job satisfaction. Locke (1969) theorizes that job satisfaction captures every element of
which a job is comprised, and reflects not only the objective quality of each aspect, but individuals’ subjective perceptions and value rankings as well. Although
greater pay is associated with more pay satisfaction (Bryson et al., 2012), overall
job satisfaction has been found to predominantly reflect non-pecuniary rather than
pecuniary aspects of work (Akerlof et al., 1988; Clark, 1998) — though disparities in pay among peers, which could arguably reflect non-wage characteristics such
as fairness and respect, can stunt job satisfaction (Card et al., 2012). Consistent
with other work that has found job satisfaction to be an important predictor for
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why workers voluntarily quit (Freeman, 1978; Bartel, 1982; Akerlof et al., 1988;
Clark, 2001; Card et al., 2012), I find that more-satisfied workers exhibit longer
firm tenure. And since job satisfaction primarily reflects non-wage characteristics
(88–92 percent), job amenities constitute meaningful drivers for worker turnover.5
To borrow a quote from Akerlof et al. (1988), “As man does not live by bread alone,
people do not quit only for wages.”
Last is a literature on the role of firms in explaining worker compensation.
The AKM model quantifies the role of firms by regressing workers’ wages on fixed
effects for the worker and the firm, a linearly additive view validated by Bonhomme
et al. (2019). Estimates for the share of the variance in wages attributable to firms
typically ranges from 15–25 percent (see Bonhomme et al. (2020) for a summary
of the literature). That range falls to 5–13 percent and the contribution from the
sorting of workers into firms rises after accounting for limited mobility, i.e. firms on
average having few job switchers in the data (Andrews et al., 2008; Kline et al., 2020;
Bonhomme et al., 2020). To account for limited mobility, I consider, in addition to
the full sample of firms, a more-connected set of firms with many job switchers in
the data. While there is some nascent work examining non-wage attributes across
firms, empirical measures for amenities are almost entirely absent, likely reflecting
the unavailability of such data.6 As a result, amenity value has to be inferred from
5

Jäger et al. (2021) find that in a survey where workers were asked their reasons for not
switching to new employers, the primary reasons given pertained to non-wage components such
as job security, work atmosphere, work schedule, and colleagues rather than difficulty in finding a
better-paying job.
6
One notable exception is the work of Lagos (2019) who captures amenities across Brazilian

9

wages and job transitions. The positive correlation I document between wages and
non-wage attributes (without having to impute amenity value from wage data) lends
empirical support to the findings of Lamadon et al. (2019), while at the same time,
is in line with workers at higher-paying firms participating more in social insurance
programs (Bana et al., 2018; Lachowska et al., 2021) and job satisfaction improving
with coworkers’ wages (Clark et al., 2009).

1.3
1.3.1

Data Description
Sources

The data for this analysis come primarily from the online platform Glassdoor, where
jobseekers can go to obtain labor market information about prospective employers
provided by current and former employees of each firm. Workers are incentivized to
volunteer their own experiences through a “give-to-get” policy whereby contributors
gain access to the information others have provided. Workers can submit one or
more of the following: an employer review, a pay report, an interview review, or
a benefits review. This work makes use of the first two: the former captures job
satisfaction and non-wage amenities, the latter wages.
firms using a textual-based analysis of collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers. Whereas I use within-worker differences in job satisfaction to identify firm-level amenities
and allow for vertical differentiation in amenities across firms, Lagos (2019) estimates firm-level
amenities based on how collective bargaining agreements with the firm change over time, where
amenity value is estimated conditional on wage growth vis-à-vis compensating differentials, capturing instead horizontal differentiation in amenities, i.e. analyzing how the wage-amenity bundle
evolves holding productivity constant.
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When submitting an employer review, each worker is first asked which firm they
would like to review and whether they are a current or former employee of the
firm. If she is a former employee, she is then prompted for the last year she was
employed at the firm. The worker can then rate the employer overall on a one-tofive-stars integral scale, with more stars indicating greater satisfaction, and provide
free-text responses describing the ‘Pros’ (i.e., positive characteristics) and the ‘Cons’
(i.e., negative characteristics) of working for the firm.7 In addition, the worker can
rate the employer along five sub-dimensions (career opportunities, compensation
and benefits, culture and values, senior management, and work-life balance) on the
same one-to-five-stars scale. Each worker can also provide the location of their
employment, their job title, and their years of tenure with the firm.8 For an indepth description of the Glassdoor reviews data, which span 2008–2021, see Green
et al. (2019).
When submitting a wage report, each worker is first asked for their job title and
whether they are a current or former employee of the firm. Again, if she is a former
employee, she is prompted for the last year employed with the firm. The worker
then provides her base wage, pay frequency (annually, hourly, or monthly), variable
pay (e.g., bonuses and commissions), years of experience, employment status (e.g.,
full-time or part-time), employer name, and location. Given that hours are not
7

Respondents are not prompted to report their wage when submitting an employer review.
As such, the concern that workers will not discuss pay when completing the free-response text
because they provide wage information elsewhere in the submission form is not present.
8
Disclosing one’s job title and one’s location is not required to submit a review.
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observed, I restrict the sample to only full-time workers. From here on, workers’
wages refers to their base earnings, meaning variable pay — which itself could
be considered an employer’s fringe benefit — is omitted. For consistency across
workers, I annualize wages assuming hourly employees work 2,000 hours per year
and monthly employees work for twelve months. For a thorough discussion of the
Glassdoor wage data, which span 2008–2021, see Sockin and Sockin (2019a).

1.3.2

External Validity

In order to make broad statements about the U.S. labor market, it is important to
first show that Glassdoor ratings accurately capture labor market patterns observed
in other datasets. Given the subjective nature of our main measure of interest, job
satisfaction, possible datasets that can be used for comparison are necessarily restricted to worker surveys. Though measures of job satisfaction in publicly-available
surveys are scant, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) asks
respondents whether they are satisfied with their jobs on a 1–5 integral ranking,
the same system used for Glassdoor ratings. Workers in the NLSY97 sample are
more positive in their job assessments than workers in the Glassdoor sample. In
the NLSY97, the average satisfaction level is 3.85, and only 10.7 percent of workers
report having either of the two lowest satisfaction levels. For comparison, the average overall rating in Glassdoor is 3.47 and 25.4 percent of workers submit ratings
of either one or two stars.
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Though the average and shape of the ratings distributions may be dissimilar,
for our purposes, the validity of using these ratings data rests in whether the Glassdoor sample accurately reflects disparities observed between different employment
opportunities. To that end, I compare the average job satisfaction level between
the two datasets both by two-digit NAICS industry and by two-digit SOC occupation, the scatterplots for which are displayed in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1.1,
respectively.9 Across seventeen industries, we observe a robust positive correlation
(0.51, p-value = 0.037), meaning that industries that tend to have high levels of
satisfaction in the NLSY97 also have relatively high ratings in Glassdoor. Similarly,
across twenty-one occupations, there is a strong positive correlation (0.47, p-value
= 0.031), highlighting that Glassdoor ratings also capture differences between jobs.
Figure 1.1: Comparison of Glassdoor and NLSY97 Satisfaction Levels

(a) By industry

(b) By occupation

Notes: This figure plots the relation between the average job satisfaction in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 and average overall rating in Glassdoor by industry or occupation.
Solid line indicates linear line of best fit and shaded region indicates 95% prediction interval. Industries and occupations are weighted by the total representative weight for each grouping from
the NLSY97.
9
Across 309 NAICS industry x two-digit SOC occupation pairs, the correlation is 0.35 (p-value
< 0.000).
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Next, I show that Glassdoor wage data capture broad trends in the U.S. labor market. One main advantage of using this dataset is that each observation
constitutes an employer-employee match, allowing for the study of firm-specific
wage-amenity bundles. Glassdoor wages have been to validate findings from other
datasets, e.g., Derenoncourt et al. (2021). Karabarbounis and Pinto (2019) find
that, conditional on industry or region, the wage distribution in Glassdoor broadly
captures the respective distributions obtained from the Quarterly Census for Employment and Wages (QCEW) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID);
though Karabarbounis and Pinto (2019) note that the distribution of employment
by industry in Glassdoor is not representative — an issue less relevant for this
work given the use of industry- and firm-level controls in predicting worker outcomes. Martellini et al. (2021) compare the average earnings of college graduates
by university within Glassdoor with the averages produced by the U.S. Department
of Education’s College Scorecard from tax data, and find that Glassdoor provides
an unbiased sample of U.S. earnings by college. I add to this by showing that
Glassdoor wages reflect the differences observed in the Annual Social and Economic
Supplement of the Current Population Survey (ASEC) between industries and occupations.
For both Glassdoor and ASEC, I take the (logarithm of) annual labor earnings for full-time workers and calculate the mean, median, standard deviation, and
interquartile range within industry-occupation pairs. The relations between the
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two samples for these four summary statistics are presented in Table 1.1. Glassdoor earnings data capture the first moment of wages well, exhibiting a correlation
above 0.9 with ASEC and an elasticity of 1.2–1.3, highlighting that Glassdoor somewhat overestimates earnings for high-wage jobs. With regards to the dispersion of
earnings, the semblance between the two datasets is noticeably weaker albeit still
appreciably positive. For the standard deviation and interquartile range, we observe
correlations of 0.44–0.48 between the two surveys. Therefore, conditional on industry and occupation, Glassdoor data capture meaningful differences in U.S. labor
earnings observed in other datasets.
Table 1.1: Earnings in Glassdoor and the Annual Social and Economic Supplement
ASEC earnings statistic

Glassdoor wage statistic
Industry-occupations
R2
Mean ASEC weight
Correlation

Mean
log earnings

Median
log earnings

Standard
deviation
log earnings

Interquartile
range
log earnings

1.348∗∗∗
(0.028)

1.217∗∗∗
(0.027)

0.709∗∗∗
(0.072)

0.677∗∗∗
(0.061)

409
0.85
18839
0.923

409
0.83
18839
0.911

409
0.19
18839
0.439

409
0.23
18839
0.483

Notes: This table reflects coefficients from regressions of moments in ASEC-level earnings data on
the same moments for Glassdoor wage data at the Glassdoor industry x two-digit SOC occupation.
Earnings in ASEC reflect inflation-adjusted total pre-tax wage and salary income for full-time
workers. Glassdoor wages excluding variable-based earnings such as bonuses, commissions, tips
or overtime pay. Regressions are weighted according to representative ASEC weights. Industryoccupations restricted to those with at least fifty observations in Glassdoor. Significance levels: *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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1.4

Relation Between Wages and Job Satisfaction

Despite the overwhelming growth in new data available to researchers, the question of whether wages and job amenities move inversely or in tandem remains an
open debate. For attributes that are unambiguously undesirable ex ante, such as
increased risk of fatality, the answer is fairly definitive.10 However, to what extent job characteristics that are harder to observe and harder to measure vary with
wages remains unclear. While some empirical work has touched upon this question,
more work is needed as jobs are complex and amenities numerous.11 Starting with
job satisfaction, I show in this section that high wages command greater levels of
satisfaction, first presenting suggestive cross-sectional evidence and then estimating two-way fixed effects models to gauge whether workers trade-off wages and job
satisfaction across firms.

1.4.1

Job Satisfaction as a Reflection of the Amenity Bundle

Determining whether variance in wages alone overstates or understates differences in
total compensation requires also estimating the degree to which job amenities differ.
10

As Smith (1979) framed it then, the evidence of compensating differentials — in which wages
trade-off with dis-amenities — has been ambiguous with regards to job attributes except for
fatality risk.
11
For instance, Pierce (2001) shows that high-income earners receive more voluntary non-wage
compensation vis-à-vis fringe benefits, Dey and Flinn (2005) that jobs offering health insurance
pay higher wages, and Maestas et al. (2018) that working conditions appear to broadly improve
with wages.
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The sheer breadth of possible job amenities makes this task especially daunting. To
quote Clemens (2021), there is a “‘many margins’ problem, in which the relevance
of various attributes may vary substantially across settings.” Some firms may offer
better fringe benefits but offset those benefits with worse working conditions such
as requiring more tasks and imposing more rigid work schedules. Some firms may
invest more in on-the-job training while promoting a competitive environment with
worse job security. Comparing any singular amenity though will inherently overlook
the correlation with other amenities provided by the firm. To quantify the full scope
of job amenities, especially non-pecuniary ones, ideally one would use an aggregation
mechanism that incorporates how workers value the collective bundle. To this end,
I use workers’ levels of job satisfaction.
The extent to which workers are satisfied with their jobs will depend not just on
the pecuniary rewards they receive, but the non-pecuniary aspects as well. Akerlof
et al. (1988) find that more than 80 percent of workers cite a non-pecuniary attribute
as the primary reason for their satisfaction if they like their job. And just because
a worker is highly-paid does not necessarily mean they will be more satisfied with
their job: While high-wage workers in our sample on average report greater levels
of job satisfaction (Figure 1.2: panel a), 18 percent of workers in our sample who
earn above $50,000 (in 2018 dollars) report either of the two lowest satisfaction
levels.12 My interpretation of job satisfaction is one akin to Hamermesh (2001),
12

This positive correlation between wages and job satisfaction is evident in other survey data,
such as the NLSY97 (Figure A.3), and is well-documented in the literature (Judge et al., 2010).
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who argues that “the satisfaction that workers derive from their jobs, might be
viewed as reflecting how they react to the entire panoply of job characteristics.” In
other words, job satisfaction reflects a mapping from total compensation inclusive
of amenities, (w, ~a), to a measure of satisfaction — where the resultant level of
satisfaction also depends upon how the worker subjectively weights w and each
amenity a.
Figure 1.2: Workers’ Overall and Subcategory Ratings by Wage Level

(a) Overall

(b) Compensation and benefits

(d) Culture and values

(e) Senior leadership

(c) Career opportunities

(f) Work-life balance

Notes: This figure plots the average rating among Glassdoor reviews for overall ratings and the
five sub-categories against workers’ log wages.

Naturally then, if job satisfaction rises, this increase could reflect either an
improvement in wages or amenities, or both. And conversely, if wages rise, we
would expect job satisfaction to improve as workers become more satisfied with their
pay. The fact that high-wage workers report greater levels of both job satisfaction
18

and pay satisfaction (panel b) is consistent with this narrative. However, that
high-wage workers also report greater levels of satisfaction with aspects of work at
best tangentially related to pay, including career opportunities, culture and values,
senior leadership, and work-life balance (panels c–f), would suggest that high-wage
workers also enjoy higher quality amenities.

1.4.2

Estimating Firm-Specific Wage and Job Satisfaction
Premia

The theory of compensating differentials reflects the wage premia required to equalize the advantages and disadvantages that arise between different work opportunities (Rosen, 1986a). Given the utility-based nature of compensating differentials —
necessitated by the fact that some aspects of work are non-pecuniary in nature —
empirical researchers often estimate workers’ willingness to pay for job atributes to
understand the trade-offs workers face. Typically, this has taken the form of studying job transitions (Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009; Sorkin, 2018) or work decisions
(Chen et al., 2019) through a revealed preference framework, or interpreting hypothetical employment choices workers make in surveys (Maestas et al., 2018; Wiswall
and Zafar, 2017). These approaches exist through the perspective of workers choosing between a menu of options; however, the composition of said menu matters
for understanding amenity valuations. If some amenities, for instance career opportunities, monotonically improve with wages, then job transitions alone will fail
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to dis-entangle the value workers place on career opportunities as no trade-off is
present. To the extent that firms have control over both the wages they offer and
the bundle of amenities (and their quality) that they produce, then the trade-offs
workers face should arise from looking at supply-side differences across firms.
Given that Glassdoor wages and ratings data are comprised of employee-employer
matches, I follow the two-way fixed effects literature to estimate firm-specific premia separately for wages and job satisfaction. Employee-employer matched data
have been seldom used in the compensating-differentials literature, and when they
have, the research question typically centers on understanding workers’ willingness
to pay for safety and reduced fatality risk (Lalive, 2003; Dale-Olsen, 2006; Lavetti
and Schmutte, 2018). Whereas the fixed effects in these analyses act as nuisance
parameters to abstract from unobserved differences across workers and firms, this
work instead uses the firm fixed effects as objects of study for understanding the
causal effect from moving between firms, as in Bana et al. (2018) and Lachowska
et al. (2021). Though each worker alone only provides a vignette of the firm by detailing the quality of a few attributes in a few reviews, the collection of experiences
provided by the set of workers who have transitioned into or out of each firm can
provide a complete picture of firms’ amenity bundles.
For log wages and overall job satisfaction ratings — the distributions for which

20

are presented in Figure A.4 — I estimate AKM models of the form,

Yikt = λi + λk + λt + γXit + εikt

(1.4.1)

where Yikt is log annual wage or overall star rating for worker i employed at firm
k in year t, λi , λk , and λt are worker, firm, and year fixed effects, respectively, and
Xit is a vector of workers observables (a fourth-order polynomial in work experience
for wages; indicators for current or former employee and employment status, e.g.,
full-time or part-time, for overall ratings).13 In this model, the firm fixed effects λk
are identified from job switchers who report their wage or satisfaction for different
firms, thereby capturing the extent to which the same worker receives more or less
pay and higher or lower satisfaction at firm k compared with the other firms at
which the individual has worker.14 From workers’ wages, I obtain firm-specific pay
premia λ̂w
k — the traditional AKM application, and from workers’ overall ratings, I
obtain firm-specific satisfaction premia λ̂R
k — the novel AKM application intended
to holistically capture dispersion in non-wage amenities.
To assess the importance of firms, I first decompose the variance of workers’
13

A firm represents the collection of establishments across the United States rather than each
establishment separately, though treating establishments separately does not alter the findings
(Table 1.8: Row 22).
14
The firm fixed effects for wages are estimated using a mostly different sample of workers than
that used to estimate the firm fixed effects for job satisfaction. Roughly three-quarters of the
workers in each sample are not represented in the other. In turn, because most workers contribute
to either the wage premia or the ratings premia but not both, this sidesteps the concern that
the wage-satisfaction relation I observe across firms is driven by selection related to workers’ own
wage-satisfaction preferences. The takeaway is unchanged though when only workers who are
included in both panels are considered (Table 1.8: Row 23).
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wages and overall ratings in Table 1.2 into components attributable to the worker,
the firm, the covariance between the two, and the left unexplained error term. I
consider two samples. The “Full” sample reflects any firm for which a fixed effect
is obtainable, i.e. there exists at least two movers in our sample who transition
into or out of the firm either from or to a firm which also has at least two such
movers. The “Connected” sample restricts the set of firms to those with at least
fifteen such movers, in the spirit of Bonhomme et al. (2020) to address the issue of
limited mobility bias in two-way fixed effects models (Abowd et al., 2003).15
Firms account for 9.3 percent of the variance in log wages in the Full sample
and 6.5 percent in the Connected sample. While below the roughly 20 percent
consensus found in the literature (Card et al., 2018), these estimates are consistent with those from a more-connected set where limited mobility bias is of less
consequence and positive sorting between workers and firms plays an increasingly
important role (Bonhomme et al., 2020). For job satisfaction, firms play a more
substantive role. Firms account for 21.9 percent and 11.0 percent of the variance
in ratings for the Full and Connected samples, respectively — roughly twice the
contribution of firms to wages. That firms are relatively more predictive of job satisfaction would suggest that firms play a more important role in setting amenities
15
Limited mobility bias refers to how the precision with which the firm fixed effects in an AKM
framework are estimated relies upon how many movers there are to represent each firm. The
fewer movers there are, the more important firms are in explaining the variance across workers
(Andrews et al., 2008). Since the job transitions of movers identify the firm-specific constants,
using a more-connected set of firms with many movers can correct this bias. Bonhomme et al.
(2020) argue this point by re-estimating their AKM model using iteratively smaller fractions of
the total movers present for each firm. I implement a similar exercise for the Connected set of
firms using the wages and ratings data in Figure A.5 and find similar patterns.
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than wages, and that there is more dispersion across firms in amenities than in
wages. While about 8 percent of the variance in wages is left unexplained by workers, firms, and observable characteristics, 23–26 percent of the variance in ratings is
left unexplained. The unexplained variance in satisfaction could reflect myriad factors, such as match-specific effects, occupation, location, time-varying preferences,
or measurement error induced by a discrete metric.
Table 1.2: Decomposition of Variance for Wages and Ratings
Log wages

Overall ratings

Variance

Full

Connected

Full

Connected

Total
Worker
Firm
Cov(Worker, Firm)
Residual

0.279
0.189
0.026
0.014
0.021

0.276
0.190
0.018
0.016
0.021

2.284
1.376
0.499
-0.191
0.527

2.124
1.199
0.234
-0.034
0.562

117,749
1,025,916
2,207,583

14,230
691,546
1,497,251

99,167
565,704
1,263,222

9,841
312,149
703,147

Number of Firms
Number of Workers
Number of Observations

Notes: This table displays the variance decomposition for log wages and overall ratings for the
Full sample of firms (all firms) and the Connected sample of firms (firms represented by at least
fifteen movers).

Further details regarding the panel of movers’ wages and ratings used in estimating these two-way fixed effects models are provided in Table A.11. Although I
observe more than one wage or overall rating for many workers — allowing for the
identification of firm-specific premia — each worker records on average only 2.2 observations in the wages panel and 2.4 observations in the ratings panel. As such, one
limitation of this analysis is the inability to conduct robustness exercises for these
AKM models, such as controlling for match-specific differences that may endoge-
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nously determine mobility decisions (Lavetti and Schmutte, 2018), e.g., through
learning about ability or match quality over time (Gibbons et al., 2005; Menzio
and Shi, 2011b), or estimating event studies of dynamic wage or ratings changes
around job transitions between firms of varying premia to confirm exogenous growth
at transitions (Card et al., 2013). However, estimating the gains and losses from
transitioning to a firm of a higher or lower decile of firm premium for wages (Table
A.12) and satisfaction ratings (Table A.13) reveals that the changes are roughly
symmetric, supporting the linearly additive AKM framework. The average duration between a workers’ pair of observations is 2.5 years for wages and 2.0 years for
ratings, 78–80 percent of pairs in each panel represent the worker switching firms,
and transitions for both current and former employees are observed frequently in
each sample, highlighting that the samples do not appear negatively selected on
representing low productivity workers who have left the firm and searching off the
job.

1.4.3

When Workers Transition Between Firms

In this subsection, I examine how workers’ individual outcomes change when transiR
tioning to firms of different wage premia λ̂w
k or job satisfaction premia λ̂k . Under the

AKM framework, how workers’ earnings or satisfaction levels co-move with these
firm-level measures can be interpreted as the causal effect of the firm.
Consider a worker i who was employed with firm k in year t and decides to
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transition to a new firm k 0 where they are observed in year t0 . If the worker leaves
an employer review for both firms, then I observe the pair of ratings (Rikt , Rik0 t0 ).
Having experienced the wage-amenity bundles offered by each firm, the worker reports her overall satisfaction with each. How does the difference in wages offered
by each translate into differences in satisfaction? On one hand, if higher-paying
firms cut amenities to offset labor costs, then moving to a higher-paying firm may
result in a non-positive change in job satisfaction, depending upon how workers
subjectively weight wages and amenities. Inversely, if higher-paying firms supplement high wages with better amenities, then moving to a higher-paying firm should
directly boost job satisfaction, as the compensation bundle improves along both
dimensions.
I relate firm-level wage and satisfaction premia to individual outcomes by considering first-difference models of the form

1{Rik0 t0 < Rikt } = βR (λ̂wk0 − λ̂wk ) + ξt + ξt0 + εiktk0 t0

(1.4.2)

1{wik0 t0 < wikt } = βw (λ̂Rk0 − λ̂Rk ) + ξt + ξt0 + εiktk0 t0 .

(1.4.3)

The first coefficient of interest, βR , captures the difference in the probability of
a worker experiencing a job satisfaction decline from working for a firm offering
one percent greater wages. Panel a of Figure 1.3 depicts this relation within bins
w
according to λ̂w
k0 − λ̂k , and reveals a clear negative effect. As workers move to lower-

paying firms, outside the tails of the distribution, the probability of experiencing a
25

job satisfaction decline rises steadily.16
Figure 1.3: Growth in Job Satisfaction and Wages by the Change in Firm Premia

(a) P(rating decline)

(b) P(wage decline)

Notes: This figure depicts the probability of a worker experiencing a decline in overall rating (panel
a) and the probability of a worker experiencing a (real) wage decline (panel b) when transitioning
between firms that differ in their wage and ratings premia, respectively (x-axis). Observations are
partitioned into twenty-five bins according to the measure on the x-axis.

The second coefficient of interest, βw , captures the difference in the probability
of a worker experiencing a real wage decline working for a firm that offers one star
greater job satisfaction. Panel b of Figure 1.3 depicts this relationship within bins
R
according to λ̂R
k0 − λ̂k , and reveals a clear negative effect, i.e., pay cuts are increas-

ingly more likely to occur when workers transition to lower-satisfaction firms. A
worker accepting a wage decline is not an infrequent occurrence in the U.S. labor
market, with estimates in the range of 23–43 percen of job transitions (Jolivet et al.,
2006; Tjaden and Wellschmied, 2014; Sorkin, 2018). In Glassdoor wage data, 29
percent of job transitions are characterized by a real wage cut. Because workers are
willing to accept lower wages at their new firms, the literature typically rational16
Using a survey of German workers, Jäger et al. (2021) find a similar pattern: individuals
report higher levels of job satisfaction with work when moving to higher-paying firms.

26

izes these observed flows by arguing that there must be a compensating differential
through improved non-wage amenity value that these workers are receiving (Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009; Sorkin, 2018; Taber and Vejlin, 2020). However, if this
were the case, we would expect wage declines to be more frequent when moving to
higher-satisfaction firms, not lower-satisfaction ones. In documenting the opposite,
I find scant evidence in the data supporting the assumption that pay cuts are offset by improvements in job amenities. This evidence points to either higher wages
driving the improvement in satisfaction — a possibility I rule out and bound in
Section 1.5.4 — or better quality amenities fueling the increase.
One limitation of studying how the likelihood of a job satisfaction decline relates
to firms’ wage premia within this sample is that why the workers transition jobs is
unobservable. If workers in this panel only transition to lower-paying firms when
they are fired or laid off, then the negative slopes observed in Figure 1.3 may not
apply more broadly. In other words, voluntary job transitions may experience the
inverse pattern if they are under-represented in the data. To address this concern,
I confirm that this negative relation, i.e. a greater likelihood of a job satisfaction
decline among lower-paying employers, is observed robustly across different types of
job transitions that likely span both voluntary and involuntary moves (Table A.14).
These transitions include workers who exited short or long spells, workers who kept
the same job title or transitioned to a managerial role, and workers who changed
their employment status to full-time or part-time when switching firms.
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Suggestive evidence that the non-wage amenities workers enjoy improve when
moving to higher-paying firms can be seen in studying how workers’ satisfaction
changes for different sub-categories. Replacing the the left-hand side of equation
1.4.2 with the first difference in ratings for career opportunities, culture and values,
senior management, compensation and benefits, and work-life balance reveals that
seemingly every aspect of the job improves (Table A.15). Perhaps not surprisingly,
satisfaction with compensation and benefits rises the most, 0.15 standard deviations
per one-standard-deviation increase in firm wage premia. But satisfaction even with
non-pecuniary dimensions, such as career opportunities, culture and values, senior
management, and work-life balance, improve as well, each rising on average 0.04–
0.07 standard deviations per one-standard-deviation increase in wage premia.

1.4.4

Are High-Paying Firms High-Satisfaction Firms?

Given that workers experience fewer wage declines moving to higher-satisfaction
firms and fewer satisfaction declines moving to higher-paying firms, naturally it
follow to what extent then is attributable to the firm? Since I observe the wage
R
premium λ̂w
k and satisfaction premium λ̂k for the same employer k, I can directly
w
relate the two, λ̂R
k = ρλ̂k + υk . The coefficient ρ then captures the extent to

which greater wages translate into more satisfaction across firms. This relation
is summarized in Figure 1.4, where a strikingly positive correlation is observed.
Formally estimating this model reveals a coefficient of ρ = 0.468 (standard error
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= 0.017) for the Full set of firms.17 Given standard deviations of 0.22 and 1.03 in
the wage and rating premia, respectively, a one standard deviation increase in firmlevel wages is associated with 0.10 standard deviations greater job satisfaction. For
the Connected set of firms, the estimate is even larger at 0.19 standard deviations.18
Figure 1.4: Relation between Firms’ Pay and Job Satisfaction Premia

Notes: This figure depicts the firm fixed effects for wages λ̂w
k (x-axis) against the firm fixed effect
for job satisfaction λ̂R
(y-axis).
The
set
of
firms
included
reflects
the Full sample. Observations
k
are partitioned into twenty-five bins according to the measure on the x-axis.

While greater wages corresponded to more job satisfaction across the 70,000
firms in the Full set, there may be heterogeneity between different types of firms.
One particularly salient firm characteristic I observe is the industry in which the firm
operates, of which there are seventeen NAICS categories. It is well-established that
there are differences in pay between industries (Wachtel and Betsey, 1972; Krueger
and Summers, 1988) and one posited theory for rationalizing these differences is
17

Table A.16 presents the results with and without industry fixed effects for the Full and Connected samples.
18
For the relation between wages and amenities across firms within each industry, see the discussion in Appendix A.4, which highlights broadly positive intra-industry correlations except within
the Educational Services industry where there is a clear negative slope driven entirely by schools
and colleges.
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that workers in higher-paying industries are compensated for worse working conditions (Holzer et al., 1991; Sorkin, 2018). If it were the case that inter-industry wage
differences equalized inter-industry amenity differences, then we would anticipate
an inverse relation across industries between the wage and satisfaction premia firms
offer. Figure 1.5 plots for each industry ι, the average wage premium in the industry
λ̂w
ι =

1
λ̂w
Nk∈ι k

against the average satisfaction premium λ̂R
ι =

1
λ̂R .
Nk∈ι k

If such com-

pensating differentials are evident, then low-paying industries would offer greater
levels of job satisfaction, and vice-versa; however, the opposite is apparent. Relatively high-paying industries such as Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
and Finance and Insurance also provide more satisfaction than low-paying industries such as Accommodation and Food Services and Retail. Across industries,
the weighted correlation between the wage and overall ratings premia is 0.47 (pvalue=0.055). One industry where there may be strong compensating differentials
is Educational Services, which offers relatively low wages but comparatively high
levels of job satisfaction. Excluding Educational Services, the weighted correlation
is 0.66 (p-value=0.005). Therefore, consistent with Krueger and Summers (1988),
inter-industry wage differentials do not reflect compensation for disagreeable work
characteristics.
Within the AKM framework, the effect from the firm by assumption is constant
over time. However, firm fundamentals or outlooks may shift over time and spillover
into changes in worker compensation. In the spirit of Lachowska et al. (2020), I

30

Figure 1.5: Heterogeneity in Wage-Rating Premia Across Industries

Notes: This figure plots the average wage premium against the average firm rating premium for
each industry. Industries reflect two-digit NAICS and are weighted by firm count in the Full set.

re-estimate a time-varying version of equation 1.4.1 where the firm fixed effects are
allowed to drift over time, λkt . For the same firm, I relate the growth in relative
wage premium offered over time to the growth in relative job satisfaction provided
w
over time by estimating λ̂R
kt = ρλ̂kt + ξk + ξt + υkt . Controlling for firm and year

accounts for inherent differences across firms (e.g., industry, size, and location) and
trends over time that may reflect sample composition or the business cycle. The
results including and excluding ξk (presented in Table A.17) reveal that ρ remains
significantly positive even when looking within firms over time, further suggesting
that wage growth corresponds to job satisfaction growth, consistent with widening
wage inequality exacerbating satisfaction inequality (Hamermesh, 2001).
One potential explanation for observing improved satisfaction at higher-paying
firms that would be orthogonal to the quality of non-wage attributes is a warm glow
effect, whereby the stature of being employed with a higher-paying firm elevates
one’s satisfaction with their job. This could reflect, for instance, a heightened sense
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of accomplishment from achieving employment with a high-paying firm, especially
if such a feat is considered difficult or rare. One way to proxy for this warm glow
effect would be to capture disparities in interview practices, such as the level of
difficulty or success rate, across firms. On glassdoor, workers can separately detail
their experiences interviewing with firms, including how challenging they perceived
the interview to be and whether they received an offer.19 Estimating an AKM
model for each of these two interview metrics and relating the resultant firm fixed
effects to those for log wages and job satisfaction (Table A.18) reveals that a warm
glow is not driving this positive relation. While higher-paying firms carry out more
difficult interviews and are more selective in extending offers (Column 1), accounting
for differences in the interview process across firms attenuates the slope between
firms’ wage and ratings premia by about 10 percent — suggesting warm glow effects
play a limited role.

1.5

Introducing Job Amenities

How does one capture the ‘many margins’ of job amenities? Doing so would involve
not only gauging the quality and/or availability of each attribute, but determining
an exhaustive set to measure. Labor market surveys have attempted to gauge the
19
Each observation in the Glassdoor interviews data is an employee-employer match that includes an assessment for the interview’s difficulty level on a one-to-five ordinal scale (corresponding
in increasing order to very easy, easy, average, difficult, and very difficult, respectively) and an
indicator for whether the worker received a job offer. There are roughly 180,000 observations covering 14,000 employers for the panel of workers with multiple interviews. For further discussion
of the data, see Sockin and Zhao (2020).
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non-wage characteristics of work to varying degrees.20 However, unlike Glassdoor,
the nature of each of these surveys precludes any firm-level analysis.

1.5.1

Semi-Supervised Topic Modeling

While workers provide ratings along five broad sub-dimensions, such as career opportunities and senior leadership (see Figure 1.2) when submitting an employer
review, these sub-dimensions reflect how workers perceive an amalgamation of different work aspects. To isolate specific job amenities, I make use of the free-text
responses that workers submit for the ‘Pros’ and ‘Cons’ sections of their reviews.
This has the advantage of, unlike other surveys where it is explicit what attributes
are being captured, allowing workers to tell us (the researchers) what amenities
matter to them. Advantageously, because workers partition their sentiment into the
positive (‘pros’) and negative (‘cons’) features, I can measure an amenity’s quality
based on whether it is discussed in the former or the latter. While workers do not
mention every amenity, I interpret the worker choosing to mention an amenity as
signaling that the quality is especially above or below average or expectation.
There are fifty amenities in total, spanning six main categories. Some are obvious, others motivated by the literature, and the rest identified after implementing
20

In the ASEC, respondents are asked whether they receive health insurance or a pension from
their employers — measures analyzed by Simon and Kaestner (2004) and Clemens et al. (2018) —
as well as usual hours of work per week on the job. In the NLSY97, respondents are asked about
work schedules, available fringe benefits, and in the most recent wave of the survey, required job
tasks. More recently, the American Working Conditions Survey (AWCS), administered by RAND
and studied in Maestas et al. (2018), captures differences along a range of workplace conditions
(see Appendix A.3).
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unsupervised topic modeling to learn what latent attributes naturally arise. The
first category is traditional pay or base earnings (pay and pay growth). The second
is other forms of pecuniary compensation, including variable earnings21 (bonuses
and commissions) and fringe benefits22 (paid time off, health insurance, retirement
contributions, employee discounts and free food). The third and most extensive is
working conditions, which includes work-life balance, hours, work schedule, short
breaks, office space, commuting, teleworking, location, autonomy/responsibility, respect/abuse, communication, support, difficulty, requirements, stress, pace, safety,
recognition, morale, fun, culture, diversity/inclusion, leadership, office politics,
change, and job security.23 Fourth is human capital, which includes career concerns,
promotions, experience, skill development, on-the-job training, mentoring, recruiting, contracting, and industry.24 The fifth is interpersonal relationships, comprised
21

Wiswall and Zafar (2017) estimate workers’ willingness to pay for bonus compensation; Sockin
and Sockin (2019b) relate jobseeker activity to the competitiveness of a role, where competitiveness
is proxied for by the share of variable pay attributable to commissions.
22
Maestas et al. (2018) examine paid time off and Simon and Kaestner (2004) evaluate health
insurance and retirement plans. Employee discounts and free food were included in surveys of
workers by Glassdoor (2015), and Fractl (2020) shows that 15–30 percent of workers surveyed
would consider accepting these fringe benefits over higher pay. I attempted to include an amenity
for tuition assistance, which received a similar valuation in these surveys, but could not recover
an interpretable topic.
23
Maestas et al. (2018) consider work schedule, teleworking, stress, pace, and autonomy/responsibility; Le Barbanchon et al. (2020) commuting; Hersch (2011) sexual harassment
(respect/abuse); Bradler et al. (2016) recognition; Wiswall and Zafar (2017) hours; Wasmer and
Zenou (2002) location; Autor and Handel (2013) job tasks (requirements), Gadgil and Sockin
(2020) culture and leadership; Gronberg and Reed (1994) fun; Quinn (1974) the challenge of the
job (difficulty), help (support), and physical surroundings (office space); and Park et al. (2021)
workplace safety. Pollak (2019) finds workers value workplace diversity/inclusion; Carpenter et al.
(2010) find office politics can hamper labor productivity; Breza et al. (2017) relate morale to the
opacity of coworker productivity; and Hamermesh (1990) examines the marginal return to short
breaks.
24
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) examine on-the-job training; Tambe et al. (2020) skill development among information technology workers; Johnston and Lee (2013) promotions; Gibbons
and Murphy (1992) career concerns; Starr et al. (2021) non-compete and Sockin et al. (2021)
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of managers, coworkers, teams, and customers.25 And the sixth is a residual category comprised of two un-anchored topics meant to freely capture the rest of the
review text.
To extract amenities from review text, I borrow a topic-modeling machine learning algorithm from the computer science literature. I implement the Anchored Correlation Explanation (CorEx) model of Gallagher et al. (2017) — a semi-supervised
approach that allows the researcher to specify topic-specific “anchor words” that
guide topics to convergence.26 The model is semi-supervised in that the researcher
identifies part of the topic (the ‘anchor words’) while the machine fills in the rest of
the topic according to the objective. A semi-supervised approach is used to ensure
the topics can be interpreted as specific amenities.27 The Anchored CorEx model
is particularly well-suited for this task since compared with other topic modeling
methods, it has been found to more readily produce coherent topics that are less
overtly discussed and may not naturally emerge (Gallagher et al., 2017).
I first calibrate the CorEx model using the full review text (stacked pros and
cons) for a sample of three-million reviews. Applying the model to a segment of
non-disclosure agreements (contracts); Dustmann and Meghir (2005) experience; Quinn (1974)
job security; Athey et al. (2000) model the interaction of mentoring and diversity; and Faberman
and Menzio (2018) relate recruiting intensity to starting wages.
25
Maestas et al. (2018) consider teamwork; Stinebrickner et al. (2019) the beauty wage premium
in jobs that rely upon interpersonal interaction (customers); and Quinn (1974) coworkers and
supervisors (managers).
26
For details on how the CorEx model successfully identifies latent topics, see Steeg and Galstyan
(2014) who first introduced the algorithm. When implementing the model in Python, I search for
fifty topics with seed set at two and anchor strength set at nine.
27
An alternative topic-modeling algorithm that is more common — the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model — was considered and even implemented using a semi-supervised, anchored
approach; however, the topics that were produced with LDA were more amorphous and less interpretable than those produced with CorEx, even under the same assignment of anchor words.
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text outputs a vector {pa ∈ [0, 1]}a=1...50 of probabilities that amenity a is discussed.
The twenty highest-incidence (or most-weighted in the case of anchors) words for
each attribute are presented in Tables A.6–A.10. For each of the 8.5 million reviews
r, I separately score the pros and cons sections to obtain the vectors {ppro
r,a } and
{pcon
r,a }. Taking the weighted difference between the two — where the weight (ωr )
is the share of review text in the pros section — I gauge the quality of amenity
con
a from review r according to qra = ωr ppro
r,a − (1 − ωr )pr,a ∈ [−1, 1]. If the amenity

is not mentioned in the review, its quality will be neutral qra = 0. The frequency
with which each amenity is discussed within the panel of reviews is presented in
Figure A.6. Amenities that are frequently discussed pertain to characteristics that
are important predictors for overall job satisfaction but would be difficult to discern
about the firm ex ante such as respect/abuse (26 percent), coworkers (18 percent)
and leadership (17 percent). Importantly, it is not uncommon for workers to highlight satisfaction with pay (15 percent) or pay growth (3 percent), implying that one
could capture the pass-through of pay satisfaction to overall satisfaction through
these text-based amenities, as in Section 1.5.4.

1.5.2

Internal and External Validity of Amenities

Crucially, using the output from this topic modeling approach rests on the interpretability of the topics, i.e., the label assigned to each amenity is accurate. For
reassurance, I first show that within Glassdoor reviews, the amenities are consis-
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tent with other measures of sentiment that respondents provide. Recall each worker
evaluates their employer on a one-to-five stars scale along five sub-categories: career opportunities, compensation and benefits, culture and values, senior leadership,
and work-life balance. Amenities that relate more to a given sub-category should
play an outsize role in predicting an employee’s satisfaction along that dimension.
Within the panel of workers’ reviews, I can relate the change in satisfaction within
each of these sub-categories to the change in quality of each job amenity according
to
Yikt =

50
X

a
βa qikt
+ λi + λk + λt + εikt ,

(1.5.1)

a=1

where Yikt is the star rating and λi , λk , and λt represent worker, firm and year
fixed effects, respectively. The coefficients βa capture the degree to which amenity
a predicts satisfaction conditional on the quality of the rest of the amenity bundle.
While job satisfaction is positively correlated with every amenity individually (Table
1.3: Column 7), the estimates from equation 1.5.1 isolate the relative contribution
of each amenity. The coefficients on overall rating and the five sub-categories are
presented in the first six columns of Table 1.3. More-positive values of βa signify
more import, while more-negative signify less.
The first column reveals which amenities workers value the most when determining overall satisfaction. A few takeaways are worth highlighting. First, the most
desirable amenities are those which are hard to observe from outside the firm. In
other words, job satisfaction appears driven by attributes that are learned through
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experience, such as employee respect/abuse, leadership and management, work-life
balance, culture, and morale. Second, aspects related to compensation and benefits
are considerably less influential in determining employer quality. While improved
pay and pay growth, health insurance, retirement contributions, and bonuses have
a significant effect on workers’ overall satisfaction, they are second-order compared
with the harder-to-observe intangibles such as culture and leadership. Third, workers appreciably value when employers make strides in issues related to social issues,
as evidence by the strongly positive coefficient on diversity/inclusion — perhaps
reflecting why employers are increasingly making investments on environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) issues.28
Last, workers seem to prefer work arrangements that are increasingly difficult or
involve heightened responsibility through more requirements — possibly reflecting
the importance workers place on developing their human capital.
Comparing the coefficients for overall rating with those for each of the subcategories provides reassuring evidence that these amenities in fact reflect their
labels. We see that the promotions amenity is more important for career opportunities than overall rating (0.23 vs. 0.04), as is the amenity for career concerns (0.25
vs. 0.14) and pay growth (0.17 vs. 0.09) — though not the amenity for pay, lending
28

The three largest institutional investors in 2017 successfully campaigned to increase female
representation on corporate boards (Gormley et al., 2021) and 53 percent of S&P 500 companies
now employ a chief diversity officer (Green, 2021). Moreover, in a 2019 survey of institutional
investors and asset managers querying why they incorporate ESG in investment decisions, 47
percent cited brand image and reputation while 27 percent cited attracting new talent (Boffo and
Patalano, 2020).
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Table 1.3: Relative Importance and Validation of Amenities
Bundled
Comp.
and
Overall Career
Attribute
rating
opp. benefits
Respect/abuse
0.61†
0.43†
0.25†
Residual I
0.44†
0.44†
0.25†
Leadership
0.42†
0.34†
0.19†
Residual II
0.38†
0.29†
0.24†
Work-life balance
0.38†
0.22†
0.16†
Culture
0.33†
0.25†
0.13†
Managers
0.29†
0.22†
0.15†
Morale
0.27†
0.19†
0.13†
†
†
Diversity/inclusion
0.21
0.20
0.11†
Support
0.21†
0.18†
0.12†
†
†
Mentoring
0.20
0.20
0.14†
Job security
0.19†
0.21†
0.04†
†
†
Fun
0.17
0.14
0.09†
Office politics
0.17†
0.12†
-0.02
Teams
0.16†
0.14†
0.07†
On-the-job training
0.16†
0.11†
0.07†
Coworkers
0.15†
0.11†
0.07†
Career concerns
0.14†
0.25†
0.10†
Pay
0.14†
0.12†
0.38†
Commissions
0.12†
0.11†
0.17†
Industry
0.12†
0.12†
0.07†
†
†
Safety
0.11
0.06
0.05†
Health insurance
0.10†
0.08†
0.25†
†
†
Autonomy/responsibility
0.10
0.08
0.05†
Pay growth
0.09†
0.17†
0.33†
Recognition
0.09†
0.11†
0.09†
Bonuses
0.08†
0.09†
0.19†
Retirement contributions
0.08†
0.05†
0.21†
Customers
0.07†
0.06†
0.03†
Work schedule
0.07†
0.01
-0.02
Stress
0.07†
-0.04†
-0.05†
Recruiting
0.06†
0.09†
0.04†
Skill development
0.06†
0.09†
0.00
Pace
0.05†
0.03
0.03
Contracting
0.05†
0.07†
0.11†
Promotions
0.04†
0.23†
0.05†
Employee discounts
0.03
0.03
0.14†
Teleworking
0.03
-0.01
0.02
Paid time off
0.03†
0.01
0.12†
Experience
0.03†
0.04†
0.00
Communication
0.02
-0.03†
-0.06†
Hours
0.00
0.02
0.09†
Short breaks
-0.01
-0.04†
-0.01
Office space
-0.02†
-0.01
0.00
Free food
-0.02
-0.02
0.04†
Commuting
-0.06†
-0.08†
-0.06†
Change
-0.07†
-0.06†
-0.07†
†
†
Location
-0.09
-0.07
-0.04†
Requirements
-0.11†
-0.14†
-0.08†
†
†
Difficulty
-0.19
-0.16
-0.15†

Culture
Work
and
life
Senior
values mgmt. balance
0.68†
0.51†
0.47†
0.42†
0.50†
0.26†
0.41†
0.54†
0.29†
0.31†
0.31†
0.28†
0.36†
0.36†
1.14†
0.48†
0.32†
0.24†
0.27†
0.33†
0.20†
0.34†
0.28†
0.20†
†
†
0.32
0.21
0.11†
0.21†
0.22†
0.17†
†
†
0.16
0.19
0.10†
0.19†
0.23†
0.03
0.18†
0.13†
0.10†
0.21†
0.26†
0.04
0.16†
0.17†
0.12†
0.14†
0.13†
0.09†
0.17†
0.13†
0.12†
0.11†
0.15†
0.06†
0.07†
0.09†
0.07†
0.08†
0.10†
0.06†
0.08†
0.12†
0.03†
†
†
0.15
0.09
0.11†
0.07†
0.08†
0.00
0.07†
0.10†
0.07†
0.04†
0.09†
-0.06†
0.08†
0.09†
0.04†
0.06†
0.06†
0.02
0.05†
0.03
-0.03
0.08†
0.06†
0.06†
0.04†
0.05†
0.32†
0.07†
0.05†
0.32†
0.03†
0.03†
0.00
0.01
0.02
-0.04
0.01
0.03
-0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.09†
-0.04†
0.05†
0.02
0.01
0.05†
0.04
0.17†
0.02
-0.01
0.13†
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.03†
0.04†
0.00
-0.02
-0.04†
0.02
-0.02
-0.04†
0.05†
0.01
-0.02
0.00
0.01
-0.01
0.01
-0.05†
-0.07†
-0.04†
-0.06†
-0.02
-0.07†
†
†
-0.10
-0.09
-0.06†
-0.12†
-0.14†
0.02
-0.21†
-0.21†
-0.14†

Separate
Overall
rating
1.53†
1.32†
0.96†
1.30†
0.83†
0.92†
0.97†
0.84†
0.87†
0.87†
0.74†
0.79†
0.67†
0.62†
0.87†
0.73†
0.81†
0.75†
0.69†
0.76†
0.73†
0.78†
0.62†
0.73†
0.62†
0.75†
0.73†
0.62†
0.71†
0.57†
0.68†
0.77†
0.72†
0.44†
0.72†
0.72†
0.50†
0.61†
0.72†
0.74†
0.75†
0.55†
0.70†
0.69†
0.61†
0.52†
0.55†
0.38†
0.53†
0.28†

Notes: This table displays the coefficients from regressing the amenities on the stars-based rating
listed in the header of each column with worker, firm, and year fixed effects. Amenities listed in
ascending order according to the coefficient for overall rating bundled. † indicates significance at
the one percent level.
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credence to the pay growth amenity capturing a separate and unique characteristic.
For compensation and benefits, the coefficient on the pay amenity is more salient
(0.38 vs. 0.14), as is that of pay growth (0.33 vs. 0.09), health insurance (0.25 vs.
0.10), retirement contributions (0.21 vs. 0.08), bonuses (0.19 vs. 0.08), employee
discounts (0.14 vs. 0.03), paid time off (0.12 vs. 0.03), hours (0.09 vs. 0.00), and
free food (0.04 vs. –0.02). For culture and values, encouragingly culture plays a
more important role (0.48 vs. 0.33), as does diversity/inclusion (0.32 vs. 0.21). For
senior leadership, the estimates are highly similar to those obtained from predicting
overall rating — signifying the importance of management for overall satisfaction —
though the coefficient on office politics is greater (0.26 vs. 0.17). And for work-life
balance, we observe that the work-life balance amenity is by far the largest driver
(1.14 vs. 0.38), but other amenities play an outsize role as well, including stress
(0.32 vs. 0.07), work schedule (0.32 vs. 0.07), teleworking (0.17 vs. 0.03), paid time
off (0.13 vs. 0.03), short breaks (0.05 vs. –0.01), and requirements (0.02 vs. –0.11).
In all, the amenities appear internally consistent within Glassdoor data.
Importantly, these job amenities capture meaningful variation in other labor
market data. Appendix A.2 shows how seven of the amenities — diversity/inclusion,
health insurance, hours, job security, paid time off, retirement contributions, and
work-life balance — trace relevant patterns observed across industries and occupations in ASEC. Appendix A.3 highlights how ten amenities mostly pertaining to
working conditions — autonomy/responsibility, communication, on-the-job train-
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ing, pay, recognition, safety, short breaks, support, work schedule, and work-life
balance — align with the AWCS across industries and occupations. Given that
both of these surveys are representative, I take this as evidence that inferences
using these Glassdoor amenities are valid for the U.S. labor market more broadly.

1.5.3

Relation between Wages and Amenities

I next turn to how wages relate to individual amenities across firms. As with overall
ratings, I estimate firm-specific premia for each amenity a by re-estimating equation
a
1.4.1 but substituting qikt
, the quality of attribute a reported by worker i at firm k in

year t, on the left-hand side. Then, relating the firm premia for each amenity λ̂ak to
a
a w
the corresponding firm’s wage premium λ̂w
k — formally estimating λ̂k = ρ λ̂k + υk

— captures the degree to which the quality of amenity a varies with the firm’s
offered wage premium. I convert the amenity-related fixed effects to standardized
normal for ease of exposition, and record the estimated coefficients for the Full set
of firms in Table 1.4.29
I emphasize three key takeaways. First, the pay and pay growth amenities
elicit particularly positive relations with the wage premia, highlighting that workers not only recognize the receipt of greater wages, but that increased satisfaction
with pay contributes to the improved perception of overall satisfaction. Second,
29

The results change little when amenity quality is calculated without weighting by the share
of the review text in each section (Table A.19). Broadly, the coefficients fall slightly, with the
negative coefficient for difficulty becoming statistically significant — though it is worth noting
that, conditional on the rest of the amenity bundle, the loading for difficulty on overall satisfaction
is appreciably negative.
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nearly all amenities are improved at higher-paying firms. In particular, the full set
of fringe benefits (free food, paid time off, health insurance, retirement contributions, and employee discounts) along with amenities related to flexible labor supply (short breaks and teleworking), working conditions (respect/abuse, leadership,
safety, autonomy/responsibility, support, office space, recognition), interpersonal
relationships (managers, coworkers, customers, and teams), and human capital development (career concerns, promotions, and experience) exhibit improved quality
at higher-paying firms.30 Third, there are few dis-amenities that come with working for higher-paying firms. The standout trade-off workers face is worsened job
security, as a one-standard-deviation greater wage premium is associated with a
0.02-standard-deviations reduction in job security.

1.5.4

Decoupling Pay Satisfaction from Job Satisfaction

One concern with using job satisfaction to argue that non-wage amenities are better
at higher-paying firms is that the increase in job satisfaction may simply reflect
improved pay satisfaction. If workers are more content with their pay, then naturally
they will be more content with their jobs overall. However, with two amenities
related to pay satisfaction (pay and pay growth), I can decompose the boon to job
satisfaction enjoyed at higher-paying firms into the fraction that is attributable to
30

One drawback is that amenity quality is assigned based on workers’ satisfaction with each
amenity, but fringe benefits are inherently pecuniary in nature, e.g., the number of paid leave
days or an employer’s contribution to a retirement account. Improved satisfaction with fringe
benefits may not necessarily translate into increased spending by the firm though in practice, the
two are likely to be highly correlated.
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Table 1.4: Relation between Wages and Attributes Across Firms

Standardized amenity
Pay
Residual I
Residual II
Pay growth
Respect/abuse
Short breaks
Managers
Culture
Industry
Teleworking
Free food
Leadership
Coworkers
Teams
Commissions
Safety
Health insurance
Office politics
Support
Career concerns
Autonomy/responsibility
Office space
Paid time off
Employee discounts
Customers

Overall Slope with
Overall Slope with
rating standardized
rating standardized
weight
wage FE
Standardized amenity
weight
wage FE
0.14
0.070*** Commuting
-0.06
0.012***
0.44
0.050*** Retirement contributions
0.08
0.012***
0.21
0.011**
0.38
0.037*** Diversity/inclusion
0.09
0.035*** Promotions
0.04
0.011***
0.61
0.034*** Location
-0.09
0.011***
-0.01
0.033*** Recognition
0.09
0.011***
-0.11
0.010**
0.29
0.033*** Requirements
0.03
0.009**
0.33
0.029*** Experience
0.12
0.029*** Work-life balance
0.38
0.006*
0.07
0.005
0.03
0.028*** Work schedule
-0.02
0.026*** Mentoring
0.20
0.005
0.42
0.025*** Contracting
0.05
0.004
0.15
0.025*** Fun
0.17
0.004
0.16
0.024*** Recruiting
0.06
0.004
0.00
0.002
0.12
0.020*** Hours
0.11
0.020*** Pace
0.05
0.002
0.10
0.020*** Bonuses
0.08
0.002
0.02
0.002
0.17
0.018*** Communication
0.21
0.018*** On-the-job training
0.16
0.001
0.27
0.001
0.14
0.017*** Morale
-0.07
-0.003
0.10
0.017*** Change
-0.02
0.017*** Stress
0.07
-0.005
0.03
0.016*** Skill development
0.06
-0.005
-0.19
-0.006
0.03
0.014*** Difficulty
0.07
0.013*** Job security
0.19
-0.019***

Notes: This table reflects coefficients from a linear regression of the firm fixed effects for each
amenity on the firm fixed effects for wages. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Overall rating
weights reflect the first column of Table 1.3. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

pay satisfaction and the fraction that is not. This decomposition is feasible since
each amenity contributes to overall job satisfaction with some weight ψ a (Table
1.4: overall rating weight) and each amenity relates to firms’ wages with some slope
ρa (Table 1.4: slope with wage FE). For each of the six broad amenity categories
(pay, compensation excluding pay, working conditions, human capital, relationships,
and residual — the mappings for which are detailed in Tables A.6–A.10 — the
contribution from group g to the cumulative effect on overall satisfaction can be

43

approximated according to

P
a a
a∈g ψ ρ
P
contributiong =
.
a a
aψ ρ

(1.5.2)

If the positive correlation observed between wages and job satisfaction across
firms is driven primarily by workers reporting greater satisfaction with pay, then
the contribution from the pay amenity group g = {pay, pay growth} will near 100
percent; however, if the uptick in job satisfaction observed at higher-paying firms
is attributable to non-wage aspects improving, then the contribution from the pay
amenity group will be closer to 0 percent. The contributions using the Full and
Connected sets are presented in Table 1.5.
Using the Full sample, it is clear that pay satisfaction is not driving the increased
job satisfaction. The pay-based amenities are responsible for only 8 percent of the
increase in overall satisfaction, meaning that 92 percent is attributable to aspects
not related to satisfaction with pay. Both improved working conditions (37 percent)
and better interpersonal relationships (13 percent) account for larger shares than
pay satisfaction. The two residual amenities — which capture general sentiment
towards the firm — also account for 35 percent. That this residual grouping has an
outsize contribution invites the possibility of under-counting the true contribution
from pay satisfaction if these residuals (partially) reflect pay. However, examining
the highest incidence words for each of the two residual amenities (Table A.10) reveals no discernible semblance to pay, mitigating this concern. Evidently, non-wage
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amenities explain a predominant share (89–92 percent) of the improved satisfaction
workers report at higher-paying firms. Further, the non-wage attributes fueling the
increase in job satisfaction reflect hard-to-observe non-pecuniary qualities, such as
working conditions and interpersonal relationships, rather than pecuniary ones —
consistent with the results, presented in Appendix A.5, from analyzing workers’
ratings of fringe benefits directly.
Table 1.5: Contribution by Amenity Type to Increased Satisfaction at HigherPaying Firms
Amenity category
Pay
Fringe benefits
Working conditions
Human capital
Relationships
Residual

Full

Connected

8.2%
2.0%
36.7%
4.9%
13.1%
35.1%

11.1%
1.9%
28.8%
4.9%
9.7%
43.6%

Notes: This table reports the percent of the total slope between job satisfaction and wage premia
across firms attributable to each of the six amenity categories for the Full and Connected sets.

Further evidence of the limited role pay satisfaction has in driving overall satisfaction can be observed in relating the change in workers’ five subcategory ratings
to the change in their overall ratings. As workers become more satisfied with these
sub-dimensions, overall satisfaction should rise; and the rates at which these subratings pass through to overall ratings summarizes the relative importance of each
dimension. A one-star increase across all five categories raises overall rating by
about one star (Table A.20), yet the rate of pass through for compensation and
benefits is only .107 — indicating that only about 10 percent of overall satisfaction
relates to compensation. This estimate accords with the text-based estimates of
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Table 1.5.

1.6

Workers’ Willingness to Pay for Job Satisfaction

The extent to which disparities in non-wage amenities contribute to welfare depends
on how much value workers place on them. If workers are indifferent to the (dis)amenities of work, then the dispersion in amenity offerings between firms matters
little for welfare — though empirical evidence strongly rejects this notion (Wiswall
and Zafar, 2017; Maestas et al., 2018). Estimating a dollar value workers place
on improved job satisfaction (or amenities) would allow the construction of a total
measure of compensation that includes amenity value.
Researchers have utilized different methodologies for calculating workers’ willingness to pay for job attributes. The most common historically has been a hedonic
approach, in which characteristics are considered implicitly priced into the accepted
wage. A (usually unfavorable) non-wage attribute is added as an explanatory variable for predicting wages, and the coefficient captures the additional wage needed
to undertake the burden of the dis-amenity (Thaler and Rosen, 1976; Herzog and
Schlottmann, 1990; Hwang et al., 1992; Lavetti and Schmutte, 2018).A more recent contingent valuation approach presents workers with a menu of hypothetical
alternatives and from their choices, willingness to pay can be inferred (Mas and
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Pallais, 2017; Wiswall and Zafar, 2017; Maestas et al., 2018). Additionally, there is
a revealed preference approach that estimates willingness to pay based on workers’
employment decisions, e.g., the length of job spells (Gronberg and Reed, 1994), the
length of non-employment spells after childbirth (Felfe, 2012), or the timing of labor
supply provision in a flexible work arrangement (Chen et al., 2019).
To estimate how much workers would be willing to pay to work with improved
job satisfaction, in the spirit of Gronberg and Reed (1994), I examine the length
of workers’ job spells. If worker utility is increasing in both wages and non-wage
attributes, i.e., the two are normal goods, then the decision to exit the match will
factor in both wage and non-wage aspects of alternative offers.31 Workers would
then stay at their firms longer if they receive greater wages, improved amenities,
or both. To this end, I estimate an ordered probit model using workers’ completed
job spells predicing a worker’s tenure with the firm as a function of both their wage
and job satisfaction.32 Because firm tenure is recorded in discrete intervals (less
than 1, 1–2, 3–4, 5–7, 8–10, and more than 10 years), an ordered probit approach
preserves the ordinal scale while accounting for the non-linearity in time elapsed
across intervals.33
Let tenureijkt be the number of years worker i with job title j spent employed at
31

Identifying whether a worker exits because of a forced separation or voluntary quit is infeasible.
Only whether the worker is a current or former employee when providing her review is known.
32
For now, I exclude workers who are still employed with the firm since their job spells are
ongoing. Gronberg and Reed (1994) incorporate both complete and incomplete job spells using
a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) procedure in which a survival function is applied to
ongoing spells. Applying a similar MLE procedure in this context is ongoing.
33
Excluded are the roughly 30 percent of workers who do not report their tenure at the firm.
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firm k as of year t. Since workers do not provide wages when filling out an employer
review, to impute a wage for each worker, I make use of each worker’s job title.34
I calculate the median log wage among the set of workers with job title j at firm
k in year t from the wages dataset, w̄jkt .35 Using each worker i’s individual job
satisfaction rating with firm k in year t, Rikt , I estimate

tenureijkt = βw w̄jkt + βR Rikt + λι(k) + λt + εijkt ,

(1.6.1)

where ι(k) corresponds to firm k’s industry.36 Here, βR captures the effect that a
one-star increase in a worker’s overall job satisfaction has on the probability she
spends more years employed with the firm. If βR > 0, then this would confirm that
workers value non-wage aspects of work when making employment and mobility
decisions. Otherwise, this would suggest that conditional on their wage, workers
do not factor the quality of job amenities into their separation decisions. Because
34

Job titles have been found to carry meaningful weight in the determination of wages. Marinescu and Wolthoff (2020) find that job titles can explain upwards of 90 percent of the variance
in (the midpoints of) posted wages on an online job board, while Sockin and Sockin (2019a) find
that 90 percent of base earnings are explained by the average among peers (same job title and
firm in the same year).
35
One alternative would be to use reported earnings from a worker’s wage report in lieu of an
imputed wage. However, this requires a worker to submit both an employer review and wage report
to be included, more than halving the sample. In this case, a similar, albeit even steeper slope in
MWP at the upper-tail of the wage distribution is observed (Table A.21). Since an individual’s
wage may be reported with measurement error, using the imputed median among peers largely
sidesteps this concern and is thus the preferred specification.
36
The industry of employment is included to account for heterogeneity in workers’ employment
opportunities, as is allowed for in the model of Gronberg and Reed (1994). One could further
account for differences in job opportunities by controlling for one’s occupation; however, occupation, which is obtained from Glassdoor’s mapping of job titles to occupations, is unavailable
for two-thirds of full-time workers’ completed job spells. Nevertheless, adding occupational controls reveals the same overall pattern (Table A.22) though with a more pronounced MWP for the
highest-earners.
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workers may value job amenities differently depending upon their wage (Maestas
et al., 2018), I implement equation 1.6.1 within wage quintiles. The results are
presented in Table 1.6.
Consistent with Akerlof et al. (1988), the first row confirms that greater job
satisfaction translates into longer employment spells (since βR is robustly positive).
This is true for workers of all wage levels, though the effect appears to increase
monotonically with one’s earnings. For workers in the top quintile, the coefficient
on job satisfaction is roughly 80 percent larger than that for workers in the bottom
quintile. The second row reveals, perhaps unsurprisingly, that greater wages also
lead to workers staying longer with their employers. Unlike with job satisfaction,
the effect wages have on tenure is largest for workers in the (lower-)middle of the
wage distribution. A wage increase elongates firm tenure more than 50 percent
more for workers in the third quintile compared with workers in the upper two.
Table 1.6: Willingness-to-Pay for Improved Job Satisfaction by Wage Quintile
1st Wage
Quintile

2nd Wage
Quintile

3rd Wage
Quintile

4th Wage
Quintile

5th Wage
Quintile

Overall rating

0.063∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.071∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.083∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.094∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.114∗∗∗
(0.002)

Log wage

0.680∗∗∗
(0.019)

0.865∗∗∗
(0.034)

0.922∗∗∗
(0.035)

0.588∗∗∗
(0.023)

0.607∗∗∗
(0.010)

151944
.093
23266
2160

150988
.082
32592
2665

140225
.09
43702
3923

147535
.159
61488
9785

147481
.187
109746
20560

Observations
Ratio of coefficients
Mean wage
MWP one additional star

Notes: This table reflects ordered probit models of wages and overall job satisfaction ratings on
firm tenure by the worker’s wage quintile, where the wage reflects the median among workers with
the same job title and firm that year. Sample is restricted to completed job spells for full-time
workers. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Because wages and job satisfaction affect firm tenure, comparing their contributions provides a means by which to convert stars of job satisfaction into dollars.
The marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for a one-star increase in job satisfaction
can be approximated by calculating

βR
βw

× w̄, the estimates of which are presented in

the final row of Table 1.6. For the lower three wage quintiles, because the ratio of
the coefficients is approximately half that of the upper two quintiles, the MWP in
these wage brackets is noticeably less at $2,200–3,900 per star. For the upper two
quintiles, increased coefficient ratios combined with noticeably greater mean wages
produces relatively high MWP estimates of $9,800–$20,600 per star. Evidently the
value of job satisfaction, and thus non-wage amenities, appears to monotonically
rise with wages, and increasingly so along the upper-half of the wage distribution.
Since workers of varying wage levels value job amenities differently, then the
amenity value each firm offers its workforce will differ as well since the average
MWP will differ depending on the composition of the firms’ workforce. Low-paying
firms employ more low-wage workers with low MWP compared with high-paying
firms which employ more high-wage workers with high MWP. To account for this
heterogeneity in MWP, let φlk represent the share of firm k’s workers with wages
in the l quintile. Then, the average MWP for firm k can be approximated by
M W Pk =

P5

l=1

φlk M W P l . For the Full and Connected sets, the distributions of

M W Pk are plotted in Figure 1.6.37 Because high-wage workers are willing to pay
37

The two distributions are highly similar in shape though the Connected sample’s is shifted
slightly to the right, highlighting how the Connected set is comprised of higher-paying firms (which
employ more workers in the upper two wage quintiles and so exhibit greater MWP).
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more for job satisfaction, then firms that increasingly employ high-wage workers
offer greater amenity value. In turn, a firm’s MWP can range from $2,000 to
$20,000 per star.

Figure 1.6: Distribution of Firm-Specific Wage-Based MWP for Job Satisfaction

Notes: This figure plots the distribution for the MWP for an additional star of job satisfaction
across firms, where the MWP for each firm is the weighted average according to the distribution of
the firms’ workers across wage quintiles and the MWP within each quintile from Table 1.6. Solid
blue line reflects the Full sample of firms, the dashed black line the Connected sample. The thick
(thin) dotted vertical lines reflect the mean across firms.

Section 1.5.3 documented a strong positive relation across firms between the
wage premia offered and the job satisfaction experienced by employees. With estimates for the dollar-value workers place on an additional star of job satisfaction and
the share of job satisfaction attributable to non-wage amenities in hand, I quantify
the firm-specific amenity value in dollars firm k offers its workers, Ak , according to

Ak =

(1 − contributionpay ) ×
M W Pk
×
(R̄ + λ̂R
)
. (1.6.2)
| {z }
| {z k }
|
{z
}
firm premia
non-pay-satisfaction share dollar-equivalent
of job satisfaction of job satisfaction
of job satisfaction
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The difference in firms’ wage offerings Wk can be captured by converting the log
wage premia λ̂w
k into dollars through multiplying by the sample average w̄, i.e.

w

Wk = w̄ × eλ̂k .

(1.6.3)

The firm’s total compensation (relative to other firms) is then summarized by Wk +
Ak .

1.7

Firm-Level Dispersion Accounting for Amenities

Just how important are firms for explaining the distribution of worker compensation
(wages plus amenities)? Recent work has emphasized a more limited role for the
firms themselves, documenting instead an increased role for labor market sorting
of high-wage workers into high-paying firms (Card et al., 2013; Song et al., 2019;
Bonhomme et al., 2020). Other work has attributed a sizable fraction of what
differences there are in pay between firms to compensating differentials for lessfavorable workplace attributes (Sorkin, 2018; Morchio and Moser, 2019). However,
because I find instead that higher-paying firms offer workers more amenity value,
wages alone will in fact understate the degree to which firms explain the distribution
of worker compensation.
Ignoring job amenities, the dispersion across firms is captured by the distribution
52

of Wk . Incorporating amenities, the dispersion across firms reflects the distribution
of wages plus amenity value, Wk + Ak . Using both the Full and Connected sets,
three measures of dispersion — the variance, the log difference between the 10th
and 50th percentiles, and the log difference between the 90th and 50th percentiles
— for Wk and Wk + Ak are presented in Table 1.7. Two specifications for Wk + Ak
are considered. The “Fixed MWP” approach computes Ak holding MWP constant
¯ P . The “Wage MWP” approach computes Ak
across firms, i.e. M W Pk = M W
allowing MWP to vary across firms. The former captures differences in amenity
value absent heterogeneous preferences, whereas the latter captures the additional
dispersion attributable to variation in how workers value job amenities.
For wages alone, the variance across the Full sample is 4.8 log points. When the
value of firms’ amenities are included, and assuming no heterogeneity in willingnessto-pay, the variance across firms rises to 8.7 log points, a 81 percent increase. This
increase attenuates to 65 percent (7.9 log points) after accounting for the fact that
low-to-middle wage workers exhibit relatively low MWP for job satisfaction. This
would imply that the high wages enjoyed at higher-paying firms do not primarily reflect equalizing differences for worse fringe benefits, unfavorable working conditions,
stunted human capital development, or poor interpersonal relationships. Rather,
workers at these firms enjoy better wages and better amenities. When looking instead across the Connected set, the jump in compensation variance across firms is
shallower but still pronounced at 50 percent, from 2.2 to 3.3 log points.
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Table 1.7: Dispersion Across Firms Adjusting for Amenity Quality
Full sample

Connected sample

With amenities

With amenities

Measure
of dispersion

Wages
only

Fixed
MWP

Wage
MWP

Wages
only

Fixed
MWP

Wage
MWP

Variance
p50 - p10
p90 - p50

0.048
0.287
0.227

0.087
0.375
0.290

0.079
0.337
0.325

0.022
0.200
0.164

0.034
0.247
0.222

0.033
0.215
0.250

Notes: This table summarizes how three measures of dispersion differ when the firm amenity value
is incorporated into the difference in compensation across firms. Fixed MWP uses a constant MWP
(the sample average) across firms, and Wage MWP reflects the distribution of firm-specific MWP
displayed in Figure 1.6 that allows MWP to vary with workers’ earnings according to Table 1.6.

A similar takeaway of increased firm-level dispersion can be observed using distributional comparisons such as the log difference between the 50th and 10th percentiles (50–10 ratio) or the log difference between the 90th and 50th percentiles
(90–50 ratio). Comparing wages alone, 29 log points separate the median and 10th
percentile while 23 log points separate the 90th percentile and the median. Incorporating amenity value absent heterogeneity, these two gaps widen by 9 and 6
log points, respectively. When heterogeneity in MWP is incorporated, the 90–50
ratio widens another 4 log points, while the 50–10 ratio attenuates 4 log points —
reflecting the steep rise in MWP at the upper-tail of the wage distribution. Taken
together, the gap between the 90th and 10th percentiles (90–10 ratio) widens by
15 log points, equivalent to a 29 percent increase. For the Connected set, a similar
pattern arises: Accounting for amenities with firm-specific MWP raises the 90–10
ratio by 10 log points, equivalent to a 28 percent increase.
Taken holistically, the bundle of job amenities is inequality exacerbating, ratther
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than attenuating. Employees at higher-paying firms benefit from higher-quality
amenities, and in turn, higher-paying firms are even higher compensating than
wages alone report. Although two-way fixed effects models have found a growing
role for working sorting and a more limited role for the firm (Song et al., 2019;
Kline et al., 2020), differences in amenity offerings between firms and a non-zero
willingness to pay for improved amenities translates into missing dispersion between
firms, on the order of 50–65 percent.

1.8

Sensitivity Analysis

In this section, I investigate the robustness of these findings under alternative specifications. For the baseline and each alternative, Table 1.8 details the following:
the number of firms for which Wk and Ak are estimated, the slope and its standard
error between firms’ wage and rating premia, the percent of the slope attributable
to increased pay satisfaction, the difference in amenity value between the first and
ninety-ninth percentile relative to the mean wage, the elasticity of total compensation inclusive of amenity value (Wk +Ak ) to wages, and the increase in compensation
dispersion across firms (variance and ninety-ten ratio) compared with wages alone.
Rows 1 and 2 present these measures for the Full and Connected sets, respectively.
For these two sets, the difference between the bottom (first percentile) and top
(ninety-ninth percentile) firms by offered amenity value can be as large as 50–84
percent of the average wage; reassuringly, the 56 percent estimate of Maestas et al.
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(2018) for moving from the worst to the best jobs falls within the lower end of this
range.
Under the baseline approach, wages reflect workers’ annualized base earnings and
as such, omit the receipt of bonuses and commissions. Since more profitable firms
increasingly offer variable earnings (Sockin and Sockin, 2021), omitting variable
pay and focusing solely on base earnings may understate the degree of dispersion
in firms’ wage premia. As shown in row 3 however, incorporating variable pay into
workers’ wages alters the results little.
Table 1.8: Alternative Specifications
Wages vs. ratings
Specification
1. Baseline
2. Connected sample
3. Incorporate variable pay†
4. Include length of spell FE∧
5. Completed 0-1 years spell∧
6. Completed 5+ years spell∧
7. Reviews from full-time employees∧
8. Reviews mentioning 5+ amenities∧
9. Exclude possible sock puppetry∧
10. Relax assumption of linear ratings∧
11. Only female employees
12. Only male employees
13. Only current employees
14. Only industry switchers
15. Only low-paying jobs
16. Only high-paying jobs
17. Only job title stayers
18. Include metro-year and job title FE
19. Include order of observation FE
20. Workers with 3+ observations
21. Restrict sample to 2017–2019
22. Establishment (firm-metro) premia
23. Only workers in both panels

Firms Slope
70,115 0.47
10,737 0.72
68,566 0.46
70,115 0.46
27,842 0.43
27,478 0.39
54,499 0.60
22,488 0.77
41,163 0.49
70,095
–
28,632 0.49
30,185 0.45
29,061 0.61
35,729 0.39
16,737 0.55
19,235 0.66
9,642
0.41
38,616 0.63
70,115 0.48
20,951 0.43
13,772 0.43
56,052 0.49
30,362 0.58

Standard
error
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.03)
–
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.10)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.02)
(0.03)

Share pay
Amenity
gap p1-p99
satisfaction
(%)
(% avg wage)
8
84
11
50
8
83
8
83
11
91
11
103
8
95
7
105
9
86
8
93
11
101
7
88
5
95
11
84
12
137
7
90
10
127
10
101
8
84
8
81
5
109
7
104
9
89

Increase from wages
Variance
Elasticity
(%)
1.07
64
1.09
52
1.07
59
1.07
64
1.05
75
1.05
106
1.09
88
1.10
124
1.07
74
1.05
68
1.08
98
1.07
64
1.08
88
1.06
52
1.10
165
1.10
131
1.06
319
1.09
131
1.07
64
1.07
59
1.08
119
1.08
84
1.10
70

90-10 ratio
(log points)
15
10
15
15
16
19
18
21
15
14
18
16
19
13
26
20
22
21
15
13
21
19
16

Notes: This table displays the coefficients from regressions of the firm fixed effects for job satisfaction on the firm fixed effects for wages under alternative specifications. Metros in Glassdoor
correspond roughly to core-based statistical areas (CBSAs); there are 858 unique metros in Glassdoor and 929 CBSAs. Standard errors are bootstrapped. ∧ indicates only the ratings panel is
affected and the wages premia are unaltered. † indicates only the wages panel is affected and the
ratings premia are unaltered.

In the AKM framework, the identification for each firm-specific premium relies
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on the experiences of job switchers entering or exiting the firm. But, not all job
transitions are alike. Workers who experience a low-quality match, i.e. a job that
lasts at most one year, will have different outside options and reasons for exiting
compared with workers who experience a high-quality match, i.e. a job that lasts
at least five years. To account for these factors related to firm tenure, I incorporate
fixed effects for the length of the worker’s job spell when estimating the ratings
premia; as shown in row 4, the results are unchanged. Additionally, workers who
have experienced a low- or high-quality match may be uniquely situated to speak
to differences in amenity quality across firms from having salient benchmarks for
comparison. In rows 5 and 6, I restrict the sample to only workers who have
experienced a low-quality or high-quality match, respectively, when estimating the
ratings premia, and find that the takeaway results hold, even magnifying somewhat.
Next, I address concerns that related to sample composition with workers’ employer reviews. First, while the wage premia are captured using only full-time
workers (because hours are unobserved), the ratings premia are estimated using
employees of various work arrangements, including full-time, part-time, contract,
and intern workers. Re-calibrating the ratings premia using only reviews from fulltime employees in row 7 only strengthens the results. Second, workers differ in their
willingness to discuss workplace amenities. Quantifying amenity value — and the
relative importance of pay satisfaction for overall satisfaction — could vary based
upon whether the ratings premia are gauged from workers who are increasingly
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willing to volunteer information. Restricting the sample to only employer reviews
that detail at least five of the fifty amenities in row 8 reveals even starker results
after incorporating amenity value. Third, employees may plant dishonest reviews
if they are incentivized or threatened by their firms to do so. Identifying potentially suspect reviews following the methodology of Sockin and Sojourner (2020)
and excluding such reviews from the analysis in row 9 does not alter the results.
One key assumption under the baseline model is that workers interpret the five
stars scale for ratings linearly. This implies that workers value jumping from one
star to two as equally as they would moving from four stars to five. However,
if workers are risk averse, then we might anticipate utility to be concave in job
satisfaction rather than linear — as avoiding poor outcomes would be increasingly
desirable. To relax this assumption, I create binary indicators for each of the five
star ratings, 1{R = r}. Then, rather than estimating premia in overall ratings
λR
k and a willingness-to-pay per additional star M W Pk , I calculate firm-specific
premia under a linear probability model for the likelihood of each star rating λrk ,
a willingness-to-pay for each individual star rating (relative to a one-star rating),
M W Pkr , and aggregate

P5

r=1

λrk M W Pkr . As shown in row 10, the results are highly

similar.
Next, to address concerns related to sample selection into the wages and ratings
panels, I investigate whether the results are driven by any particular category of
worker or job transition. First, although male employees are over-sampled in the
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Glassdoor data (Sockin and Sockin, 2019b), restricting the samples in the two panels to only include female or male employees in rows 11 and 12, respectively, reveals
that both on average receive greater amenity value at higher-paying firms. Second,
because Glassdoor is a platform through which workers learn about employment
opportunities, the concern may arise that the workers supplying their wages and reviews to the website are negatively selected on ability, disgruntled former employees
that have been laid off, or both. As shown though in row 13, restricting the sample
to only wages and employer reviews provided by still currently employed workers
changes the takeaway results little. Third, the salience of non-wage amenities may
differ depending on whether the worker chooses to remain in or exit an industry.
Workers may decide to switch industries precisely to achieve improved amenities,
especially if there are more salient differences across industries than within. Focusing only on industry switchers in row 14 however attenuates the results only
slightly.
Additionally, workers’ evaluations of job satisfaction and amenity quality could
differ depending upon their position with the firm. As workers ascend the job
ladder, amenities could differ because they exhibit heterogeneous preferences, have
heterogeneous experiences, or both. In fact, looking across workers within the same
firm, low- and high-wage workers have markedly different evaluations of amenity
quality (Table A.23).38 Consequently, a firm’s overall rating premium could differ
38

There are two takeaways worth highlighting. First, forty of the fifty amenities exhibit a
statistically significant slope with wages. Second, the amenities that are negatively related with
individuals’ wages include many pecuniary attributes, whereas the amenities that are positively
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depending upon whether the Glassdoor sample is comprised of low or high earners
from the firm. Restricting the panels however to only low-paying or high-paying
job titles in rows 15 and 16, respectively, only strengthens the results. In fact,
focusing solely on job transitions in which workers retain their job title — and
thereby minimizing differences between firms attributable to disparities in tasks or
responsibilities — in row 17 while greatly reducing the sample of firms covered,
reveals an even starker increase in dispersion when amenities are incorporated.
Lastly, since amenities may vary between across locations as well, I show in row 18
that the results are robust to incorporating metropolitan area by year and job title
fixed effects into the AKM models.39
Further, the arrival of a new wage report or employer review may be non-random.
For one, subsequent wages or employers reviews may be selected on whether match
quality improves or worsens. Additionally, workers transitioning into a firm may
report systematically different sentiment than workers separating from a firm. Addressing these concerns by including fixed effects for the arrival order of each workers’ wage or review into the AKM models in row 19 does not alter the results.40
related with individuals’ wages pertain to working conditions and interpersonal relationships —
though job security and office politics are notable exceptions. One explanation is that low-wage
workers care primarily about pecuniary compensation beyond wages, while high-wage workers care
more about intangibles. Another is that as workers climb the job ladder, workers benefit from
improved attributes that were previously inaccessible at lower rungs. Examining these possibilities
further I leave to future researchers.
39
Since reporting one’s location and job title in an employer review is optional and may reflect
a strategic concealment decision (Sockin and Sojourner, 2020), the baseline approach conditions
on neither.
40
Subsequent wages are on average more positive, consistent with movement up the job ladder
over the life cycle or positive selection on unobservables, and subsequent ratings are on average
more negative, possibly reflecting an increased propensity for workers to voice their views when
dissatisfied (Table A.24).
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Most workers in the two panels though are only observed twice, implying that the
worker fixed effects from the AKM models will be imprecisely estimated, which in
turn, could spillover into the firm fixed effects. Restricting the sample in row 20
to include only workers in each panel who are observed at least three times though
does not change the results.
These findings are also not driven by employers’ differential responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic, or by structural changes to the website and its users over
time, as restricting the sample to only wages and reviews for the three year period
2017–2019 in row 21 only strengthens the results. Finally, in the AKM literature,
the employer traditionally corresponds to an individual establishment rather than a
firm in aggregate. Because providing the location for an employer review is optional,
the baseline approach does not distinguish between firms’ various establishments.
Recalibrating the model in row 22 to separate firms into establishments according
to metropolitan area offers the same findings.

1.9

Discussion and Limitations

If firms do not set amenities according to a compensating differential framework, it
raises the question how do firms choose the quality of amenities to supply? Why do
some firms offer better quality amenities than others? One obvious possibility is that
firms differ in their marginal costs of amenity provision (Rosen, 1986a). However,
to be consistent with the positive relation observed across firms between wages and
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amenities, this would imply that high-paying firms uniformly exhibit economies of
scale in providing amenities compared with their lower-paying counterparts. One
alternative is that more-productive firms compensate workers through greater wages
and amenities because both are normal goods, as in the theoretical exposition of
Appendix A.1 (Mortensen, 2003; Lang and Majumdar, 2004). Relating the firm
premia for wages and satisfaction with a measure of average labor productivity for
public firms available through Compustat (Figure A.7) lends support to this view.
There are alternative theories though that warrant further exploration. For
one, amenity provision may reflect a strategic decision for targeting optimal tenure
with the firm. Since more satisfied workers stay longer on the job, firms interested
in fostering a low-turnover, high-retention workforce may offer improved amenities. While a dollar in wages is identical across firms, observing the quality of an
employer’s amenities may require direct inspection through on-the-job experience
(Menzio and Shi, 2011b), thereby rendering exiting a firm and relinquishing its
amenities a risky decision. Second, improved amenities may cause productivity to
increase and subsequently drive wage growth, though the evidence on this relation
is mixed (Iaffaldano and Muchinsky, 1985; Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2012). If
employees who are more satisfied — a concept that predominantly reflects nonwage aspects of work — are able to produce more efficiently (Bellet et al., 2019) or
have improved complementarities with peers, then firms may become higher-paying
through promoting amenity quality. Finally, the provision of high-quality amenities
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could reflect a means by which to attract top talent. Given that high-wage workers
place more value on job satisfaction, higher-paying firms providing more-favorable
non-wage amenities may help explain the high degree to which productive workers sort into productive firms (Card et al., 2013; Borovičková and Shimer, 2017;
Hagedorn et al., 2017; Lopes de Melo, 2018).41
Although this work contributes to a budding literature on job amenities by making use of novel data on job switchers’ satisfaction and amenity values at different
jobs, there are a number of limitations that future work in this area may help address. For one, the analysis rests on the firm fixed effects being precisely estimated
in the two-way fixed effects models for both wages and satisfaction levels. However,
workers in each of the two samples only have on average 2.2–2.4 observations (Table
A.11). The thinness of the two panels implies that the worker fixed effects will be
noisily estimated, which can spillover into the firm fixed effects being imprecisely
estimated if there are few identifying movers. This concern is somewhat alleviated
by the fact that the main takeaways follow through when the sample is restricted to
a more-connected set of firms with many movers. However, the inability to observe
the same workers’ wages and amenities more frequently for each employer hampers
the possibility of controlling for potential violations to the assumption of exogenous mobility, e.g. match-specific quality, on-the-job learning, peer effects, and
41

Since amenities are unobserved in administrative employee-employer matched datasets of labor
earnings, they are necessarily omitted. Analyses using wages alone may then understate the role
of firms and overstate the role of sorting. While the variance between firms has risen in the United
States since the late 1970s, that increase has been attributed to changes in the composition of
workers within firms (Song et al., 2019).
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labor demand shocks, as well as accounting for time-varying preferences in workers’
valuations of the firms’ amenities throughout their tenure with the firm.
Additionally, since I seldom observe each worker and only at instances of employment, the time between between jobs is unobserved. The average time between
observations is 1.7–2.3 years (Table A.11), suggesting that workers’ preferences for
amenities are unlikely to have changed much between observations. However, because workers are not observed in consecutive time periods — as is typical for
administrative employee-employer matched data often used in the AKM literature
— determining whether the pair of matches observed for job switchers constitutes
a job-to-job transition, job-to-nonemployment followed by nonemployment-to-job
transitions, or even if there were intermediate unreported jobs in between. The
absence of continuous employment histories hampers determining whether the jobs
I observe in the data are selected in some manner relative to jobs that are unobserved. Moreover, although the data include whether each worker was no longer
employed with the firm at the time of the review, the reason for each separation is
unobserved. Although the job duration approach for estimating willingness-to-pay
of Gronberg and Reed (1994) incorporates voluntary and involuntary separations,
the wage declines and rating declines observed in the data may reflect low bargaining power from an involuntary spell of non-employment between jobs rather than a
willingness to separate from a match to accept lower pay or satisfaction at another.
Last, the empirical analysis is limited to coverage in Glassdoor data. Only
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firms represented by job switchers will be included. Unfortunately, I cannot test
for whether the results regarding firm-level amenities extend to all U.S. firms. In
particular, if there is heterogeneity in the relation between wages and amenities by
firm age or firm size, then the applicability of the results for new or small firms that
are more likely to be overlooked in the sample may be limited. Furthermore, because
the sample period only covers the years 2008–2021, making conclusions about how
non-wage amenities, their relation to firm-level wages, and their dispersion have
changed over time is not feasible. While Pierce (2001) speaks to how dispersion in
fringe benefits has evolved over time, research that could speak to how dispersion
in non-pecuniary amenities has changed over time would uniquely contribute to the
inequality literature.

1.10

Conclusion

Using matched employee-employer data on workers’ wages and job satisfaction levels, I find that higher-paying firms offer their workers more in amenity value than
lower-paying firms. In gauging a comprehensive set of hard-to-observe, hard-toquantify amenities from workers’ descriptions of their employers, I document how
nearly the entire bundle of amenities improves with the wage premium a firm offers,
including better working conditions, fringe benefits, interpersonal relationships, and
human capital development. This evidence runs contrary to the idea that the boon
in wages workers enjoy from employment at a higher-paying firm primarily reflects
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an equalizing difference for lower-quality amenities. That is not to say though that
there is not a compensating differential whereby workers are willing to accept somewhat lower wages in exchange for better amenities.42 However, when looking across
vertically-differentiated firms, the higher-paying employer is more likely to offer an
improvement in job amenities than a decline.
Since high-paying firms are high-amenity firms, wages alone understate labor
market inequality. In turn, if we were to account for job amenities, low-wage workers would have even lower lifetime compensation than high-wage workers, the opportunity cost of work would be even greater for high-wage workers, and the returns
to investing in human capital and climbing the firm ladder would be even more pronounced. Now that capturing hard-to-measure non-wage amenities is feasible given
the advent of online job boards, linking such data to labor market interventions that
may alter compensation packages, such as minimum wage laws (Clemens, 2021) and
tax policies (Powell and Shan, 2012), as well as theories of job search, occupational
sorting, educational attainment, worker bargaining, and firm dynamism would be
promising avenues for future research.

42

Implementing a hedonic approach for estimating the willingness to pay for an additional star
of job satisfaction reveals a positive MWP, but only after conditioning on the productivity of the
match through worker fixed effects. More details are provided in Appendix A.6.
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Chapter 2 What’s the Inside Scoop? Challenges
in the Supply and Demand for Information on Employers

2.1

Introduction

Workers face information problems in choosing between employers that appear the
same but differ in unobservable ways. Jobseekers value information that helps them
better understand how a prospective employer treats workers, especially in hardto-observe and hard-to-contract dimensions. Nelson (1970) described experience
goods as those whose quality cannot be learned before transaction. Menzio and
Shi (2011a) develop a directed search model that permits analysis of the extent to
which prospective jobs are experience goods versus inspection goods, where match
quality and the value of a prospective job is known to the jobseeker before accepting
it. They find that the experience-good model better explains cyclical labor-market
dynamics and that this difficult-to-observe match quality explains a huge share of
variance in job productivity.43
43

Jobs are complex, difficult to fully characterize and subject to change. An incomplete list of
job attributes includes wages; aspects of health insurance quality and cost; criteria for and schedule
of potential raises; opportunities for career development and advancement; risk of illness, injury,
or fatality; degrees of autonomy and micro-management; personal and professional (dis)courtesy
paid by one’s supervisor and peers; presence of sexual harassers; layoff risk in a downturn; whether
one is routinely asked to work overtime and what consequences follow from refusal; and ease in
scheduling time off to take a child to the doctor. Attributes’ starting levels and possible future
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Hungry to understand the job quality they can expect, jobseekers seek the inside scoop from firms’ current and former employees who have private knowledge
of how the firm treats its workers. Carmichael (1984a) developed a theory of employer reputation in the labor market. He argues, “Since a searching worker does
not typically get to observe a firm very closely before he joins it, it does not seem
sensible to assume he has intimate knowledge of its technology or the tastes of its
owners.” An employer’s public reputation helps jobseekers deal with this information problem, “if the worker himself is not very different from other workers the firm
has hired in the past, then he may do very well just by assuming that the firm will
treat him as it has treated everyone else.” However, insiders’ private information
about jobs at a particular firm does not flow easily to interested jobseekers, unless
they are lucky enough to share a social network and take the time to discuss it
individually. An insider supplying accurate, private information about an employer
creates a positive externality for other workers and so, such information will tend to
be undersupplied via voluntarism, a theoretical point Avery et al. (1999) developed
with respect to general voluntary evaluation systems. Lacking a market-clearing
mechanism, there’s no reason to expect the supply of information to meet demand.
Better evidence on workers’ use of information about job quality and attributes
would improve our understanding of labor markets but these processes have been
difficult to measure until recently. The introduction of online platforms such as
LinkedIn, Glassdoor, and Indeed has enabled workers to search for, learn about,
paths can matter. These are challenging for jobseekers to credibly understand.
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and apply to jobs online. Before online search existed, workers had to rely on
newspapers word of mouth, personal networking, and best-places-to-work stories in
magazines to learn about potential employers. The movement toward online job
search has changed how workers gather, process, and act on job-related information
and what economists can observe. Now, seventy percent of unemployed Americans
use the internet to search for jobs.44
Harnessing data from an institution that facilitates the flow of information about
job quality and attributes between workers, Glassdoor, we develop evidence to better understand workers’ supply of and demand for information about employers.
Broadly, Glassdoor is similar to other third-party review sites like Yelp or Tripadvisor, in that each relies on volunteers to supply private information toward the public
good of publicly-available reputation for counter-parties. However, in the case of
Glassdoor, the reputation system helps workers share information about employers
rather than consumers about sellers.
We focus on three research questions:
 How do volunteered ratings affect labor supply to firms, if at all? Are the

effects stronger for less well-known firms?
 How do jobseekers value marginal information supplied? Equally across the

range of employer ratings or more-strongly for negative information?
 How do risks of employer retaliation affect the supply of inside information
44

Authors’ analysis of November 2019 Current Population Survey.
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from potential volunteers?
We begin by developing novel evidence on how reputation affects firm-specific
labor supply in the broad labor market. We exploit an ability to see each firm’s
overall rating at high precision when the firm posts each job opening and measure
the impact on application rates, adapting the regression discontinuity logic of Luca
(2016) in analyzing restaurant reviews on Yelp. Looking at jobseeker application
rates to multiple job postings by each firm, we contrast application rates for postings
made when the firm’s average overall rating was just above versus just below a
threshold for rounding to a tenths-place digit. This generates a +0.1 star (on a oneto-five stars system) shock between postings to the jobseeker-observed rating when
the true ratings actually differ by very little. For example, we contrast application
rates for postings with an average rating of 3.651, which rounds to 3.7, versus 3.649,
which rounds to 3.6. We pool across multiple such thresholds. This design reveals
that higher ratings tend to increase application rates among firms with relativelyfew prior reviews but not among those with many prior reviews. Because of labor
supply effects, firms, especially smaller ones, have incentives to discourage insiders
from volunteering negative reviews as well as to encourage supply of positive ones.45
45

Benson et al. (2020a) found evidence of positive labor supply effects of better firm reputation
and that this effect is strongest among less well-known firms in a market for online micro-tasks:
Amazon Mechanical Turk. We extend this to the broad labor market and find similar results.
While literatures in economics, management, and personnel psychology have all tried to estimate
effects of firm reputation on labor supply, other prior evidence comes almost exclusively from
the lab or from observational studies that lack credibly-exogenous variation in firm reputation
(Turban and Cable, 2003; Collins and Han, 2004; Schmidt et al., 2012; Harvey and Morris, 2012;
Lievens and Slaughter, 2016; Makarius and Stevens, 2019). An exception is Brown and Matsa
(2016), which exploited high-frequency changes in major financial firms valuations and found
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Secondly, we test whether jobseekers value new information across the full spectrum of employer quality equally. They do not. We find that jobseekers find reviews
that help guide them away from worse employers more helpful than reviews that
help guide them towards better employers. This finding contrasts with those from
consumer review sites and, thus, does not appear to be a fundamental property of
reputational information flow. Meta-analysis of the consumer review literature does
not find that negative reviews are rated more helpful (Hong et al., 2017). We do not
know of prior investigations into what constitutes helpful information in employer
reviews.
The finding that jobseekers vote reviews delivering more-negative information
more helpful is robust to using any available uni-dimensional, vertically-differentiated
measure of how positively/negatively volunteers evaluate their firms, such as the
one-to-five star overall rating, the share of “Pros” versus “Cons” text written in
the review, and whether the volunteer would recommend the firm to a friend. This
stronger relative demand for negative information holds across firms of different
ages, sizes, review counts, and pay premia. Where we can precisely track a particular volunteer’s votes, we find that the increased demand for more negative information holds true regardless of the volunteer’s level of satisfaction with their own
employer, highlighting that demand for negative information is not restricted to the
dissatisfied or the satisfied alone. The only exception is when the jobseeker votes
that jobseeker applications to a firm fall as public information about prospects for firm survival
diminish.
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for a review of their own employer: those who rate their own employer highly also
tend to vote more helpful others’ positive reviews of their employer. This could be
sincere or part of employers’ efforts to promote their own reputations.
We develop and discuss evidence on why workers may demand negative information. Risk-averse workers will value a signal that shifts their posterior beliefs about
the expected value of a potential job down by  more than a signal that shifts it up
by . Given employers’ incentives to supply positive information and worker risk
aversion, it would perhaps be surprising if jobseekers expressed no preference for
negative information. In addition, positive information about a potential employer
may be available outside a reputational information system. In fact, we establish
that job descriptions written within postings more closely resemble the “Pros” text
of reviews than the “Cons” text, a new though perhaps not surprising finding. Further, we develop evidence that the preference for negative information is robust to
omitting weeks with unusual spikes in the supply of positive reviews—which may
be due to employer encouragement of positive reviews (sock puppetry) as well as
considering differences in how abstract the language used is between positive and
negative text.
Thirdly, we explore a potential challenge for the flow of accurate information
into a reputation system: whether risk of employer retaliation off-site against insiders who supply negative information discourages its supply and distorts the ability
of jobseekers to distinguish better from worse employers.46 We document that vol46

A Society for Human Resource Management article on managing employer reputation online
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unteers on Glassdoor are more likely to conceal aspects of their identity—their job
title or location—when reporting negative rather than positive information about
a particular firm. Corroborating evidence comes by testing whether, conditional on
supplying negative information, volunteers were more likely to conceal aspects of
their identity when they face higher retaliation risks, either reporting on a current
(rather than former) employer or working at a smaller firm where they blend into a
smaller pool of likely suspects. Even looking across multiple reviews from the same
volunteer, a volunteer is more likely to conceal aspects of their identity when leaving
a more negative review, when leaving a review about a current rather than former
employer, and when reviewing a smaller rather than larger employer. Further, the
(inverse) relationship between review rating and rates of identity concealment is
stronger in contexts with greater risk of retaliation. We study this phenomenon using multiple identification strategies, including examining differences within person,
using variation in the implicit costs of retaliation driven by variation in state unemployment rates over time, and quasi-experimental variation in the availability of
identity concealment options to potential volunteers within the Glassdoor platform
over time.
Although the option for volunteers to conceal identifying aspects causes more
reports an attorney’s advice to have all employees sign confidentiality agreements on hire so that,
if they share negative information online, the company can assert that they are in violation and
threaten legal action (Grensing-Pophal, 2019). Further, over 100 employers have sued Glassdoor
to try to get the company to reveal the identity of reviewers posting negative reviews. Though
almost all suits failed, the fact that companies file them is consistent with worker concern about
potential retaliation if they were to communicate unflattering information about an employer
(Glassdoor, 2018; Grothaus, 2020).
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negative information to be supplied on the platform, we also document for the first
time that concealment tends to degrade the value of the supplied information for
jobseekers. Jobseekers tend to vote reviews less helpful when volunteers conceal
aspects of their identity, consistent with concealment eroding jobseekers’ ability to
judge the supplied information’s relevance to their own decision. Taken together,
this implies a “Catch-22”, leaving some volunteers stuck between honesty and fear,
and jobseekers stuck between positive bias and extra noise.
Retaliation risk exists in other markets’ reputation systems. Filippas et al.
(2019) found that, within a market for online gig work, when the system shifted
from reviews being observable only by the site operator to being public so that
the rated worker and their future, potential employers could see what was said by
whom, ratings of workers submitted by employers inflated. Others have studied the
potential for retaliation to bias consumer or similar online gig work settings, including Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) and Nosko and Tadelis (2015) for eBay consumers,
Bolton et al. (2013) for eBay, the gig labor market RentACoder.com, and a few
other sites, and Fradkin et al. (2019) for Airbnb. On Glassdoor itself, Marinescu
et al. (2018a) found that marginal reviews by workers tend to be more negative than
average reviews, suggesting a tendency for negative potential reviews to remain unvolunteered. Glassdoor reviews pertain to the market for in-person, long-term U.S.
jobs and focuses on workers rating employers, making the stakes in choice and in
retaliation plausibly higher than in previously-studied settings.
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Retaliation risks are likely to be particularly severe with respect to reviews of
long-term employers. When considering whether to volunteer a potential negative
review, workers may worry much more about retaliation risk from their employer
than they would worry about potential retaliation as a consumer from a seller.
Retaliation risks for a negative review of a restaurant on Yelp or a printer on
Amazon are quite limited. Employment is different. For most working-age adults,
their single largest market relationship is with an employer. As Hart (1989) puts it,
“the reason an employee is likely to be more responsive to what his employer wants
than a grocer is to what his customer wants is that the employer has much more
leverage over his employee than the customer has over his grocer. In particular, the
employer can deprive the employee of the assets he works with and hire another
employee to work with these assets, while the customer can only deprive the grocer
of his custom and as long as the customer is small, it is presumably not very difficult
for the grocer to find another customer.” Is it worth the possibility of antagonizing
your boss, losing your job, and causing a lifetime of retaliatory references in order
to help jobseekers—whom you do not know—make more informed employment
decisions?47
Taken together, this analysis suggests that workers struggle to get accurate, relevant information about prospective jobs in the U.S. labor market, making verticallydifferentiating information about employers, especially less well-known employers,
47

On Glassdoor, potential employer retaliation would happen off-site. There is no way for
employers to retaliate on site. Unlike Mechanical Turk or oDesk, there are no jobs done through
the site and no firm rating of workers.
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valuable to workers. Institutions and policies that seek to improve the flow of information must confront the challenge that, when a system succeeds in affecting firm
labor supply through the provision of such information, employers have stronger
incentives to retaliate against volunteers—inducing bias and noise into the system,
thereby degrading its value and its potency.

2.2

Setting and data

A volunteer can submit one employer review per employer-year, which she is free to
update, but can review multiple employers within the same year.48 Each review-r
pertains to a job at a specific firm-f . Each has an associated volunteer v(f r) and
creation time t(f r).
Each review contains many kinds of information. Figure 2.1 displays a blank
review form for the University of Pennsylvania. Volunteers are asked to provide
feedback on their employer, through both supplying a star rating for the firm and
submitting free response text for the “Pros” and the “Cons” of working for that
firm. In order to complete the review, volunteers are required to supply the following information: an overall rating, employment status, review headline title,
“Pros” text, and “Cons” text. They also may have the option to voluntarily supply
information about their job title, tenure at the firm, and location of employment.
48

To create some accountability on volunteers, Glassdoor requires them to have a verified active
email address or a valid social network account, assesses the content of each submitted review,
and suppresses those outside their guidelines. Assessment guidelines are here: https://help.g
lassdoor.com/article/Community-Guidelines/en US.
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Figure 2.1: Blank Volunteer Review Form

Notes: Figure is a screenshot of the survey users fill out when submitting an employer review to
Glassdoor. An asterisk indicates that the field is required. Overall rating is restricted to integer
ratings between one and five stars. Once text is added to the “Review Headline,” “Pros,” or
”Cons” sections, users are asked to provide additional information (not shown), which includes
location of employment.

The volunteer’s employment status, job title, and geographic location (if available)
are displayed with their review to site visitors but not their identity. If a volunteer leaves multiple reviews under the same account identity, Glassdoor and the
researchers can link these reviews as being left by the same person. Site users
cannot.
Each volunteer assigns the firm an overall rating (R) on a one-to-five-star Likert
scale, a vertically-differentiated summary of the volunteer’s overall evaluation of the
employer explicitly meant to inform other workers about the quality of employment
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provided by the firm. We sometimes refer to reviews that include one- or two-star
ratings as negative reviews and those including four- or five-star ratings as positive
reviews. Broadly, the site contains about twice as many positive reviews as negative
reviews.49
Once a volunteer’s review is added to the website, people who go to the website
to learn about that employer can see the review and vote it as helpful. Until a few
years ago, users could also vote it as unhelpful (Appendix B.3 discusses in greater
detail). We use these (un)helpful votes as a way to measure jobseeker demand for
different kinds of information about firms and jobs.
Given the public nature of each review, worried volunteers may try to conceal
aspects of their identity. We measure whether a volunteer attempts to conceal their
identity by how they fill in the job title and location fields. Forty-five percent of
reviews’ volunteers choose to either leave the job title field blank, include the word
“anonymous” in the job title, or end their job title with “employee.” Volunteers
can also hide identifying information by leaving the geographic location field blank.
About forty-two percent of volunteers do not report a location. These aspects of
the volunteer’s identity, or lack thereof, pipe into the display of the review that
jobseekers see.
When a jobseeker reads a review, she can click to classify the review as either
helpful, unhelpful, or refrain entirely from expressing an opinion. To understand
49

The distribution of reviews by overall rating in the data is 15.3% one-star, 12.9% two-star,
20.4% three-star, 24.2% four-star, and 27.3% five-star.
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the demand for information, we measure the helpfulness of any review by the share
of jobseeker votes that are helpful rather than unhelpful. Review-r’s helpfulness to
jobseekers is then given by Hr = #helpfulr /(#helpfulr + #unhelpfulr ), which we
refer to as helpful share.50 When analyzing helpful share, we analyze the 685,505
reviews posted before 2015 that received at least one of the 1.90 million helpful or
0.23 million unhelpful votes. Reviews averaged 2.76 helpful votes, 0.34 unhelpful
votes, and a helpful share of 0.86 with a standard deviation of 0.31. Using the
helpful share, rather than the helpful count, allows us to control for the number
of jobseekers who saw a review but results are similar in any case. Other reviews
posted during this time received no votes at all (731,989) and are excluded because
we lack a way to control for how (in)frequently jobseekers viewed them or a measure
of how meaningful the review was to jobseekers who did in fact view them.
Glassdoor has additional information about reviewed firms through an employer
lookup table. For each firm, there is a single entry that contains the following
information (when available): the industry of the firm, the most-recent employment
total for the firm (meaning that our measure of firm employment has no time
variation), and the year in which the firm was founded.51 Firm age is then calculated
50

Analyses with this outcome will always control for the year-month the review was posted. In
2015, Glassdoor phased out the option for jobseekers on its website to classify reviews as unhelpful,
leaving the helpful and refrain options. For an in-depth description of the time line, see Appendix
B.3. For the share of unhelpful classifications submitted for employer reviews over time, see Figure
B.3.
51
There are 25 broad industries in the data: Accounting & Legal, Aerospace & Defense, Agriculture, Arts & Recreation, Biotech & Pharmaceutical, Business Services, Construction, Consumer
Services, Education, Energy, Finance, Government, Health Care, Hospitality, Information Technology, Insurance, Manufacturing, Media, Mining, Non-Profit, Real Estate, Restaurants, Retail,
Telecommunications, and Transportation.
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as the difference between the year in which the review is submitted and the year the
firm was founded. We incorporate each of these three firm characteristics in order
to study differences in identity concealment, review helpfulness and job satisfaction
among workers across firms.

2.3

Results

The next three subsections present evidence on our three research questions. In a
fourth, we discuss the findings overall and complementary evidence guiding interpretation.

2.3.1

How do volunteered ratings affect labor supply to
firms, if at all?

Are effects stronger for less well-

known firms?
Our measure of labor supply is the rate at which jobseekers apply to a firm’s job
posting, which we compute as the number of jobseekers who click on a posting’s
“Apply Now” button per 100 jobseekers who are presented a summary view of the
posting within a list of search results (example in Figure B.1). Section B.1 details
the sample for this analysis and how it was constructed. This measure – appliers
per 100 viewers – helps focus on jobseekers’ choices and adjusts for any differences
in how frequent postings were presented to jobseekers.
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Our design takes advantage of a rounding discontinuity. The employer star
rating observed by jobseekers on each job posting is rounded to the tenths digit
but based on a more-precisely calculated rating index that we can measure. To
credibly identify the effect of a 0.1 higher observed rating within an otherwise very
homogeneous set of postings, we limit the sample to postings by employers with
a latent rating within a 0.01 bandwidth on each side of a rounding threshold and
define an indicator for whether the posting’s observed rating reflects a round up
rather than a round down.52 We estimate effects of the induced 0.1 higher observed
star rating on apply rates according to equation (2.3.1), which pools across all
thresholds and includes firm f , job title j, metropolitan area m, day-of-posting t,
and #.#5-threshold c fixed effects.

ApplyRatef jmt = β 1{Rf t >= c}f jmt + λf + λj + λm + λt + λc + εf jmt

(2.3.1)

Theory and evidence in Luca (2016) and Benson et al. (2020a) suggest that
effects may differ depending on how well-known the employer is to workers from
off-site sources. To proxy for this aspect of firms, we measure the posting firms’
number of prior reviews. Across job postings, we create percentiles based on the
posting firm’s number of prior volunteer ratings submitted up to the time when the
posting was first listed on the website. We then implement equation (2.3.1) first
52

Around each #.# = 1.0, 1.1, 1.2...4.9, latent values in the [#.#4,#.#5) interval round down
to #.# and those in [#.#5,#.#6] round up to (#.#)+0.1. We refer to a generic such threshold
as #.#5.
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for postings listed by firms with few reviews on the website, and then iteratively
incorporate more-reviewed firms.
The left-most estimate in Figure C.2 restricts the sample only to postings in the
bottom decile of prior reviews. Here, we see a positive effect of a 0.1 higher star
rating on apply rates. Among firms with relatively-few prior reviews, a 0.1 higher
star rating—induced by rounding—raises apply rates by about 0.03–0.05 applies per
100 impressions. Relative to the sample average of 0.76 applies per 100 impressions
(Table B.1), this constitutes a 4–7% increase. As the sample expands to include
postings from firms that had more prior reviews, the estimated effect of a 0.1 higher
rating falls towards null. On-site ratings appear to matter most for firms that are
least well-known otherwise, extending the Benson et al. (2020a) result from labor
supply in an online gig market to the broader U.S. labor market.53
We assess the robustness of this result by considering three alternative approaches, the results of which are displayed in Figure B.4. First, we reverse the
order in which review count quantiles are iteratively added to the sample, starting
instead with the top decile of prior reviews. As shown in panel (a), we observe
no effect from rounding discontinuity on apply rates for larger, well-known firms,
with the effect turning positive as the smallest quantiles by prior review count are
incorporated. Second, we expand the bandwidth around each cutoff from ±0.01
53

This analysis focuses only on how the rating affects labor supply via the channel of jobseeker
choice conditional on seeing a posting listed in their search results. If a higher employer rating
also makes it more likely that a jobseeker will see the posting summary or see it earlier on the
page (Nosko and Tadelis, 2015), this would only add force to the result.
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Figure 2.2: Effect of 0.1-Star Higher Rating on Apply Rate at Rounding Threshold,
Robustness to Including Postings by More Well-Known Firms

Notes: Sample is restricted to job postings for which the employers’ weekly rating’s hundredths
places falls within ±0.01 bandwidth of the #.#5 cutoff. Numbers on the x-axis refer to the
maximum prior review count percentile included in the regression sample. Each job posting is
weighted by its impression total. Regressions include employer, job title, metro, day-of-posting,
and #.#5 threshold fixed effects. Vertical red bars indicate a 95% confidence interval around each
point estimate. Standard errors clustered by firm.

to ±0.02, and find similar results in panel (b). Third, following the framework of
Schmieder et al. (2012) and Luca (2016), we incorporate a flexible function in our
running variable—the difference between employer rating and the nearest cutoff—
on each side of the cutoff, specifically a piece-wise linear function. Incorporating
linear slope parameters before and after the cutoff and expanding the bandwidth
to ±0.04 (to facilitate estimating now three parameters), we find the same pattern
in panel (c). Across these alternative specifications, rating increases labor supply
for lesser-known firms only.
Last, we consider whether the effect of a 0.1 higher average rating on apply rates
is constant across the range of employer ratings, or whether the effect varies across
the range of values. While the estimates presented above pool across all cutoff
values, here we allow estimates to differ across the spectrum of employer quality.
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As we did with the employer review count at the time of posting, we bin job postings
into percentiles based on the firm’s overall rating displayed to jobseekers at the time
of posting. Given the result above that ratings affect labor supply only for less wellknown firms, we focus this analysis only on the subsample of job openings whose
firms were in the bottom quintile of prior review count. We begin with a subsample
including only postings from the lowest-rated employers, and iteratively add job
postings from higher-rated ones to the sample. Figure B.6 displays the results.54
The labor supply boost we find from pooling across thresholds is driven by positive
impacts on labor supply for ratings throughout the bottom and middle, but not the
top, of the ratings scale. This pattern illustrates that it is lesser-known, low-road
and middle-of-the-road employers that benefit vis-a-vis increased labor supply from
improved reputation.

2.3.2

How do jobseekers value marginal information supplied? Equally across the range of employer ratings
or more-strongly for negative information?

We focus on whether a review’s positive or negative content relates to jobseekers’
perceptions of the review’s helpfulness. Our analysis rests on the idea that, when
jobseekers see a volunteer’s evaluation of her job, they are more likely to classify
54

Though outside the purview of this work, we note that this pattern is consistent with jobseekers
using a reservation-cutoff strategy, whereby they are indifferent to employer quality insofar as it
satisfies a minimal level. Of course, it could also be that jobseekers discount ratings that appear
unreasonably high.
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the review as helpful if it contains the kinds of information about which they want
to learn and are more likely to classify it as unhelpful if it does not. Conceptually,
we would expect helpful reviews are those that shift one’s posterior belief about the
value of a potential job at a firm either by shifting the mean belief up or down or
by reducing uncertainty. Unhelpful reviews do not.
Jobseekers find reviews containing negative information about employers unequivocally more helpful than those containing positive information. Straightforward evidence comes from comparing the distributions of helpful and unhelpful
votes by the overall rating value attached to each review (Figure 2.3). Not only
are helpful votes predominantly concentrated among the lowest two rating options
(one or two stars), but unhelpful votes—a clear indication of relative informational
value—are predominantly concentrated among the highest two rating options (four
or five stars). Reviews where the volunteer gave the firm a one-star rating account
for thirty-eight percent of helpful votes but only thirteen percent of unhelpful votes.
For the other extreme (five-star ratings), the vote shares flip. And although reviews
with less extreme values (two, three, or four stars) may be less biased, they are each
deemed less helpful than the most negative (one star) reviews.
The value of information, in particular negative information, might reasonably
depend upon the firm in question. For example, information may be less in demand for more-established firms with well-understood, off-line reputations or for
firms that already have more-established, on-line reputations with many reviews
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Figure 2.3: Marginal Distributions of Jobseeker (Un)Helpful Votes by Review Rating

Notes: The figure above shows the distribution of all helpful votes and unhelpful votes submitted
by users of the website for employer reviews submitted before 2015 (see Section B.3), where
reviews are partitioned according to the employer rating.

on Glassdoor. With this in mind, we examine whether the value of positive and
negative information to jobseekers changes across firm characteristics. Although
the magnitudes vary, in every type of firm observed, jobseekers rate more positive
reviews as less helpful than other reviews. Negative information about the firm is
most sought after by jobseekers regardless of how long the firm has been in operation, how highly rated the firm was, how many prior reviews the firm had, or
how much the firm pays its workers compared with other firms (see Figure B.7).55
The ranking of helpfulness across review ratings is qualitatively highly stable. The
average helpful vote share for one- and two-star reviews consistently hovers around
ninety-five percent, whereas average helpful vote share for four- and five-star reviews
is consistently below eighty percent.
55

Firm-specific pay premia are estimated using an AKM-style approach (Abowd et al., 1999)
with two-way fixed effects for firm and due to the thin panel of repeat observations for workers,
job title in lieu of worker fixed effects. The adjusted R2 from this regression is 0.86. For detailed
analysis of Glassdoor pay data and for a comparison to other income surveys, see Liu et al. (2019);
Sockin and Sockin (2019a,b).
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Additional evidence comes from a regression of a review’s helpful share on the
review’s star rating of the firm, controlling for other factors that might influence
helpfulness. In particular, we control for firm fixed effects; year-month fixed effects;
and measures of the nature of the review text, including the length of the review,
the sophistication of its language, and the subjectivity of its tone.56 Reviews communicating a one-star-higher rating were classified as helpful by a smaller share of
voting jobseekers, resulting in an 8.5 percentage points lower helpful share (Table
2.1: Column 1). This result is robust to predicting a review’s helpful share with
alternative measures for the volunteer’s evaluation of her job in lieu of the employer
rating. One such alternative is whether the volunteer would recommend the employer to a friend (59.6 percent would per Table B.2). On average, the helpful share
of would-recommend reviews is 22.8 percentage points lower than that of would-notrecommend reviews (Column 2). Reviews where the volunteer approves of the CEO
witness a 17.3-percentage-points-lower helpful share (Column 3), while those that
report a positive business outlook for the firm see a 17.7-percentage-points-lower
helpful share (Column 4). An additional alternative—which is also a more continuous measure of a review’s positivity—is the share of text characters spent discussing
pros of the job, rather than cons. The pro share of review text (which averages 46.8
percent) gauges the volunteer’s overall evaluation of her job, avoiding the coarseness
56

Although not the main takeaway from Table 2.1, the helpful share regressions indicate that
longer, better-written, and more objective reviews are viewed as more helpful by jobseekers. While
the quality and subjectivity of the text have relatively muted associations, doubling the length of
a review is associated with a helpful share that is about 4 percentage points higher, conditional
on the volunteer’s evaluation of the firm.
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of the discrete five-star rating system. Reviews with a 10-percentage-points-higher
pro share of review text experience on average a 3.8-percentage-points-lower helpful
share (Column 5). Finally, we apply sentiment analysis to the review text and measure the positive versus negative emotional polarity of the text and similarly find
that more-negative sentiment improves helpful share (Column 6). When we include
all of these measures together, they all negatively predict helpfulness conditional
on one another: Evidently, this finding is extremely robust.57
Next, we consider whether there is heterogeneity in demand for negative information depending on the voting jobseeker’s satisfaction with her own job. We
split the sample between jobseekers who expressed dissatisfaction with their own
employer (one or two stars), moderation (three or four stars), or satisfaction (five
stars). This requires us to restrict the analysis to a subsample of (un)helpful votes
where the jobseeker reviewed her own employer. To try to clarify the influence of
potential insincere voting by “jobseekers,” we further split each subsample between
jobseekers voting on the helpfulness of a review who: (a) do not work at the reviewed firm and are, therefore, presumably more likely to be engaged in genuine job
search, or (b) do work at the reviewed firm, and therefore, may be more likely to be
engaged in insincere sock puppetry. This partitions observations into six (un)helpful
voter subsamples, by the voter’s own expressed satisfaction at her own employer
57

An alternative specification—where the count of helpful votes is predicted rather than the
helpful share—reaffirms this robust finding that negative information is most helpful. Results
from these count-helpful regressions are displayed in Table B.7. This sample of reviews is not
restricted to the pre-2015 period.
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Table 2.1: Predicting Helpfulness of Volunteer’s Review
Share of review votes helpful
Star rating

∗∗∗

-0.044∗∗∗
(0.001)

-0.085
(0.001)

-0.228∗∗∗
(0.004)

Would recommend employer to friend

-0.075∗∗∗
(0.003)
-0.173∗∗∗
(0.003)

Approves of the CEO

-0.028∗∗∗
(0.002)
-0.177∗∗∗
(0.003)

Positive business outlook for the firm

-0.041∗∗∗
(0.002)
-0.383∗∗∗
(0.006)

Pro share of review text

Polarity of text

-0.039∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.165∗∗∗
(0.003)

-0.017∗∗∗
(0.003)

Log character length of review

0.044∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.043∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.057∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.049∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.040∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.062∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.034∗∗∗
(0.001)

Flesch-Kincaid reading grade

0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)

0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)

0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)

0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)

0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)

0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)

0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)

Subjectivity of text

-0.015∗∗∗
(0.003)
X
530502
0.26

-0.020∗∗∗
(0.003)
X
458916
0.26

-0.029∗∗∗
(0.003)
X
407704
0.20

-0.020∗∗∗
(0.004)
X
355688
0.21

-0.021∗∗∗
(0.003)
X
530502
0.19

0.007∗∗
(0.003)
X
530502
0.16

-0.008∗∗
(0.004)
X
291785
0.28

Employer, year-month FE
N
Adjusted R2

Notes: The dependent variable, share helpful votes, is defined as the ratio of helpful votes to the
sum of helpful and unhelpful votes. Sample is restricted to reviews submitted before 2015 (see
Section B.3) as well as reviews for which the Flesch Kincaid reading grade is non-negative and no
greater than 20. Polarity and subjectivity of each review are measured through natural language
processing using the TextBlob library in Python. Standard errors clustered at the employer level.
One, two, and three stars denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For
a summary of the dataset, see Table B.2.

crossed by whether or not her employer is the review’s firm on which she is voting.
In each subsample, we predict whether a jobseeker votes the review helpful rather
than unhelpful as a function of the review’s overall rating, to capture if jobseekers
show a stronger relative demand for negative versus positive information (Table 2.2).
For jobseekers voting on reviews of firms where they do not work, demand for
negative information is very similar regardless of their own job satisfaction. Among
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those who rated their own firm as one- or two-stars, reviews with one-star higher
overall rating by the volunteer are 7.9 percent less likely to be voted helpful by
the jobseeker. Among those who rated their own firm as four- or five-stars, the
analogous estimate is 7.8 percent less likely.
Table 2.2: Conditional Probability of Helpful Vote by Voter Rating and Firm Coincidence
Voter’s rating of employer from own review
Review’s firm 6= Voter’s firm

Review’s firm = Voter’s firm

1–2 stars 3–4 stars 5 stars 1–2 stars 3–4 stars 5 stars
Review’s rating of employer -0.079∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.011)
(0.005)
(0.009) (0.038)
N
77990
24537
9509
51888
8155
5515
2
Adjusted R
0.42
0.43
0.37
0.51
0.28
0.42
Notes: Sample consists of a panel of (un)helpful votes for different employer reviews. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that the user up-voted the review helpful. Because the
dataset consists only of helpful and unhelpful votes—meaning it excludes decisions where no vote
was given—this dummy is conditional on submitting a vote. Sample is restricted to voting users
who submitted at least one of their own employer reviews on the website prior to submitting the
(un)helpful vote. Each regression includes fixed effects for the reviewed employer. Standard errors
are clustered by voter. One, two, and three stars denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively. For a summary of the dataset, see Table B.2.

In contrast, among jobseekers who work at the reviewed firm, there’s a sharp
difference in voting behavior depending on own job satisfaction. Those who express
dissatisfaction with their own job are more likely to vote negative reviews of their
firm as helpful. However, those who express satisfaction with their own firm are
instead more likely to vote positive reviews as helpful. This is the only exception to
the pattern of more negative information being more demanded. This could be due
to sock puppetry, a boss rewarding employees for supplying positive reviews of the
firm and upvoting other positive reviews of the firm. It could also be sincere; I like
90

my firm and think reviews by others who like it will be most helpful to jobseekers.

2.3.3

How do risks of employer retaliation affect the supply
of inside information from potential volunteers?

When workers decide whether to supply negative feedback, they must weigh the
benefits and costs of providing such information. An altruistic volunteer will value
the prospect of helping other jobseekers make more informed employment decisions,
but a negative review also creates some risk that the employer retaliates against
the volunteer personally.58
Externalities from a volunteer’s review on firms are mixed, depending on if the
information will tend to increase or decrease labor supply to the firm. This gives
firms incentives to intervene in the information supply process. The employer that
would be hurt by a negative review has a concentrated interest in the worker not
supplying it and an incentive to discourage its supply, whereas the set of workers
and competitors with any interest in the information being revealed each have only
a minor interest, thereby making it difficult to coordinate (Olson, 2009). Workers
with negative, but not positive, information about an employer have little incentive
to volunteer it and some incentives to withhold it.
There is anecdotal and survey evidence that workers risk employer retaliation
58

Appendix Section B.2 offers a model to illustrate how we see the firm’s, insider’s, and jobseeker’s interactions fitting together. We wrote this down after obtaining the estimates but it aims
to help readers understand the logic we had in mind when designing the analysis.
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when sharing negative information about working conditions.59 Women defying
pressure and retaliation threats from their bosses to share information about sexual harassment at work gave rise to the #MeToo movement. Firms use broad
interpretations of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) and nondisparagement clauses
to threaten lawsuits to prevent workers from sharing negative, private information about jobs there, and over one-third of U.S. workers report being bound by
NDAs (Starr et al., 2019).60 According to Lobel (2019), “NDAs regularly include
information beyond traditionally defined secrets under trade secrecy laws, including
general know-how, skills, client lists, and salary information. They also include provisions prohibiting the employee from disparaging the company.” Many companies
have sued Glassdoor seeking the identities of workers who anonymously reviewed
them, with many companies claiming that the reviews violated former employees’
nondisclosure clauses (Kidwai, 2020). Employers’ interest in suppressing negative
information and willingness to retaliate against employees who share it provide the
59

Eidelson (2020) writes, “In the past few months, U.S. businesses have been on a silencing
spree. Hundreds of U.S. employers across a wide range of industries have told workers not to
share information about COVID-19 cases or even raise concerns about the virus, or have retaliated
against workers for doing those things, according to workplace complaints filed with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).”
60
Silver-Greenberg and Kitroeff (2020) say, “Employees who are fired or resign in frustration are
often pushed to sign contracts that prohibit them from in any way disparaging the company, several
of the former employees said in interviews. Those pacts bar the employees from even acknowledging
the existence of the agreements.... The Times spoke to 13 former Bloomberg employees... who said
they wanted to be released from their exit agreements so that they could speak openly about the
culture at the company... If they were free to talk, some of the former employees said, they would
describe a company that, while it provides generous pay and benefits, can be an uncomfortable
place to work, especially for women.” Benner (2017) says, “Nondisparagement clauses are not
limited to legal settlements. They are increasingly found in standard employment contracts in
many industries, sometimes in a simple offer letter that helps to create a blanket of silence around
a company.”
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rationale for many whistle-blower protections laws and procedures (Weil and Pyles,
2005; U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2017). Systematic evidence about the chilling role of retaliation fears comes from a recent study showing
that stronger protection of workers who blow the whistle on rights violations by
employers increases the willingness of workers to report such violations (Johnson
et al., 2020). Cortina and Magley (2003) found in a survey of public-sector employees, where incentives for managers to retaliate may be weaker than in the private
sector, that only 27 percent of respondents who experienced some recent interpersonal mistreatment in the workplace voiced concern over their mistreatment.
Among those who did, 66 percent reported being the subject of work-related or antisocial retaliatory behavior. Workers who report workplace violations might face
retaliation that lowers their income or sours their job satisfaction vis-a-vis, e.g.,
reduced pay, fewer hours, and task reassignment.61 The consequences though can
be even more dire, resulting in more extreme responses such as deportation.62
If the worker can more easily blend into the crowd of co-workers, this reduces
expected costs because the probability of identification and subsequent retaliation
falls. Qualitative evidence suggests that the fear of being discovered does alter
61

Covert (2020) discusses retaliation against McDonald’s workers reporting sexual harassment, “Instead of the harassers facing discipline, punishment was often meted out to the victims...assigned difficult or uncomfortable tasks—working the grill all day or being stuck at the
drive-through window for an entire shift. She was also disciplined for minor infractions, had her
hours cut, was demoted, and got suspended for two weeks. She was eventually fired.” This is
an awful example of workers expressing dissatisfaction with workplace conditions and bearing the
negative consequences from their current employer for doing so.
62
For example, when undocumented workers in Minnesota complained to their employer about
working conditions and said they would complain to others, the employer reported them to U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, which deported them (Walsh, 2018; Chen, 2018).
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workers’ disclosure patterns: A Fractl (2019) survey of 1,096 workers conducted
who left online employer reviews revealed that one-third of those sampled who
waited some time to leave their review did so because they did not want to be
identified by their former employers. On Glassdoor, a volunteer can conceal aspects
of their identity—their job title, location, or both—when leaving the review, making
it harder for the employer to potentially infer who wrote the review. About fiftythree percent of volunteers conceal at least one of these two aspects.
Volunteers leaving more negative reviews are more likely than other volunteers
to conceal aspects of their identity. This holds across volunteers for the full sample
of reviews (Table 2.3: Column 1) and the pre-2015 sample of reviews used for the
share helpful analysis (Column 2). Reviews by volunteers who conceal some aspect
of their identity tend to rate their employers on average 0.075–0.091 stars lower
overall. One concern is that volunteers who tend to be more negative in their
employer evaluations may also be more anxious about retaliation and more prone
to identity concealment. However, this relationship is not driven by individual
differences across volunteers in their tendency to review negatively and to withhold
identifying information. Among those who volunteer multiple reviews, the reviews
for which they choose to conceal an aspect of their identity are associated with
0.087 stars lower average rating (Column 3).63
If risk of retaliation contributes to concealment behavior, it would be less com63

The same volunteer leaving multiple reviews when logged into their Glassdoor account each
time can be linked across reviews by Glassdoor and by the researchers. However, a jobseeker
cannot identify multiple reviews left by the same volunteer.
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Table 2.3: Overall Employer Rating, Retaliation Risk Measures, and Review Helpfulness by Identity Concealment
1{Current

Log
employee} employment

Star rating
Conceals aspect of identity -0.075∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.014)

0.059∗∗∗
(0.006)

-0.454∗∗∗
(0.025)

Star rating
Sample
Mean dependent variable
Share conceal
Employer FE
Volunteer FE
N
Adjusted R2

Full
3.34
0.53
X

pre-2015 pre-2015
3.17
2.83
0.39
0.35
X
X
X
6308865 1268132 101361
0.14
0.16
0.45

pre-2015
0.540
0.35
X
X
101361
0.21

pre-2015
8.615
0.35
X
101361
0.49

Share of review
votes helpful
-0.002∗
(0.001)

-0.012∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)

-0.078∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
pre-2015 pre-2015 pre-2015
0.86
0.86
0.86
0.40
0.40
0.40
X
657691
0.04

657691
0.16

657691
0.24

Notes: When submitting a review, users are asked to provide their job title and location, but can
leave them blank. Respondents can also report an anonymized job title, i.e., job titles including
the word “anonymous” or ending in “employee.” Firm employment is based on a fixed employer
lookup table and does not vary over time. Each regression includes year-month fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the employer level. One, two, and three stars denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For a summary of the data, see Table B.2.

mon in contexts where this risk is less of a concern. What kinds of workers should
worry less? First, former employees should worry less than current employees. Retaliation threats that apply to former employees (e.g., the prospect of a bad reference
in the future) also apply to current ones but current employees face additional risks
(e.g., undesirable schedule or task assignments, demotion, cuts to pay and hours,
personal harassment, or firing).64 Second, workers in firms with more employees
might worry less about the boss inferring their identity, because they can blend
into a larger crowd. Consistent with these predictions, among volunteers who leave
multiple reviews, respondents are more likely to conceal an aspect of their identity
if they are currently an employee and when they are reporting on a smaller firm
64

According to Weil and Pyles (2005), “Public law groups and other organizations representing
low-wage workers note that many employee complaints... are filed after a worker has been fired
by an employer, often for other causes (thereby lowering the cost of complaining at that point).”
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(Columns 4 and 5, respectively).65 Volunteers are 5.9 percentage points more likely
to conceal an aspect of their identity when reporting on a firm that currently, rather
than formerly, employs them and firms where they conceal aspects of their identity
are 36.5 percent (45.4 log points) smaller on average than firms where the job title
and location are revealed. For these specifications, we incorporate volunteer fixed
effects, meaning that our estimates are identified off of the same worker reviewing
as both a current and former employee, and who left multiple reviews for firms of
different sizes, respectively.
Finally, when volunteers conceal aspects of their identity, it may degrade the
value of the information they supply, since doing so limits the ability of jobseekers
to judge the relevance of the informational content to their own decisions. For
instance, a jobseeker deciding whether to apply to a particular job posting may
derive the greatest value from reviews by volunteers with the same job title and
in the same location as the posting. To test this, we predict each review’s helpful
share with whether the volunteer concealed either aspect of their identity. Indeed,
jobseekers tend to classify reviews from volunteers who concealed their identity
as less helpful conditional on the reviewed firm, the review’s year-month, and the
volunteer’s overall rating of the firm (Column 8). Jobseekers classify reviews for
which either aspect of volunteer identity is concealed as 1.8 percentage points less
helpful on average than non-concealed reviews with the same star rating for the
65

In terms of the model, current employees face higher costs of retaliation (cR ). If a firm tries
to uncover the reporting insider’s identity among all possible insiders to retaliate, smaller firms
will have a higher probability of success (ρ).
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same firm.
Beyond a general desire for anonymity, if fear of retaliation works to suppress
the supply of negative information, then we would anticipate workers facing greater
retaliation risks to seek anonymity more when relaying negative information than
when relaying positive information. Figure 2.4 presents flexible evidence that this
is in fact the case. We stratify the sample by measures of retaliation risk—whether
the volunteer was a current or former employee and the size of the firm reviewed.
Reviews are grouped into decile based on firm size with reviews of larger firms
further right on the horizontal axis. Reviews by current employees are represented
by solid lines and former employees by dashed lines. Those with negative ratings
(one- and two-stars) are represented by thicker, red lines and those with positive
ratings (four- and five-stars) by thinner, blue lines.
Figure 2.4: Share of Volunteers Concealing Aspects of Their Identity by Their
Rating of Firm, Employment Status, and Firm Size Decile

Notes: The figures above detail the rate at which volunteers conceal potentially identifying information depending upon the size of the employer and whether the volunteer is still currently
employed at the firm. The sample of positive reviews reflects four- and five-star reviews, while the
sample of negative reviews reflects one- and two-star reviews. Sample of volunteers is restricted
to those who leave multiple reviews on the website. Firm size deciles are defined across reviews.
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First, we observe a markedly steeper slope in concealment with respect to the
size of the firm for negative reviews than for positive reviews. When the review is
negative, employees in the smallest two deciles by firm size conceal at rates that are
17–18 percentage points above that of employees in the highest decile. For positive
reviews, the slope in employer size is negative but noticeably flatter. Second, across
the spectrum of employer size, when supplying negative information, current employees are consistently more likely to conceal aspects of their identity, consistent
with current employees facing a greater risk than former employees. When supplying positive information, the same relation is not observed. For larger firms, former
employees are more likely to conceal than current ones. Taken together, we observe
that if retaliation risks affect employee disclosure, such risks appear most relevant
when supplying negative content, consistent with expectations.
To formally test whether retaliation risks are borne out among workers when
supplying negative rather than positive information, we predict concealment with
an interaction between the volunteer’s rating of the firm and the two measures of
retaliation risk—current employee status and firm size. Let 1(Conceal)ir indicate if
volunteer-i conceals an identifying aspect of their identity in review-r. We consider
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the following linear probability model,

1(Conceal)ir =β1 Ratingir + β2 log(F irmSize)ir + β3 1(CurrentEmployee)ir
+ 1(Ratingir ≤ 2) × [β4 log(F irmSize)ir + β5a 1(CurrentEmployee)ir ]
Industry
Y ear−M onth
+ δir
+ δir
+ γi + ir .

(2.3.2)

If fear of retaliation drives identity concealment—and thus likely works to suppress
negative feedback more broadly—we should observe that reviews of one or two
stars are more likely to have identifying aspects concealed among volunteers facing
higher retaliation risk. Our hypothesis then is that a worker’s concealment probability is higher when leaving a negative review and being either at a smaller firm
(β4 < 0) or a current employee (β5 > 0). Estimates of this model both across and
within volunteers are displayed in Table B.3 and are consistent with the predicted
signs. Figure B.8 presents more flexible evidence that allows for but does not find
meaningful non-linearities in the key relationships.66
The evidence presented so far looks at variation in measures of retaliation risk
66
Panel (a) considers how the difference in the probability of concealment when leaving a negative rather than a positive review relates to firm size. Panel (b) considers how the difference relates
to current employee status. The two provide a visual representation of the semi-parametric relationship expressed in β4 and β5 , respectively. The relationships appear reasonably linear and
robust. In the case of firm size, the negative slope is more than twice as steep for negative reviews
than positive reviews, pointing to systematically higher rates of concealment when supplying negative information at smaller firms than at larger firms. A negative slope is observed for positive
reviews as well, possibly reflecting a widespread desire for anonymity. In the case of current employee status, concealment is higher in the context of negative reviews and higher retaliation risk,
as an appreciably steeper positive slope is observed among negative reviews.
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specific to and reported by the worker who is deciding on a rating to leave and
whether to conceal identity. Next, we focus on a more-remote source of variation
in retaliation risks. We assume that workers in weaker labor markets—those with
higher unemployment rates—face a higher expected cost of retaliation and study
whether relationships strengthen in this case. Low unemployment rates means more
robust employment alternatives. Higher unemployment rates mean workers have
worse outside options and, thus, a higher expected cost of retaliation. In sum, we
expect worker demand for anonymity to be counter-cyclical.
To test this, for volunteers who report their location of employment, we assign their review the unemployment rate in that state for the year-month in which
the review was written. Although these employees have revealed their location—
foregoing one layer of anonymity—the workers can still choose whether or not to
conceal their job title. Above we highlighted two contexts in which workers may
fear retaliation risk more and thus have heightened desire for anonymity: being a
current employee and working for a smaller firm. This theory predicts that, as the
unemployment rate rises, current employees and workers from smaller firms will
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increasingly conceal their identity. The model we estimate is,

1(ConcealJobT itle)f sti =β1 Ratingf sti + β2 U Rst + γi + γι(f ) + γs + γt
+ β3 1(CurrentEmp)f sti + β4 U Rst × 1(CurrentEmp)f sti
+ β5 log(F irmSize)f + β6 U Rst × log(F irmSize)f + f sti
(2.3.3)

where fixed effects are included for volunteer i, industry ι(f ) for firm-f , state s, and
year-month t. If retaliation risk contributes to concealment, then we would expect
β4 > 0 and β6 < 0. Columns 4 and 6 of Table 2.4, which correspond respectively
to β4 and β6 , reveal that these relations do arise and are statistically significant.
For current employees—who risk being fired and having to search for new employment opportunities—a five-percentage-point rise in the local unemployment rate is
associated with a three-percentage-point increase in concealment. Given that the
average rate of job title concealment among reviews for which location is available
is about twenty percent, an increase of three percentage points would constitute a
roughly 15 percent increase in concealment, suggesting that retaliation risk plays a
non-trivial role in the supply of reviews.
The evidence presented so far establishes a reliable association between volunteers concealing aspects of their identity and their reviews being more negative
in ways consistent with concerns about retaliation risk, which in turn suppresses
helpful information. Is this relation causal? Consider an ideal experiment. If one
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Table 2.4: Labor Market Tightness and Identity Concealment

Conceals job title

Share
conceal

Star
rating

Unemployment
rate (UR)

0.199

-0.017∗∗∗
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.002)

1{Current employee}

Log employment

Alone

× UR

Alone

× UR

0.032∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)

-0.014∗∗∗
(0.001)

-0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)

Notes: The table above presents estimates of how identity concealment varies with labor market
tightness along two dimensions of retaliation risk—current employee status and working for a
smaller firm. Estimates are from a single regression which includes volunteer, industry, state,
and year-month fixed effects. Sample size is 508,004 reviews. The unemployment rate (UR) is
the monthly-state rate, in percentage points, from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rate in [State], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis). Standard errors are clustered by state. One, two, and three stars denote
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

population of potential reviewers were randomly assigned the ability to conceal
identifying aspects and another was not, how would the ability to conceal identifying aspects change what information is volunteered? The phenomenon described
above implies that, reviews volunteered by those randomly assigned an ability to
conceal would differ in the following ways: 1) more negative ratings on average,
2) a higher share of reviews from workers in higher risk contexts — from current
employees and firms that are smaller on average, and 3) conditional on the rating,
jobseekers rate reviews as less helpful on average due to the greater prevalence of
identity concealment and degraded ability to judge relevance.
To approach this, we harness large, discontinuous, persistent changes in the
proportion of volunteers whom conceal aspects of their identity over time. There
have been four such discontinuities in concealment rates since Glassdoor started.
We believe these are due to changes in Glassdoor user interfaces, as they changed the
logic of required fields on the forms volunteers use to review employers. Figure 2.5
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plots the trends in concealment rates for job title and location in each calendar week
since Glassdoor started recording employer reviews through the end of 2013. There
were no such discontinuities after 2013 (Figure B.9). In the eighteenth and twentysecond weeks of 2009, rates of location and job title concealment, respectively,
jumped sharply. In the forty-eighth week of 2009, rates of location concealment
collapsed to zero. In the twenty-first week of 2012, rates of job title concealment
dropped roughly twenty percentage points between weeks. And in the third week of
2013, rates of job title and location concealment both jumped drastically. Given the
sharpness in and persistence following the change in concealment rates around these
dates, we interpret these events as structural changes that are exogenous shifters in
the ability for volunteers to conceal.67
To exploit this quasi-experimental variation, our baseline estimates restrict attention to the sample of reviews volunteered within four weeks of a policy change
and assume that, there was not a shift in the flow of potential reviews from another
source within this time window. We define two instruments to represent shifts in the
ability to conceal each identifying aspect, which take different values across a change
date. The first is an indicator for job title concealment becoming more available
67

We cannot say for certain what the exact causes were for each of these shifts. As location
concealment falls to near-zero rates, we suspect that the option to leave location blank was entirely removed during this period, with the modicum of concealment during this period perhaps
attributable to user error where entries cannot be matched to a real location or to A/B testing.
For job titles, concealment rates collapse but not to zero, per conversations with Glassdoor staff,
this likely reflects a change in the availability of concealment for users on some platform (e.g. web
via computer) but not another (e.g. iPhone app). Nevertheless, as long as the changes are unanticipated by users to the site and do not influence outcomes via other paths besides concealment
ability, the sudden, persistent changes would suffice as valid instruments for concealment.

103

Figure 2.5: Trends in Rates of Job Title and Location Concealment

Notes: The figure plots the share of reviews that conceal job title or location in each calendar
year-week. This range includes all exploitable discontinuous probability changes. Concealment
trends after 2013 are available in Figure B.9, which spans from the twenty-fourth week of 2008
through the final week of 2018.

to respondents (Z JobT itle ), which takes the value one on the side of a policy change
with a discontinuously higher job title concealment rate, zero on the lower side of
such a change, and zero on both sides of a policy change that affected only location concealment, not job title concealment. The second instrument is for location
concealment becoming more available (Z Location ) and is constructed analogously.
Table B.4 provides detail about the definition of these instruments. These policy
variables are instruments for a volunteer’s decision to conceal on a given review,
isolating the variation in concealment behavior driven by the policy changes. The
IVs have a strong first stage in predicting actual rates at which volunteers conceal
an identifying aspect (Table B.5). In this ±4 week bandwidth sample, we estimate both ordinary least square (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) regressions
of concealing any identifying aspect on average rating, whether the respondent is
a current employee, the size of the firm being reviewed, and the helpfulness of the
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review. Table 2.5 summarizes the results.
These models do not include firm or volunteer fixed effects because the key
variation is coming from the policy changes. When the option to conceal is more
available to potential volunteers, different sets of volunteers may opt into leaving
reviews, changing the set of firms reviewed. We want to capture the total effect,
including both changes in information supplied within volunteer and firm who report
always as well as changes in the composition of volunteers and firms depending on
concealment availability.
Table 2.5: Overall Rating, Retaliation Risk Measures, and Review Helpfulness by
Identity Concealment Driven by Exogenous Policy Shifts, OLS and IV Estimates
Star rating
Conceals aspect of identity

-0.119∗∗∗
(0.011)

-0.260∗∗∗
(0.052)

1{Current employee}
0.023∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.043∗∗
(0.019)

Log(employment)
-0.679∗∗∗
(0.035)

-0.484∗∗∗
(0.122)

Share of review votes helpful
0.010∗∗
(0.004)

0.010
(0.025)

Star rating
Specification
Dep. var. mean
Dep. var. std. dev.
N
Adjusted R2
F statistic
Anderson-Rubin chi-sq

OLS
3.15
1.31
77176
0.00
35.86

IV
3.15
1.31
77176
0.00
18.74
29.91

OLS
0.57
0.49
77176
0.00
35.54

IV
0.57
0.49
77176
0.00
30.08
28.32

OLS
8.56
2.82
71368
0.02
124.41

IV
8.56
2.82
71368
0.02
58.03
16.66

OLS
0.81
0.35
39119
0.00
3.25

IV
0.81
0.35
39119
0.00
2.25
1.76

-0.005
(0.004)

-0.032
(0.022)

-0.104∗∗∗
(0.003)

-0.105∗∗∗
(0.003)

OLS
0.81
0.35
39119
0.17
227.18

IV
0.81
0.35
39119
0.17
220.12
2.82

Notes: Sample is restricted to reviews that arrive within ±4 weeks of each large, sudden, persistent
shift in the availability of identity concealment options. Each regression includes a linear time
trend in year-week and a dummy variable for each of the three latter policy change periods: late2009, mid-2012, and early-2013. Indicators for concealment of location or concealment of job title
becoming more available (detailed in Table B.4) are used as instruments for IV specifications.
Standard errors are clustered by firm. One, two, and three stars denote significance at the 10, 5,
and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Consistent with the results from Table 2.3, the OLS results in the sample within
four weeks of the discontinuities reveal similar associations with identity concealment: more-negative average ratings, increased likelihood of volunteers being a
current employee or from a smaller firm, and slightly less helpful (but not statisti-
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cally significant in this specification) to jobseekers conditional on rating. The IV
finds qualitatively similar patterns. The option for volunteers to conceal identifying
aspects causes reviews to be on average 0.260 stars lower, more than twice as large
of an effect as the OLS estimate and equivalent to about one-fifth of a standard
deviation. With regards to the probability volunteers are current employees, the IV
estimate shows an even stronger relation, with the option to conceal causing a 4.3
percentage points increase. The IV estimate for firm size attenuates somewhat compared with the OLS estimate but remains robustly negative at –38.4 percent (–48.4
log points), confirming that the option to conceal induces reviews from volunteers
at smaller firms.
Lastly, the OLS and IV estimates for review helpfulness unconditional with respect to review’s rating suggest reviews with identity concealed are more helpful
or about the same on average. However, this combines two countervailing channels
– concealment draws in more negative information, which is helpful, but degrades
its value by obscuring relevance, which is unhelpful. When conditioning on review
rating as in the last two columns, more-negative reviews are estimated to be more
helpful, with an average increase in helpfulness share of 10.5 percentage points for
reviews with a one-star lower rating in the IV. On the other hand, identity concealment itself conditional on review rating appears to make reviews less helpful. The
IV point estimate for review helpfulness, –3.2 percentage points, is similar in sign
and order of magnitude to the estimates in Table 2.3, but is not statistically differ-
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ent from zero in this ±4-week bandwidth sample. We consider though alternative
bandwidths for the number of weeks around each discontinuity to include in the
sample. Reasonable arguments could be made for focusing on both narrower and
wider bandwidths, consistent with the logic of a standard bias-variance tradeoff.
The results from re-estimating the IV specification for review helpfulness conditional on the review rating with bandwidths ranging from ±1 to ±10 are displayed
in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Effect of Concealment on Helpful Share, IV Estimates with Alternative
Bandwidths

Notes: Sample is restricted to reviews that arrive within ± bandwidth weeks of each large, sudden,
persistent shift in the availability of identity concealment options. Each regression includes a linear
time trend in year-week and a dummy variable for each of the three latter discontinuity periods:
late-2009, mid-2012, and early-2013. Each regression additionally controls for the review’s star
rating. Indicators for concealment of location or concealment of job title becoming more available
(see Table B.4) are used as instruments. Vertical red bars indicate a 95% confidence interval
around each point estimate. Standard errors are clustered by firm. The result for ±4 bandwidth
is displayed in the final column of Table 2.5.

The effect appears negative and relatively stable at around 3–4 percentage points
across the choice of bandwidth. While the estimate is not statistically significant
for a bandwidth of ±4 weeks, it is stable in magnitude and significant for a smaller
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bandwidth (±2) and larger bandwidths (above ±7), offering evidence that identity
concealment per se lowers the helpfulness of reviews conditional on rating.68 Concealed reviews might be less helpful to workers because determining the relevance
of the content to one’s own employment opportunities becomes harder. If workplace attributes are specific to establishments and differ by the job—for instance
the management and coworkers with whom one would interact may vary greatly
even for the same firm—then inability to tie the review to a specific employment
opportunity could render the information less helpful.
We also consider alternative instrument definitions that use the same discontinuities but aggregate them differently.69 The first stage remains robust (Columns
1 and 3 of Table B.5) and second-stage estimates (Table B.6) change little with
respect to the choice of instrument(s).

2.3.4

Why stronger demand for negative information?

Insiders will tend to under-supply negative reviews if they face retaliation risk.70
The cost of retaliation — which depends on the probability of being identified as
well as the magnitude of punishment if identified — creates a wedge whereby employees with bad experiences at the firm might strategically choose not to volunteer
68

The analogous IV results for star rating, whether the volunteer is a current employee, and
firm size change little when shrinking or widening the bandwidth (Figure B.10).
69
The first alternative is to use only a single indicator for whether concealing either aspect
becomes more available (Z either ≡ max{Z JobT itle , Z Location }). The second alternative is to use
three indicators for concealing job title only, location only, or both becoming more available
(Z JobT itle \ Z Location , Z Location \ Z JobT itle , and Z JobT itle × Z Location ).
70
Section B.2 uses a game to describe how.
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this information. Consequently, signals of employer reputation will be biased upwards, and especially so for employers with strong retaliatory stances. A firm can
have a high rating because it is a high-road company where workers have good experiences or because it retaliates against its workforce to suppress negative ratings.
To the jobseeker, these two are observationally equivalent, as only publicly disclosed
information is available to them. Negative reviews run counter to this bias, and can
move employer reputation closer to true quality. Much evidence is consistent with
this as part of the explanation for jobseekers’ finding negative reviews more helpful.
Other potential channels—jobseeker risk aversion, the tendency of employers to
advertise positive information, a large supply of employer-induced positive reviews,
and differences in the perceived truthfulness of negative content—would also push
this way. This section discusses and offers some evidence on these mechanisms to
build an understanding about the process. Given employer preferences for supplying
positive information and worker risk aversion, it would be perhaps surprising if
jobseekers expressed no preference for negative information from volunteers.
Worker risk aversion would contribute to the demand for negative information.
Consider a risk-neutral jobseeker for whom each new review is an independent,
mean-zero signal about the true quality of an employer and who so far has seen n
ratings of the firm with average R̄n . Consider the n + 1th signal: Rn+1 . The value
of this signal to the jobseeker does not depend on the particular value of Rn+1 or
the difference Rn+1 − R̄n . A signal leads to an updating of the prior and increases
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belief precision. If it does this by confirming that the prior average was correct,
this is as valuable as a signal that leads to an update up or down. On the other
hand, if the jobseeker is risk averse, then the value of a signal that shifts her mean
posterior belief down  is more valuable than one that shifts it up by the same
amount. Avoiding an -worse outcome is worth more than gaining an -better one.
That workers tend to be risk averse seems uncontroversial and likely part of the
explanation.
Second, jobseekers acquire information about jobs through communication with
the hiring firm and it seems reasonable to suppose that the hiring firm supplies
positive, rather than negative, information. To test this, we study a sample of
413,846 job postings on Glassdoor for which we observe the text of the job description associated with the posting.71 These job descriptions can be interpreted
as advertisements for the firm. As one might expect, firms write job postings full
of positive language. Sentiment analysis of these descriptions confirms this. Job
descriptions are less positive than the pros text of reviews but far more positive
than the cons text of reviews (Figure 2.7). Almost no employer advertises with
negatively-charged text, as less than one percent of descriptions are interpreted
as relaying negative sentiment. It is in the firm’s interest to supply positive, not
negative, information.72 Without a reputation system in place where jobseekers
71

Glassdoor collects postings from three main sources—online job boards, applicant tracking
systems, and company websites—and captures about 81 percent of U.S. job openings, as measured in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(Chamberlain and Zhao, 2019).
72
Firms have incentives to supply information that horizontally differentiates them from com-

110

can obtain information about the firm from experienced sources, presumably the
only employer-specific information non-referral workers would have access to would
be job advertisements and public media coverage. The former, as evidenced by
Figure 2.7, contains little if any negative content, while the latter would likely be
limited in scope to only large, well-known employers.
Figure 2.7: Emotional Polarity of Job Postings and Reviews’ Cons and Pros Sections

Notes: Polarity of the “Pros” section for employer reviews, “Cons” section for employer reviews,
and job posting descriptions are measured through natural language processing using the TextBlob
library in Python. The polarity measure ranges from -1 to 1, with more positive (negative)
values reflecting more positively (negatively) charged text, and is partitioned into seven bins. The
leftmost, center, and rightmost bars reflect the share of reviews within a polarity bin for the
“Cons” field, “Pros” field, and job descriptions, respectively. Bars sum to 1 for each text category.

Finally, we generate evidence on the extent to which jobseeker preference for
negative information is driven by employers inducing the supply of more positive
information through sock puppetry, i.e., directly producing positive reviews under
false identities or creating some kind of incentives for employees to supply them
petitors in workers’ eyes. This can improve fit. They do not have incentives to supply information
that vertically differentiates them in a negative way. The challenge for high-road firms is to
credibly differentiate themselves from others. Institutions, including Glassdoor, may help communicate both kinds of information. Further, note that what distinguishes a dimension of horizontal
versus vertical differentiation is primarily the correlation in workers’ tastes. More highly correlated tastes imply greater vertical differentiation. Less correlated tastes imply greater horizontal
differentiation.
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using their own identities. This does not seem to be the main explanation. Prior
research in consumer markets shows that firms have incentives to increase the supply
of positive reviews about their own firm and the supply of negative reviews about
their competitors (Mayzlin et al., 2014), as firms benefit from improved reputation
in online [product] markets (Cabral and Hortaçsu, 2010) and if better ratings contributes to an improved search ranking on the platform (Nosko and Tadelis, 2015).
In turn, firms may take it upon themselves to farm positive reviews on the website
through their employees. Firms may incent their employees with monetary and
non-monetary rewards, or engage in campaigns to promote reviews from current
employees, especially those with positive sentiment towards the firm. The extent to
which sock puppetry exists could impact our findings. On the supply side, if a large
share of reviews are planted by employers, then the information may not reflect
true qualities of the firm. Conversely, on the demand side, if jobseekers believe that
a large share of positive reviews are employer-planted and thus disingenuous, then
they may discount positive reviews on the website, shifting helpfulness of supplied
information towards more negative reviews.
To explore these concerns, we attempt to identify reviews submitted disingenuously on the website, motivated by the investigational analysis done by The Wall
Street Journal.73 If employers launch a campaign or create some incentive for producing positive reviews, or if a deadline is approaching for an acknowledgement
73

See Fuller and Winkler (2020) for a case study analysis of how employers farm positive reviews
on the website, the incentives such firms have to engage in sock puppetry, and the mechanisms by
which employers will get their employees to supply positive reviews.
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from Glassdoor, then we would expect resulting reviews to arrive in abnormally
large waves during this period relative to trend.74
Motivated by this, we measure surge months as those with extreme, positive
growth rates in reviews submitted by firm, study how reviews during surge months
tend to differ from a firm’s reviews in other months, and whether the basic relationship of interest—jobseekers’ demand for negative information—holds excluding
surge months. For each firm f in each calendar year-month t, we calculate rates of
change in review count relative to the three months before and after t:

P
gfBt = log(rf t ) − log(

−3≤τ ≤−1 rf τ
+ 1) and gfAt = log(rf t ) − log(
3

P

1≤τ ≤3 rf τ

3

+ 1)

where rf t is the number of new reviews submitted by volunteers for firm f in yearmonth t. Together, the two growth rates detail the extent to which the number
of reviews submitted in a given month deviates from trend. If these surge months
capture some degree of sock puppetry, then we would anticipate reviews that are
submitted during these months to be more positive on average than other months
and disproportionately submitted by current employees who are more responsive to
employer manipulation. Evidence presented in Columns 1–4 of Table 2.6 confirms
74

For example, if an internal promotion starts at the beginning of April, we would expect reviews
in April to be large relative to preceding months. Additionally, the impact of an incentive may
dissipate after introduction as employees motivated to participate do so sooner rather than later.
Consequently, we would expect the reviews in April to be large relative to the subsequent months
as well. Alternatively, if there is a deadline for when Glassdoor considers firms for awards or
acknowledgements, we would anticipate a wave of disingenuous reviews to be submitted leading
up to that deadline.
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that this is the case, and increasingly so as the degree of abnormality in review
count used to define a surge month (increasingly high cutoff) is applied.
Table 2.6: Identifying Sock Puppetry
Star rating
100%
cutoff

1{Above monthly review growth cutoff} 0.394∗∗∗
(0.005)

1{Current employee}

50%
cutoff

100%
cutoff

50%
cutoff

0.166∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.128∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.047∗∗∗
(0.001)

Star rating
Year-month FE
Employer FE
Share of reviews above cutoff
N
Adjusted R2

X
X
0.109
6606743
0.15

X
X
0.278
6606743
0.14

X
X
0.109
6606743
0.07

X
X
0.278
6606743
0.07

Share of review
votes helpful
100%
cutoff

50%
cutoff

-0.088∗∗∗
(0.002)

-0.093∗∗∗
(0.002)

X
X
.
615358
0.23

X
X
.
470626
0.24

Notes: Table above attempts to identify sock puppetry in the reviews data and investigates
whether reviews identified as possible sock puppetry are driving the helpfulness of negative reviews.
For each firm in each year-month, we calculate the log change in reviews relative to the three
months prior (gfBt ) and the three months after (gfAt ). The x% percent cutoff refers to firm-yearmonths in which gfBt ≥ x% and gfAt ≥ x%. For Columns 5–6, reviews that lie above the cutoff are
excluded. Standard errors are clustered by firm. One, two, and three stars denote significance at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

To illuminate the extent to which sock puppetry drives jobseeker demand for
negative information, we re-estimate the specification for helpful share in Column
1 of Table 2.1 but removing potentially disingenuous reviews in an increasingly
conservative fashion. The last two columns of Table 2.6 affirm that the helpfulness
of negative information is not driven by the lack of helpfulness of employer-planted
reviews.
Even outside of an orchestrated campaign to boost positive reviews, workers
may be more honest or truthful when relaying negative content. To test whether
perceived truthfulness drives the expressed preference for negative information, we
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draw on a finding from Hansen and Wänke (2010). They found in an experimental
setting that individuals attributed statements written in language that was more
concrete than abstract as more likely to be true, even when the statements conveyed
the same content. If jobseekers value truthfulness in volunteers’ reviews of their
employers, we would anticipate more-concretely written reviews to receive a greater
helpful share. And, if volunteers tend to write using more concrete language when
supplying negative feedback—perhaps due to providing more detailed experiences—
then the increased perception of truth could drive jobseekers’ outsized demand
for negative reviews. Using the word-to-concreteness mapping of Brysbaert et al.
(2013), we measure each reviews’ mean level of word concreteness and standardize
the cross-sectional measure to standardized z-scores. We find that negative reviews
tends to be written more concretely. Reviews written with one standard deviation
more concrete language are on average 0.04–0.07 stars more negative (Table 2.7:
Columns 1–3). Such an increase in concreteness is associated with reviews being
0.4–0.9 percentage points more helpful to jobseekers (Columns 4–6). However,
controlling for each review’s degree of language concreteness, jobseekers still find
more-negative reviews more helpful.

2.4

Conclusion

This work contributes to our understanding of workers’ information problems, how
workers acquire information differentiating employment opportunities, and how rep115

Table 2.7: Relation between Concreteness of Review Language and Helpfulness
Star rating
Standardized language concreteness

Share of review votes helpful

-0.065∗∗∗

-0.058∗∗∗

-0.038∗∗∗

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.007)

0.009∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.005∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.073∗∗∗
(0.001)

-0.085∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.86
X

0.86
X

0.85
X
X

554190
0.06

554190
0.16

527372
0.26

Star rating
Mean dependent variable
Year-month FE
Employer FE
Volunteer FE
N
Adjusted R2

3.22
X

3.21
X
X

1206567
0.04

1124343
0.19

2.88
X
X
X
70897
0.47

Notes: The table above relates overall star rating and share helpful to the relative concreteness
of the language used in each review’s text. Word concreteness is taken from a list of 37,058
unigrams and 2,896 bigrams compiled by Brysbaert et al. (2013), and reflects the review’s average
across all unigrams and bigrams successfully matched to this list. Language concreteness is then
converted to standardized z-score. Each specification controls for the log character length, FleschKincaid reading grade, and text subjectivity. Sample is restricted to reviews written prior to 2015.
Standard errors are clustered by firm. One, two, and three stars denote significance at the 10, 5,
and 1 percent levels, respectively.

utation matters for firms.75 Successful reputation systems shift jobs from experience
goods towards inspection goods. The difficulty for workers to obtain information
about the real nature of each potential job creates friction. Lack of credible information can prevent workers from pursuing or even accepting job offers that would
have higher value to the worker than their better-understood current job. Even
if a worker knows her current job is bad, she may not trust another employer’s
75

Personnel economics has focused heavily on the manager’s information problem of choosing
among workers who appear the same but actually differ in unobservable ways. Workers differ
in unobservable type ex ante (adverse selection, unobserved productivity) and in unobservable
strategy ex post (moral hazard, unobserved effort). Abundant theory and empirical knowledge
have developed how these asymmetries create inefficiencies and how employers attempt to deal with
these challenges using screening mechanisms (credentials, interviews, monitoring) and incentive
mechanisms (pay-for-performance, promotion tournaments, job security). As Oyer et al. (2011)
note, “Because many researchers in this field must take their insights into MBA classrooms and
offer advice to future managers, Personnel Economists are typically interested in how firms can
solve human resource management problems and how the solutions to HR problems are related
to firms’ broader strategic contexts.” Workers’ information problems with respect to employer
heterogeneity merits greater attention.
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promising offer. In some ways, increased uncertainty acts like a larger mobility
cost. Institutions that reduce workers’ uncertainty about the nature of jobs should
increase efficiency. If workers face adverse selection in choosing employers such that
there are low-road employers that break their promises but successfully pool with
high-road employers that fulfill their promises, the worker should discount attractive promises. In this case, institutions that help workers distinguish firms that
treat workers well versus ill would have value, as modelled in Carmichael (1984a)
and Benson et al. (2020a).
Reputation institutions may help promote entrepreneurship and entry from the
competitive fringe by reducing the risk that workers face when considering going
to work for such firms. Younger, smaller firms succeed and grow by gaining the
trust necessary to attract customers and financing. Our finding here, that rating
effects on applications are strongest among the least-well-known firms, extending
the finding of Benson et al. (2020a) from Amazon Mechanical Turk to the broader
U.S. labor market, supports the idea that lesser-known firms face another challenge:
gaining potential workers’ trust. Well-functioning reputation institutions enable
firms with better jobs to credibly communicate that to potential workers and create
disincentives against offering worse jobs. The rise of new institutions that make
information exchange visible to economists creates new opportunities for improving
our understanding of the worker’s information problem.
The challenge in establishing a market for firm reputation is not due to the
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information lacking aggregate value. Rather, at least in part, the sheer number of
employers, workers, and the high degrees of differentiation in tastes, productivities,
and amenities between them makes the information space required to characterize
all jobs for all workers quite complex. Demand for and supply of information is
highly differentiated and thinly distributed. There is no mass market for singular pieces of labor-market information. It’s all long tails, with only a tiny share of
people interested in any one piece of information and only a tiny share of others possessing it. Lots of small transactions would have to be coordinated among strangers.
With the rise of online labor market platforms—where employer information can
be readily shared, aggregated, and consumed—information flow has improved but
there is reason to believe that it remains quite imperfect. A market for information
about jobs is missing, making the full quality of jobs difficult to observe. Improving
institutions that elicit, aggregate, and distribute workers’ private information can
create value.
New evidence reported here points to a problem with the flow of private information between workers about employers. Because jobs matter so much to workers’
lives, they have incentives to guard against risks of employer retaliation. This may
lead them to refrain altogether from supplying negative information or to conceal
in ways that degrade the value of the negative information supplied. The evidence
developed here—along with that in Marinescu et al. (2018a)—suggests that the
negative information supplied may be just the tip of an iceberg of negative infor-
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mation that remains largely out of workers’ and researchers’ view, owing to the
reluctance of informed firms and workers to supply it. This highlights a “Catch-22”
with the flow of information about employers. Volunteers are reluctant to supply
negative information and aspects of their own identity together. From the perspective of jobseekers, this creates bias, from a lack of negative information supplied,
or noise, from coarsening of volunteer identity. Threats to each worker’s exercise of
voice increases other workers’ uncertainty about job quality at prospective employers, potentially reducing their ability to match efficiently and, thus, their expected
value of exit.
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Chapter 3 Caught in the Act: How Corporate
Scandals Hurt Employees

3.1

Introduction

Corporate scandals are costly for firms. Revelations of impropriety hurt firm reputation and lead to poor performance (Karpoff et al., 2008; Armour et al., 2017).
Academic studies and the popular press have extensively covered the effects of scandals on financial measures such as earnings, but employee outcomes have received
considerably less attention.76 The disparity is notable, as corporate governance and
social responsibility have become increasingly important considerations for members of the workforce (Winograd and Hais, 2014).
In this paper, we use data from the online employer rating platform Glassdoor to
help fill the gap. The website crowd-sources employee reviews of firms, pay reports
decomposed into base and variable wages, and employee reviews of fringe benefits
packages. The data thus allow us to study the effects that scandals have on job
satisfaction and multiple types of compensation. We seek to determine if there
are decreases along any of these dimension and, if so, whether they are offset by
increases in another. For example, if worker sentiment falls after a scandal, firms
76

Examples from the popular press include “Wells Fargo Posts Weaker Earnings After SalesPractices Scandal,” Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2017, and “Sexual-harassment scandals are
hurting companies’ reputations and balance sheets,” The Economist, September 27, 2018.
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may look to mollify employees by improving wages or benefits. Alternatively, if
declines are not offset in any way, we can conclude that employees are left strictly
worse off by corporate misdeeds. The breadth and granularity of the data allow us to
conduct analysis across a variety of individual and employer characteristics within
narrow time intervals. If changes in job satisfaction and compensation arise due to,
say, increased news coverage or stock price reactions in the immediate aftermath
of a scandal, they may quickly revert to their original levels. If the misdeeds have
long-lasting effects on firms, however, negative outcomes for employee may persist.
We begin by investigating how corporate scandals affect workers’ perceptions of
their employers. Utilizing a difference-in-differences framework, we find that employees report less satisfaction with their firm in the wake of such events. More
specifically, the overall rating among reviews drops on average 0.069 stars (on a 1–5
star scale) in the two years following a scandal. Based on the Glassdoor-star-todollar estimate of Sockin and Sojourner (2020), this decrease translates to a $725
annual loss for each employee. Subcategory ratings reveal that the decline in job
satisfaction is driven by worse evaluations of firm culture and values, senior leadership, and career opportunities. Evidence from the gig economy suggests that lower
ratings may make it more difficult for firms to attract new applicants and retain
current employees (Benson et al., 2020b). As high employee satisfaction is associated with better stock returns, the reduction in sentiment may also lead to worse
performance in the long run (Edmans, 2011). We further find that CEO approval
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rates drop 7.6 percentage points and that employees are less likely to recommend
their firm to friends in the aftermath of a scandal. Referred workers generate higher
profits and have longer tenures than their peers (Burks et al., 2015; Brown et al.,
2016), so a weakened referral network may hamper a firm’s productivity and impair
its ability to fill future vacancies.
To validate our identification strategy and determine if the declines are persistent, we repeat the analysis using finer time intervals. We find that ratings
drop immediately after misdeeds become public and remain lower throughout the
twenty-four month post-event period. Further, we find that ratings of scandal-hit
and control firms evolve similarly leading up to event dates. Thus, while underlying
characteristics may render certain firms more likely to engage in misconduct (Liu,
2016; Ji et al., 2017), there is no evidence that the parallel trends assumptions
underlying our analysis are violated.
We further explore how reviewer heterogeneity affects our results. While we utilize a rich set controls, our findings could stem from changes in reviewer composition.
To address this concern, we re-estimate the baseline regressions with additional person fixed effects. This limits the sample to individuals who leave multiple reviews,
but the results are similar to those from our benchmark specification. We also test
if certain types of employees drive the drop in ratings. We find decreases along
every margin, particularly in the firm culture and values subcategory, indicating
that our results are not explained by losses in wages, job seniority, or other observ-
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able characteristics. The one exception to this universal decline comes when we
extend the post-event period and test if employees hired after scandals also exhibit
reduced sentiment. We find no effect for these newer hires, suggesting that workers
less perturbed by misconduct may sort into scandal-hit firms.
We next study how corporate misdeeds impact employee compensation. We find,
after controlling for a rich set of worker and firm characteristics, that base pay is
unaffected by such events. Annual variable compensation, however, falls on average
10.2 percent for workers at scandal-hit employers relative to their peers at firms
that did not experience a scandal. It also appears that the set of employees who are
awarded variable pay may shrink after scandals. Our results are evidence in support
of nominal rigidity in base pay and demonstrate that variable compensation acts
as a mechanism for passing firm-level shocks onto employees. Separating workers
based on experience shows that junior employees bear larger percentage point in
reductions in variable wages, but that their senior colleagues face larger decreases in
dollars. Decomposing the effects into finer time bins reveals that the declines persist
throughout the the three year post-event period. Again, there is no indication that
the parallel trends assumption is violated.
Using employees’ reviews of their fringe benefit packages, we find no evidence
that firms improve benefits following corporate scandals. Together, our results
demonstrate that workers at scandal-hit firms are left strictly worse off. They
experience a reduction in job satisfaction and variable pay, but are not compensated
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for these declines.
Our work is most closely related to three studies from the accounting literature. Lee et al. (2021) and Zhou and Makridis (2021) show that Glassdoor ratings
decline following news about tax avoidance and Auditing Enforcement Releases
(AAERs) by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), respectively. Zhou
and Makridis (2021) also find that reviewer more negatively about firm culture and
that base wages remain unchanged following misconduct announcements. Choi and
Gipper (2019) use confidential Census data to show that wages fall during and after
periods of misconduct, and that employee turnover increases following AAERs. We
add to this literature by considering a broader set of events and outcome variables.
Unlike Choi and Gipper (2019), we find no difference in wages prior to the actual
revelation of corporate misdeeds. Further, the granularity of our allows us to separately measure impacts on base and variable pay, a decomposition not included in
the other studies. We also utilize non-wage benefits ratings and present evidence
that misconduct may hinder a firm’s ability to attract job seekers.77
Other work on negative reputation shocks has investigated the effects of financial
misconduct (Karpoff et al., 2008; Murphy et al., 2009; Armour et al., 2017), environmental violations (Karpoff et al., 2005), product recalls (Jarrell and Peltzman,
1985; Liu and Shankar, 2015), and data breaches (Kamiya et al., 2020). The ma77

In Appendix C.5, we show that Glassdoor users are less likely to click on and apply to job
listings in the months following a scandal. Our job search data have several limitations, but the
results provide preliminary evidence that firm reputation is an important consideration for job
seekers in the traditional labor market.
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jority of these studies have shown declines in financial outcomes such as stock price
volatility and earnings. A notable exception is Akey et al. (2019), who find that
firms increase corporate social responsibility spending to offset losses in reputation
associated with data breaches. By contrasting the effects of scandals with those of
breaches, we highlight how destructive corporate misconduct can be to employer
reputation.
A related strand of literature focuses on collective reputation (Freedman et al.,
2012; Bai et al., Forthcoming; Bachmann et al., 2021). These papers find that incidents such as the Volkswagen emissions scandal and Chinese dairy quality scandal
have negative spillovers on firms in similar product markets and industries. In contrast, we focus only on effects for employees at firms committing misconduct. If
there are indeed negative externalities on ratings and wages at competing firms,
our difference-in-differences estimates will understate the true impact of corporate
scandals.
We also contribute to a broader literature linking firm reputation and the labor market. Early theoretical contributions include Holmstrom (1981), Carmichael
(1984b), and Bull (1987). Turban and Cable (2003) document that business school
graduates are more likely to apply to firms that appear on lists of “the best companies to work for” published by various media outlets. More recently, Benson et al.
(2020b) find that employers with high ratings are able to attract workers more
quickly on Amazon Mechanical Turk and Sockin and Sojourner (2020) show that
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higher employer ratings on Glassdoor lead to improved job seeker application rates
for firms with fewer ratings on the website. We add to this literature by documenting causal links between firm reputation, employee sentiment, and the ability to fill
openings in the traditional labor market.

3.2
3.2.1

Data
Corporate Scandals

Our sample of corporate scandals comes from the popular press. Several publications, including Fortune Magazine, produce annual articles detailing the year’s
most notable “business misdeeds.” We aggregate these lists and restrict attention
to firms with appreciable coverage on Glassdoor. To ensure the presence of sufficient data both before and after a scandal, we consider only events that take place
between 2013 and 2018. Table 3.1 presents information on the 23 scandals in our
primary sample.78 As shown in Column 3, the events are heterogeneous, but each
involves misconduct that conveys unfavorable information about firm management
and culture. Event dates are those on which a transgression became publicly known,
not necessarily when it occurred. Our maintained assumption is that while certain
insiders may have been aware of impropriety prior to these dates, the majority of
rank-and-file employees were not.
78

Additional details about sample construction as well as links to background news articles and
the underlying scandal lists are provided in Appendix C.1.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Scandal Employer Samples
Event date

Employer

Description

CEO exits

Employer
reviews

Base
pay

Variable
pay

Benefits
reviews

February 10, 2013
March 18, 2013
July 11, 2013
October 24, 2013
December 05, 2014
July 20, 2015
September 20, 2015
October 21, 2015
July 06, 2016
August 18, 2016
September 02, 2016
September 08, 2016
February 19, 2017
April 10, 2017
September 07, 2017
December 20, 2017
January 25, 2018
February 01, 2018
March 06, 2018
March 15, 2018
July 27, 2018
August 07, 2018
November 19, 2018

Carnival∗
lululemon∗
GlaxoSmithKline
Macy’s∗
Sony∗
Toshiba
Volkswagen
Valeant
Fox∗
Mylan Inc∗
Samsung∗
Wells Fargo
Uber∗
United Airlines∗
Equifax∗
Apple∗
Wynn Resorts∗
Guess?∗
Google∗
Facebook∗
CBS∗
Tesla
Nissan∗

Stranded ship
Product recall
Bribery
Racial profiling
Data breach
Accounting fraud
Emissions fraud
Accounting fraud
Sexual harassment
Price gouging
Product recall
Fake account fraud
Sexual harassment
Customer abuse
Data breach
Slowing old phones
Sexual harassment
Sexual harassment
Secret gov’t contract
Data misuse
Sexual harassment
Potential fraud
Misusing funds

06/25/2013
06/10/2013
N
N
02/06/2015
07/21/2015
09/23/2015
03/21/2016
07/21/2016
N
N
10/12/2016
06/21/2017
N
09/26/2017
N
02/06/2018
06/12/2018
N
N
09/09/2018
N
11/19/2018

138
153
480
6,462
1,317
458
301
144
836
285
1,359
13,184
1,909
1,796
464
7,201
229
462
4,258
1,971
562
2,293
541

143
225
1,011
5,189
1,248
440
328
129
1,113
374
1,435
18,051
3,737
2,486
820
12,710
447
625
17,247
7,765
181
5,325
1,340

63
51
769
796
684
232
177
85
252
237
920
8,263
1,304
779
425
3,400
78
75
8,551
4,180
7
1,441
577

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
135
108
354
3,204
766
581
166
2,575
59
142
2,236
1,305
212
732
175

Notes: This table briefly describes each of the scandals in our sample. Observation counts are
provided in windows around event dates. For employer reviews, windows range from 24 months
before through 24 months after each event; for pay reports, four years before through four years
after; and for benefits reviews, three years before through three years after. Events with starred
names are included in our “non-fraud” subsample.

The accounting literature has shown that wages decrease during periods of fraud
(Choi and Gipper, 2019) and that employee sentiment falls after AAERs (Zhou
and Makridis, 2021). To demonstrate that our results are not driven or unduly
influenced by these types of events, we conduct robustness tests on the set of “nonfraud” scandals. This subsample consists of the firms with starred names in Table
3.1.
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3.2.2

Glassdoor Data

Our data come primarily from Glassdoor, an online platform with information about
firms, compensation, and the labor market more broadly. Glassdoor data are particularly well-suited for the study of scandals, as employers are identified by name
and we observe both compensation and job satisfaction for employees at each firm.
Public surveys and other standard data sources typically redact employer identities
and are published at low frequencies with a non-trivial lag between data acquisition
and publication. We make use of three Glassdoor datasets: i) employee reviews
of their employers, ii) employee pay reports, and iii) employee reviews of fringe
benefits.

Employer Reviews
Employer reviews are provided voluntarily and anonymously by visitors to Glassdoor. Individuals are incentivized to submit reviews through a “give to get” policy,
whereby visitors gain access to more information on the website by contributing
to its content. This policy has been shown to reduce the selection bias inherent
to online reviews, by motivating individuals with more moderate opinions to share
their views (Marinescu et al., 2018b). Ratings are measured on a Likert scale from
1 star to 5 stars, with more stars corresponding to higher degrees of satisfaction.
Beyond an overall rating, current and former employees can evaluate their firm on
the same 5-star scale along the following dimensions: culture and values, career op128

portunities, senior management, compensation and benefits, and work-life balance.
Respondents are also asked if they approve of CEO performance, whether they
would recommend the employer to a friend, and if they have a positive business
outlook for the firm over the next six months. For each of these three questions, we
generate indicator variables equal to one for positive responses and zero for neutral
or negative responses. Respondents may also disclose the following information:
whether they are a current or former employee, employment status (i.e., full-time,
part-time, contract, intern, or freelance), job title, length of employment, and location. We assign the 41 percent of reviews without a location, the 40 percent of
reviews without a job title, and the 22 percent of reviews without an employment
status to the “concealed” group for each variable. In total, we observe 6.22 million
employer reviews. Observation counts around event dates for firms in the scandal
sample are reported in Column 5 of Table 3.1.

Employee Pay Reports
Employee pay reports are also submitted to Glassdoor voluntarily, anonymously,
and under the “give to get” policy. Since reports are anonymous, individuals have
little, if any motive to distort wages. Karabarbounis and Pinto (2018) show that the
distribution of Glassdoor salaries broadly matches income distributions observed in
publicly available datasets within but not across industries. As our pay regressions
exploit variation within firm and industry-job title pairs, the lack of representative-
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ness across industries does not compromise the validity of our results.
When submitting a pay report, respondents are asked for the following information: firm name, job title, year of salary, base income, additional income
earned through cash and stock bonuses, profit sharing, sales commissions and
tips/gratuities, pay frequency (annual, hourly, or monthly), gender, years of work
experience, location, whether current or former employee, and employment status.79
Pay is reported by calendar year, and we inflation-adjust to 2018 dollars using U.S
headline CPI. We define variable pay as the sum of an employee’s cash and stock
bonuses, profit sharing, and sales commissions. To limit the influence of outliers
and misreporting, we exclude reports that document less than $200 in any compensation category and those in the top and bottom 0.05 percent of base or variable
pay. We observe a total of 5.24 million pay reports. Table 3.1 displays the number
of base pay (Column 6) and variable pay (Column 7) observations for each firm in
the scandal sample.

Employee Benefits Reviews
Employer benefits reviews are also submitted voluntarily and anonymously under
the aforementioned “give to get” policy. Respondents are asked to rate their overall
benefits package, which includes items such as health insurance and retirement
79

For the 24.6 percent of reports providing hourly wages, we annualize pay by multiplying by
2000 (50 weeks with 40 hours per week). We drop the 1.3 percent of reports providing monthly
wages. The 31 percent of pay reports without gender information are assigned to an “unavailable”
group.
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plans, on a Likert scale from 1 star to 5 stars. They are further asked whether they
are a current or former employee and for their employment status, job title, and
location. These reviews are available starting in 2014, which limits our sample to
14 scandals. We observe 887,000 benefits reviews in total. Counts around event
dates are presented in Column 8 of Table 3.1.

3.3

Effects on Employee Sentiment

In this section, we study the effects of corporate scandals on employee sentiment.
Because these events convey negative information about firms, we expect them to
adversely affect Glassdoor ratings. In particular, we expect worse assessments of
senior management, firm culture, and CEO approval. If shocks to reputation are
long-lived, as in Liu and Shankar (2015), the decline in sentiment will be persistent.
If, however, diminished employee perception is driven by negative news coverage or
other short-term phenomena, ratings will quickly revert to their pre-event levels.
In order for a scandal to shift ratings, it must constitute a “surprise.” If workers
believe ex-ante a firm is prone to misconduct, their sentiment may not change when
a scandal occurs. Further, if employees learn that misconduct has taken place before
the public, we will not observe changes in ratings around event dates. Actions taken
by a firm in the aftermath of a scandal may also lead to improved sentiment. If
firm leadership quickly addresses misconduct or attempts to placate employees by
bettering working conditions, ratings might actually increase.
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3.3.1

Baseline Regressions

Summary statistics for variables in the Glassdoor ratings dataset are presented in
Table 3.2. The control group consists of firms that did not experience a corporate
scandal or data breach between 2013 and 2018.80 Since scandal-hit firms tend to be
large employers, we also restrict the control sample to only include large employers.
Following Haltiwanger et al. (2010), we define large firms as those with at least 500
employees. As shown in Columns 2 and 5, average ratings range from 3.05–3.58
stars across categories for both sets of firms. The means of the binary response and
demographic variables are also similar for both groups.
To ensure our estimates are not biased by secular trends in ratings over time,
we employ a generalized difference-in-differences framework to assess how scandals
affect employee sentiment. The key identifying assumption is that absent an event,
ratings of scandal-hit firms would have evolved in the same manner as those of
control firms. Our benchmark specification is given by the equation

Rikst = β · P ostScandalkt + λXi + γk + γι(k)t + ikst

(3.3.1)

where Rikst is the star rating or indicator response for worker i employed at firm
k in state s in year-month t, γk is a firm fixed effect, γι(k)t is an industry-year80

In Appendix C.3, we study the evolution of ratings around data breaches to demonstrate that
our findings are not driven by increased news coverage. For parsimony, we therefore exclude the
27 firms that experienced large data breaches from the control sample.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics for Employee Reviews
Corporate scandals

Control firms

Measure

N

mean

sd

N

mean

sd

Overall rating
Career opportunities
Compensation and benefits
Culture and values
Senior management
Work-life balance
Would refer a friend
Positive business outlook
Approve of CEO performance
Overall benefits

47
40
40
40
40
40
47
28
28
1

3.58
3.40
3.58
3.50
3.12
3.32
0.52
0.59
0.41
4.14

1.25
1.33
1.26
1.41
1.40
1.34
0.50
0.49
0.49
1.07

4,837
4,114
4,111
4,083
4,048
4,118
4,837
3,089
3,089
795

3.40
3.17
3.28
3.33
2.96
3.26
0.49
0.54
0.46
3.69

1.33
1.38
1.30
1.46
1.46
1.39
0.50
0.50
0.50
1.22

Is current employee
Concealing employee
Low tenure employee
Female employee
Full time employee
HQ employee
Managerial employee
Age
Firm employment

47
47
28
45
35
26
47
15
47

0.53
0.52
0.59
0.28
0.69
0.19
0.08
31.55
133.96

0.50
0.50
0.49
0.45
0.46
0.39
0.28
9.41
96.24

4,837
4,837
3,089
4,440
3,970
2,832
4,828
1,296
4,836

0.53
0.49
0.54
0.28
0.74
0.26
0.11
33.29
63.96

0.50
0.50
0.50
0.45
0.44
0.44
0.31
10.54
155.23

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for scandal-hit and control firms from our Glassdoor
ratings data. The control sample consists of large firms that did not suffer a scandal or data
breach between 2013 and 2018. Sample sizes (N) and firm employment are reported in thousands.

month fixed effect, Xi is a vector comprised of current employee and employment
status indicators, and P ostScandalkt is an indicator equal to one if firm k faces a
scandal prior to or during year-month t. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level, as employee ratings for a given firm are likely to be correlated across time.
In our primary specification, the pre-period consists of the twenty-four calendar
months before an event and the post-period is composed of the event month and
the subsequent twenty-three months.
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 3.3. The overall rating among
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newly-submitted reviews drops by an average of 0.069 stars in the two years following a scandal. Relative to the pre-scandal average of 3.84 out of 5 stars, this
represents a 1.8 percent decrease. Sockin and Sojourner (2020) estimate that one
star in overall Glassdoor rating is worth about $10,500 in additional annual pay.
The 0.069-star decline therefore translates to an average loss of about $725 per year
for each employee at the firm. Consistent with our hypotheses, coefficients from the
sub-category rating regressions indicate that the decline in overall rating is driven
primarily by diminished perceptions of firm culture and values (–0.115 stars) and
senior management (–0.094 stars). The significant, negative estimate for career
opportunities suggests that scandals may also reduce employees’ opinions of their
firms’ future prospects. The insignificance of the compensation and benefits and
work-life balance coefficients confirm that employees do not indiscriminately report
that all aspects of the firm are worse.
The final three columns in Panel A present results for regressions on the three
binary response variables. We estimate that a corporate scandal causes a 2.3 percentage point decline in the fraction of employees who would recommend their
employer to a friend. As referral networks are a valuable recruiting channel (Brown
et al., 2016), this finding provides suggestive evidence that misconduct hinders a
firm’s ability to hire new workers. We also find a 6.4 percentage point decline in
the share of employees who hold a positive outlook for their employer. This result
accords with the reduction in perceptions of career opportunities at the firm and
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Table 3.3: Ratings Difference-in-Differences Results
Overall
rating

Culture
and
values

Senior
mgmt.

-0.069∗∗∗
(0.026)
3.64
4872600
46803
0.17

-0.115∗∗∗
(0.029)
3.58
4111917
39902
0.17

-0.094∗∗∗
(0.029)
3.17
4076533
39544
0.15

-0.098∗∗∗
(0.032)
3.84
4855740
29943
0.17

-0.117∗∗∗
(0.045)
3.77
4097290
25275
0.17

Career
opp.

Comp.
and
benefits

Work/life
balance

Would
refer a
friend

Positive
business
outlook

Approve
of CEO
performance

-0.000
(0.040)
3.31
4147415
40233
0.15

-0.023∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.69
3839869
37283
0.14

-0.064∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.59
3617913
35187
0.13

-0.076∗∗∗
(0.022)
0.61
3241784
33112
0.14

-0.031∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.75
3826443
23857
0.14

-0.051∗∗
(0.021)
0.64
3605257
22531
0.13

-0.042∗∗
(0.017)
0.66
3230196
21524
0.14

Panel A: Corporate scandals
After scandal
Pre-scandal mean
N
Scandal firm N
Adjusted R2

-0.057∗∗∗
(0.021)
3.45
4143486
40277
0.15

-0.030
(0.023)
3.66
4140066
40247
0.17

Panel B: Corporate scandals excluding fraud
After scandal
Pre-scandal mean
N
Scandal firm N
Adjusted R2

-0.110∗∗∗
(0.041)
3.35
4062021
25032
0.15

-0.056∗
(0.030)
3.48
4128738
25529
0.15

-0.045
(0.030)
3.83
4125325
25506
0.17

-0.062∗
(0.034)
3.43
4132664
25482
0.15

Notes: This table reports coefficients when Equation 3.3.1 is estimated for corporate scandals on
the dependent variable listed in each column. The pre- and post-periods are each 24 months.
Regressions include firm, industry x year-month, current employee, and employment status fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

may predict poor future stock performance (Sheng, 2021). Lastly, we find a 7.6
percentage point drop in CEO approval rate in the wake of a scandal. The magnitude of this effect indicates that a loss of employee confidence in firm leadership
may contribute to the high rate of CEO turnover shown in Table 3.1.
In Panel B of Table 3.3, we report results when Equation 3.3.1 is estimated
on the set of “non-fraud” events. The coefficient estimates remain significant and
similar in magnitude to those for the full sample. The findings indicate that all
types of scandals, not just financial misconduct, lead to declines in employee sentiment. Additional robustness checks are presented in the Internet Appendix. They
include regressions with a broader set of control firms, stacked regressions to avoid
bias arising from the staggered timing of events, and a series of “leave-one-out”
regressions to ensure no single event drives our findings. In all cases, the results are
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similar to those from our benchmark specification.
We next study how the effects of corporate scandals evolve over time. This
decomposition allows us to determine if employee sentiment is eroded in the immediate aftermath of an event and quickly recovers, or if the drop persists. Moreover,
we are able to test if there are parallel trends in the outcome variables prior to
scandals taking place. We re-estimate Equation 3.3.1, but allow the coefficient on
the scandal indicator to vary over time by estimating separate coefficients for consecutive two-month bins ranging from twenty-four months before to twenty-three
months after an event. The omitted group consists of the two calendar months
immediately prior to the event.
Results for the focal outcome variables are presented in Figure C.5. The estimates from the pre-event periods affirm that pre-trends do not drive our baseline
results. Though the time-varying estimates have less statistical power, the negative
effects of scandals on overall ratings, culture and values, and senior management
develop quickly and are persistent. Ratings in each category drop more than onetenth of a star in the immediate aftermath of a scandal and remain below their
pre-scandal levels more than one year after an event. Referral probabilities also
fall sharply and remain depressed over the two years following a scandal. Because
executives exit in the post-event period, we take greater care when decomposing
the effects of scandals on perceptions of CEOs. The bottom two panels show that
approval rates decrease regardless of whether a CEO leaves, but that the short-
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term decline is sharper for separations. Beyond impairing a firm’s ability to attract
and retain workers, the longer-term reduction in job satisfaction may also lead to
diminished employee productivity (McGregor, 1960).

3.3.2

Further Results

Given that our dataset is comprised of cross-sections of individuals, the previous
findings may be partially due to shifts in the types of employees who submit ratings
after an event. We therefore restrict the sample to individuals who leave multiple
reviews and re-estimate Equation 3.3.1 with additional worker fixed effects to account for time-invariant idiosyncratic characteristics. Results for the focal rating
categories are presented in Table 3.4. Despite an appreciably smaller number of
observations, we find significant declines in overall and culture and values ratings in
the specifications with the extra fixed effects. These estimates suggest that changes
in reviewer composition do not explain our findings.
In the subsequent section, we show that base pay remains unchanged after a
scandal, but that variable pay falls. To determine if decreased pay is associated with
stronger reactions to misconduct, we therefore re-estimate Equation 3.3.1 with an
interaction term between high-likelihood of receiving variable pay and post-scandal
indicators. We classify a reviewer as having a high (low) likelihood if the percentage
of workers with their firm-job title pair who earn variable wages is above (below)
the median. Panel A of Table 3.5 shows that there is a significant decrease in
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Figure 3.1: Employee Ratings around Scandal Dates, Dynamic Results

Overall rating

Senior management

Culture and values

Would refer a friend

CEO approval (when exits)

CEO approval (when stays)

Notes: The left panel displays the cumulative share of CEOs that leave their firm after a scandal.
Specific exit dates are available in Column 4 of Table 3.1. The middle panel depicts the mean
share of employees who approve of their CEO in a 30-month window around scandal dates when
the sample is split based on whether or not the CEO exits within a year of the event. The
right panel displays coefficients from the dynamic version of Equation 3.3.1 on CEO approval
rates within the same 30-month window. The horizontal dashes represent 95 percent confidence
intervals for the point estimates. Regressions include firm, job title, industry x year-month, state,
and employment status fixed effects. Each coefficient is relative to the two-month period prior to
the event. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
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Table 3.4: Outcomes After Scandals Incorporating Worker Fixed Effects
Overall rating

Culture and values

Senior management

Panel A: Corporate scandals
After scandal
Worker FE
Pre-scandal mean
N
Scandal firm N

-0.031
(0.055)
N
3.28
492896
4243

-0.071∗
(0.041)
Y
3.28
492896
4243

-0.122∗∗
(0.053)
N
3.28
426978
3675

-0.119∗∗
(0.057)
Y
3.28
426978
3675

-0.047
(0.051)
N
2.88
422869
3631

-0.062
(0.053)
Y
2.88
422869
3631

Panel B: Corporate scandals excluding fraud
After scandal
Worker FE
Pre-scandal mean
N
Scandal firm N

-0.077
(0.080)
N
3.46
490362
2747

-0.104∗∗
(0.053)
Y
3.46
490362
2747

-0.113
(0.078)
N
3.44
424783
2373

-0.140∗∗
(0.062)
Y
3.44
424783
2373

-0.057
(0.077)
N
3.02
420685
2336

-0.058
(0.066)
Y
3.02
420685
2336

Notes: This table reports results when Equation 3.3.1 is re-estimated with additional worker fixed
effects on the dependent variable listed in each column heading. The pre- and post-periods are each
24 months. Regressions include firm, industry x year-month, current employee, and employment
status fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, ***
1%.

ratings for both groups. The point estimates are sharper for employees who are less
likely to receive variable pay, which suggests the decline in sentiment is not due to
a reduction in wages. The same is true in panel B whether we partition the sample
between employees with greater span of control, i.e. managers, and more rank-andfile employees, i.e. non-managers. We conduct similar tests for other characteristics
such as job seniority, location, gender, age, firm tenure, and whether identifying
aspects are concealed in the Internet Appendix. In all cases, we find statistically
significant cases across groups.
Given that scandals have long-lasting effects on sentiment, they may lead to
worker sorting. Individuals who value culture, for example, may choose to avoid
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Table 3.5: Difference-in-Difference Results for Scandals, Worker Heterogeneity
Overall
rating

Culture
and values

Senior
management

Panel A: Probability of earning variable pay
Total effect: low probability

Total effect: high probability

-0.075∗
(0.040)
[6630]
-0.065∗∗∗
(0.025)
[18671]

-0.088∗∗
(0.041)
[6041]
-0.124∗∗∗
(0.028)
[15179]

-0.072∗
(0.040)
[5986]
-0.101∗∗∗
(0.026)
[15051]

Panel B: Managerial role
Total effect: manager

Total effect: non-manager

-0.139∗∗∗
(0.049)
[2199]
-0.062∗∗
(0.026)
[23073]

-0.207∗∗∗
(0.057)
[2048]
-0.106∗∗∗
(0.029)
[19145]

-0.175∗∗∗
(0.055)
[2046]
-0.085∗∗∗
(0.028)
[18964]

-0.105∗∗∗
(0.027)
[8205]
-0.038
(0.059)
[1984]

-0.099∗∗∗
(0.028)
[8169]
0.022
(0.059)
[1942]

Panel C: When hired
Total effect: hired before scandal

Total effect: hired after scandal

-0.078∗∗∗
(0.027)
[8766]
-0.014
(0.048)
[2230]

Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates for the effects following a scandal on different
partitions of reviewers. The pre- and post-periods are each 24 months, except the post-period for
panel C is 60 months to sufficiently incorporate new hires. Regressions include firm, industry x
year-month, current employee, and employment status fixed effects. To account for the partitioned
characteristic, the following observables are included in each panel respectively: an indicator for
low probability, an indicator for managerial job title, and firm tenure fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered by firm. Sample counts for scandal-hit in the post-period are given in brackets.
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

firms associated with impropriety. To test for such effects, we add an indicator
for workers hired after scandals to our baseline specification. We also extend our
post-event window to six years in order to augment the number of new employees.
The results, presented in panel C, reveal significant decreases in ratings only for
workers hired before scandals. This disparity suggests that individuals who are less
disapproving of misconduct may indeed sort into firms that have recently suffered
a scandal.
Together, the findings in this section demonstrate that scandals erode employee
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sentiment. Workers’ ratings of employers drop appreciably and persistently in response to such events, signifying a deterioration in job satisfaction. The results do
not stem from changes in reviewer composition and are robust to alternate specifications.

3.4

Effects on Compensation

Our findings in the preceding section show that employee sentiment worsens following a corporate scandal. If workers derive utility from workplace attributes
unrelated to compensation (referred to herein as job attribute value), these reductions represent a loss in value from their employee-employer match. Firms may,
thus, respond to scandals by raising wages in order compensate employees for the
loss. They may also improve fringe benefits such as health insurance and retirement
plans.
Alternatively, firms may lower wages in response to corporate scandals. If they
seek to keep total expenditures unchanged despite the pecuniary costs associated
with such events (e.g. fines, loss of revenue) or productivity declines due to diminished job satisfaction, firms may lower their labor bills by reducing pay. In a
model where the surplus of the employee-employer match is split at a fixed rate
between the worker and firm, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), a negative
shock to surplus is passed on to workers through lowered wages. In the presence
of downward nominal rigidity in base wages for current employees (Fallick et al.,
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2016) and centropy toward base pay equity for new hires (Bewley, 1995), the shock
would be most apparent in variable pay, the more flexible component of employee
compensation (Grigsby et al., 2021; Sockin and Sockin, 2019b).

3.4.1

Base and Variable Pay

Summary statistics for the sample of 5.15 million Glassdoor pay reports are presented in Table 3.6. We report statistics separately for scandal-hit and control
firms (i.e., the 41,321 large firms that faced neither a corporate scandal nor a data
breach). While demographic information is similar across samples, employees at
scandal-hit firms earn about $20,000 more on average in base wages than those
at other firms. A key advantage of the Glassdoor data is that earnings are broken
down into base and variable components. Scandal-hit firms are 12 percentage points
more likely to compensate their employees with variable pay than control firms, and
employees at the former earn significantly more in variable wages. In our regression
specifications, we control for a rich set of observables, including firm and job title,
to account for these differences.
We further classify workers as low or high experience, with the former (latter)
group comprised of employees with at most (more than) three years of work experience. Across samples, low-experience workers are approximately eight years
younger, twenty percentage points less likely to receive variable pay, and earn 38
percent less in base wages than their more-experienced peers. Conditional on earn-
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics for Wages Sample
Corporate scandals
Sample size (1000s)
Base pay ($1000s)
Variable pay ($1000s)
Earns variable pay (%)
Age (years)
Years of experience
Salaried (%)
Junior position (%)

Control firms

all

low exp.

high exp.

all

low exp.

high exp.

82
88.9
(56.4)
21.5
(54.5)
40.5
31.8
5.6
74.9
55.5

40
68.9
(43.8)
9.9
(29.9)
30.5
28.2
1.6
64.4
74.9

42
107.9
(60.3)
32.5
(68.6)
50.1
35.5
9.5
84.8
36.2

5,151
69.0
(42.5)
5.9
(22.7)
28.3
33.3
6.4
73.1
48.0

2,365
52.9
(29.5)
3.0
(13.2)
21.6
29.0
1.5
63.9
68.7

2,786
82.7
(46.9)
8.5
(28.1)
33.9
37.5
10.5
80.9
30.2

Notes: This table presents summary statistics from the pay reports data for scandal-hit and control
firms. Each entry reflects the within-sample mean. Base and variable pay are inflation-adjusted
using U.S. headline CPI to 2018 dollars, and their standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The sample is restricted to full-time workers and pay for hourly workers is annualized assuming
40 hours of work for 50 weeks. For variable pay, we present the conditional mean among those
who earn it. Low (high) experience reflects employees having at most (more than) three years of
experience. Junior positions are industry-job titles for which the median years of work experience
is at most three years.

ing variable pay, high-experience workers receive on average 2.5x–3x more than their
low-experience colleagues. Demographics are similar within groups across samples,
but employees at scandal-hit firms are still paid appreciably more on average.
We also partition employees based on their standing in the corporate hierarchy,
as this assignment may better capture how firms allocate variable pay (Sockin and
Sockin, 2019a). To do so, we bin workers by their industry and job title, and take
the median years of work experience among all employees within each pair.81 We
define junior (senior) positions as pairs for which the median is at most (more
81
Industries are assigned through a mapping from firm to industry. There are 21 industries:
Accounting & Legal, Aerospace & Defense, Arts, Entertainment & Recreation, Biotech & Pharmaceuticals, Business Services, Construction, Consumer Services, Education, Finance, Government,
Health Care, Information Technology, Insurance, Manufacturing, Media, Non-Profit, Energy, Real
Estate, Retail, Telecommunications, Transportation, and Travel. To limit measurement error,
industry-job title pairs with fewer than 20 observations are omitted.
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than) three years. As evidenced by the final row of Table 3.6, there is significant
commonality between low experience and junior standing, but the classifications do
not perfectly overlap.
To formally test how firms alter employee base and variable pay in the wake of a
scandal, we again implement a generalized difference-in-differences framework. The
benchmark regression specification is

wijkmt = β · P ostScandalkt + λXi + γk + γι(k)jt + γmt + ijkmt

(3.4.1)

where wijkmt is log base or variable pay for worker i with job title j employed at firm
k in metro m in year t, γk is a firm fixed effect, γι(k)jt is an industry-job title-year
fixed effect, γmt is a metro-year fixed effect, Xi is a vector of individual controls that
includes years of experience squared and gender, and P ostScandalkt is an indicator
equal to one if firm k faced a scandal prior to year t.82 Standard errors are clustered
by firm. By incorporating firm, industry-job title-year, and metro-year fixed effects,
our coefficient of interest, β, captures the change in pay for employees at scandal-hit
firms in the years following an event relative to employees in similar roles at peer
firms, accounting for trends over time in local labor markets. The rich set of control
variables ensures that we recover tightly identified estimates.
Results for the full sample of corporate scandals are presented in the first three
82
Because employee pay is reported by calendar year, we are unable to determine exactly when
a worker’s base and variable compensation is set. We therefore exclude the year of the scandal
from the analysis. Metro areas in Glassdoor data correspond roughly to core-based statistical
areas (CBSAs). There are 858 unique metros in the Glassdoor pay data and 929 CBSAs.
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columns of Table 3.7. Column 1 shows that base pay is unchanged following a
scandal, which we view as evidence in support of downward nominal wage rigidity. We note that firms’ total labor bill for base wages may not remain unchanged,
however, as scandal-hit firms could respond by laying off workers. Column 2 reveals that variable pay is affected by scandals. Employees at scandal-hit firms see
their variable pay fall 10.2 percent (10.8 log points) on average in the post-event
period relative to their peers at control firms.83 This finding affirms that variable
compensation acts as a mechanism for passing firm-level shocks on to workers. In
Column 3, we estimate Equation 3.4.1 using an indicator equal to one if the worker
earns variable pay as the dependent variable. The marginally significant negative
coefficient suggests that firms may shrink the set of workers who receive variable
pay after a scandal.
Columns 4–6 report findings when we repeat the exercise using only the “nonfraud” events. Again, we find that base pay is unchanged. The estimate for variable
pay remains significant and, at –12.4 percent (–13.2 log points), is similar to the full
sample counterpart. These results affirm that the reduction in wages is not driven
by instances of fraud.
We next return to our full sample of corporate scandals and re-estimate Equation
3.4.1 separately for low- and high-experience employees. Columns 1 and 2 of Table
3.8 indicate that base pay for both groups is unaffected by scandals. Column 3
83

The decrease is not inconsistent with the null result on employees’ ratings of compensation
and benefits from table 3.3, as there is no decline in base wages and not all employees earn variable
income.
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Table 3.7: Difference-in-Difference Results for Employee Pay
Corporate scandals

Corporate scandals
excluding fraud

Base
pay

Variable
pay

Earns
VP

Base
pay

Variable
pay

Earns
VP

After scandal

-0.014
(0.013)

-0.108∗∗∗
(0.035)

-0.054∗
(0.031)

-0.021
(0.016)

-0.132∗∗∗
(0.038)

-0.068∗
(0.037)

Pre-scandal mean
N
Scandal firm N
Adjusted R2

11.09
4435101
63615
0.83

9.85
1160649
24228
0.64

0.49
4683995
67866
0.32

11.24
4415796
45034
0.83

10.42
1152794
16770
0.64

0.46
4663036
47653
0.32

Notes: This table reports coefficients for corporate scandals and data breaches estimated from
Equation 3.4.1 on the dependent variable listed in each column. The pre- and post-periods are
four and three years, respectively, and the year of the scandal or breach is excluded. Regressions
include years of experience squared along with firm, industry-job title x year, metro x year, gender,
and pay frequency fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%,
** 5%, *** 1%.

reveals that for employees with at most three years of experience, variable pay drops
by 16.8 percent (18.3 log points), which amounts to roughly $1,660 per year following
an event. The decline is smaller in percentage-point terms for high-experience
employees (Column 4), but larger in dollar terms at about $2,530. When we separate
employees by job hierarchy, we get a small, marginally significant effect on base pay
(Columns 5–6). The decrease in variable pay is more modest for junior employees
than those in the low-experience category, but the magnitudes are similar for senior
employees and those in the high-experience group.
Results from a series of robustness tests are presented in the Internet Appendix.
As with employer ratings, we consider an alternate control sample of only large
firms. To ensure our findings for variable pay are not driven by a single event, we
again estimate “leave-one-out” regressions by iteratively excluding one firm from the
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Table 3.8: Difference-in-Difference Results for Low- and High-Level Employee Compensation
Work experience
Base pay
Low
After scandal
Pre-scandal mean
N
Scandal firm N
Adjusted R2

Job hierarchy

Variable pay

Base pay

High

Low

High

Junior

-0.010
(0.009)

-0.017
(0.012)

-0.183∗∗∗

-0.081∗∗

-0.017∗

(0.041)

(0.036)

10.83
1968759
30417
0.81

11.36
2276654
31098
0.82

9.29
377385
8515
0.62

10.24
715761
14625
0.63

Variable pay

Senior

Junior

Senior

(0.010)

-0.011
(0.019)

-0.140∗∗∗
(0.043)

-0.090∗∗
(0.044)

10.83
1952238
33183
0.81

11.42
2096411
26264
0.80

9.36
391712
10355
0.63

10.25
698006
12538
0.63

Notes: This table reports coefficients when Equation 3.4.1 is estimated on the dependent variable
listed in each column heading and the sample is split into low and high experience employees,
or junior and senior employees. The pre- and post-periods are four and three years, respectively,
and the year of the scandal is excluded. Low (high) experience employees have at most (more
than) three years of experience. Junior (senior) positions are industry-job title pairs for which
the median years of experience is at most (more than) three years. Regressions include years
of experience squared along with firm, industry-job title x year, metro x year, gender, and pay
frequency fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%,
*** 1%.

scandal sample. We also re-weight observations to account for changes in sample
composition across firms over time. In all cases, the results are similar to those
obtained under the baseline specifications.
To explore how the effects of scandals on compensation vary over time, we reestimate the difference-in-differences regressions described by Equation 3.4.1, but
allow the coefficient on the scandal indicator to vary by event-year. The top panels
of Figure 3.2 reaffirm that, for all employees, base pay remains unchanged while
variable pay declines in the aftermath of a scandal. The lower left panel reveals
that reductions in pay for less experienced employees is larger throughout the postevent window. The coefficient estimates for high experience workers are negative
and stable, but lack statistical significance throughout the post-scandal period.
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Plots of the estimates for junior and senior employees are included in the Internet
Appendix, and closely resemble those for low- and high-experience workers. There
is no evidence of pre-trends over the four-year period prior to a scandal occurring,
which suggests that the identifying assumption of parallel trends underlying the
difference-in-differences framework holds.

3.4.2

Fringe Benefits

Our findings thus far have shown that employees at firms affected by scandals lose
utility from their employee-employer match due to decreases in job-attribute value,
and that this decline is not offset by an increase in wages. In fact, for workers
who receive variable pay, we observe a sizable reduction in earnings. An alternative
channel through which employers may increase compensation is an improvement in
fringe benefits such as health insurance and paid time off. Bolstering benefits could
be more appealing to employers than raising wages if the marginal cost of doing
so is lower (Rosen, 1986b). If firms decide to cut costs in response to a scandal,
however, workers’ fringe benefits may instead worsen.
Though we cannot directly observe whether firms alter benefits, we can test for
changes in employees’ Glassdoor ratings of their overall benefits packages. Ratings
should increase if firms opt to improve benefits. To formally test for changes following an event, we again employ a difference-in-differences framework. The regression
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Figure 3.2: Compensation after Corporate Scandals, Dynamic Results

Base pay

Variable pay

Variable pay, low experience

Variable pay, high experience

Variable pay, junior positions

Variable pay, senior positions

Notes: Each panel displays coefficients estimated from Equation 3.4.1 for log variable or base pay
within an eight-year window around event dates. Low (high) experience employees have at most
(more than) three years of experience. Junior (senior) positions are industry-job title pairs for
which the median years of experience is at most (more than) three years. Regressions include a
quadratic in years of experience along with firm, industry-job title x year, metro x year, gender,
and pay frequency fixed effects. Horizontal dashes indicate a 95 percent confidence interval around
each point estimate. Each coefficient is relative to one year prior to each event. Standard errors
are clustered by firm.
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equation is

rikst = β · P ostScandalkt + λXi + γk + γst + γι(k)t + ikst

(3.4.2)

where rikst is the benefits rating from worker i employed at firm k in state s in year
t, γk is a firm fixed effect, γst is a state-year fixed effect, γι(k)t is an industry-year
fixed effect, Xi is a vector of individual controls, and P ostScandalkt is an indicator
equal to one if firm k faced a scandal prior to or during year t. The control group
is comprised of 106,112 firms in the sample who experience neither a scandal nor
breach from 2013 through 2018.
The results are summarized in Table 3.9. The estimate in Column 1 is small
and not statistically different from zero. The null result suggests that firms do not
respond to scandals by improving fringe benefits.84 We also find no effect for the
set of non-fraud scandals.
As declines in job-attribute value are not offset by improvements to wages or
benefits, we conclude that employees at scandal-hit firms are left strictly worse off.
It follows that worker turnover may increase in the wake of such events, especially
for workers with strong outside options. The Glassdoor data do not allow us to test
this hypothesis, but Choi and Gipper (2019) use confidential data from the U.S.
Census to show that employee separation rates increase after periods of fraudulent
84
In addition to rating an employer’s overall benefits package, workers may separately rate fiftyfour distinct fringe benefits. Our conclusions are unchanged if, as in Liu et al. (2017), we estimate
regressions including the full set of benefit-specific ratings instead of only overall ratings.
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financial reporting. In Appendix C.5, we also find that job seekers on Glassdoor
express less interest in firms that have recently suffered a scandal. We estimate
that users are 10–20 percent less likely to click on and apply to job listings in the
months following the revelation of misconduct. As search data are only available
from January 2017 onward and Glassdoor is not primarily a job board, we consider
these preliminary but suggestive findings.
Table 3.9: Difference-in-Difference Results for Ratings of Overall Benefits
Corporate scandals

Corporate scandals
excluding fraud

After scandal

-0.039
(0.055)

-0.080
(0.069)

Pre-event mean
N
Scandal firm N
Adjusted R2

4.12
801591
12750
0.25

4.23
797655
8814
0.25

Notes: This table reports coefficients for corporate scandals and data breaches estimated from
Equation 3.4.2 on employee ratings of employers’ overall benefits. The pre- and post-periods are
each three years, respectively. Regressions include firm, industry x year, current employee, and
employment status fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%,
** 5%, *** 1%.

3.5

Conclusion

In this paper, we explore how corporate scandals affect the relationship between
firms and their employees. Using data from the website Glassdoor, we find that
scandals have both immediate and longer-term negative effects. Employee sentiment experiences a sharp, lasting decline, driven primarily by diminished perceptions of senior management and firm culture. This drop is evident for scandals that
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do not reveal compromising information about firm fundamentals and does not materialize following data breaches. Further, workers at scandal-hit firms appear less
optimistic about their employer’s prospects. They express lower opinions of business outlooks, less willingness to recommend their firm to members of their social
networks, and more disapproval of chief executives. While base wages and fringe
benefits are unchanged following a scandal, variable pay declines. The decrease
is more pronounced for less experienced workers, consistent with the notion these
individuals wield less bargaining power.
While the academic literature and popular press have shown that negative reputation shocks lead to poor financial performance, we instead focus on employee
outcomes. Our results highlight two channels—reduced worker satisfaction and
an impaired ability to hire—through which firm productivity may be harmed. As
workers do not receive compensation, pecuniary or otherwise, to offset the decline
in sentiment, corporate scandals leave them strictly worse off. We conclude that
firms and employees jointly bear the adverse consequences of corporate misconduct.
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APPENDIX A
Additional Results for Chapter 1

A.1

Positive and Negative Correlations Possible

In this appendix, I introduce a simple firm maximization problem which reveals
through comparative statics that amenities can complement or substitute for wages.
Suppose there is a continuum of firms of varying productivity z looking to hire a
single worker for production. Each firm posts a compensation package (w, a) where
w is the wage workers can then spend on consumption and a is the amenity bundle
characterizing all of the job characteristics associated with working at the firm. The
firm can produce amenities a at cost c(a), where c0 (a) > 0. There is a continuum of
workers whose utility depends on both the wage and amenities consumed, U (w, a),
and is increasing in both arguments, i.e. Uw (w, a) > 0 and Ua (w, a) > 0. The
objective function of the firm is to choose a compensation package that maximizes
profits,
max z − w − c(a).

w,a≥0

Under perfect competition with perfect information, firms make zero profits, so
firms with productivity z will offer (w, a) such that z = w + c(a).
Workers choose the employment opportunities that offer them the most utility.
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As such, they select the firm offering (w = z − c(a), a) that solves

max U (z − c(a), a)
a≥0

. The first order condition for the worker’s maximization problem is given by
Uw (z − c(a), a)c0 (a) = Ua (z − c(a), a). Rearranging slightly, we obtain the equation
governing the equilibrium level of amenities provided by the firm:

c0 (a) =

Ua (z − c(a), a)
.
Uw (z − c(a), a)

The left-hand side represents the marginal cost to the firm of providing more
amenity a, while the right-hand side constitutes the marginal rate of substitution
between amenities and wages for the worker, i.e. the added benefit the worker would
gain from giving up part of their wage for more amenities.
Suppose that U (w, a) = log(w) + β log(a), where β is a scaling parameter dictating to what extent workers prefer amenities compared with wages. Further, let
us assume a linear cost function for amenity production c(a) = κa. Under these
functional forms, the wage and amenities offered by a firm with productivity z is

w=

βz
z
and a =
.
1+β
(1 + β)κ

Comparative statics reveal how the correlation between w and a can be positive
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or negative. Consider first the degree of firm productivity, z. In this case,
and

∂a
∂z

∂w
∂z

>0

> 0, so corr(w, a) > 0 since both are positively correlated with firm output

per worker. Second, consider the workers’ preference for trading off amenities for
wages, β. In this case,

∂w
∂β

< 0 and

∂a
∂β

> 0, so corr(w, a) < 0. Because workers with

relatively high β increasingly prefer amenities to wages, firms will shift compensation for these workers away from wages toward amenities. Finally, with regards
to the marginal cost of providing amenities κ, while the wage is unaffected, since
∂a
∂κ

< 0, the amenity value provided by the firm falls (Rosen, 1986a). Therefore, the

wage-amenity bundles we observe across firms will reflect differences in firms’ productivity levels (z), employees’ preferences for amenities (β), and costs of amenity
provision (κ), which together, can induce a positive or negative relation between w
and a.

A.2

ASEC and Glassdoor Amenities

In this appendix, I detail how the measures used for externally validating the
Glassdoor amenities against the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC)
dataset are constructed. I first restrict attention to the thirteen survey waves from
2008–2020, for which the microdata are made available by Flood et al. (2020)
through IPUMS-CPS. I then map workers from their industries in ASEC according to 1990 Census Bureau classifications into twenty-two Glassdoor industries.85 I
85

The industries and corresponding Census Bureau mappings are: Accounting & Legal (841,
890); Arts, Entertainment & Recreation (800–810, 872); Biotech & Pharmaceuticals (891); Busi-
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then map workers from their occupations in ASEC according to 2010 Census Bureau classifications into twenty-one two-digit standard occupational classification
(SOC) occupations. Each of the measures used in Table A.1 are then calculated by
taking weighted averages (according to representative ASEC weights) by industryoccupation pairing for the following observables, where the relevant variables are
included in parentheses.
 Offers pension: The worker responds that there is a pension plan at work, but

she is not included or that she is included in a pension plan at work (pension).
 Offers insurance: The worker was included in an employer group health plan

last year (inclugh).
 Using paid time off: The worker was absent from work last week or working

part-time last week for a vacation or personal days (whyabsnt, whyptlwk ) .
 Absent due to layoff: The worker was unemployed because she was on layoff

or lost her job for other reasons (whyunemp).
 Employment white-male: The worker responds that is male and white (sex,

race)
 Weekly time at work: The worker’s usual hours worked per week at main job,
ness Services (721–731, 740–741, 882, 891–893); Construction, Repair & Maintenance (60, 751–
760); Finance (700–710); Health Care (812–840, 861–870); Information Technology (732); Insurance (711); Manufacturing (100–392); Media (440); Non-Profit (880–881); Oil, Gas, Energy &
Utilities (450–472); Real Estate (712); Retail (580–640, 642–691); Telecommunications (441–442);
Transportation & Logistics (400–432); and Travel & Tourism (762–770).
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conditional on the worker being employed at work (uhrswork1,empstat).
As shown in Table A.1, Glassdoor amenities capture labor market patterns observed across metrics related to these variables. I first consider fringe benefit information contained in ASEC by calculating the share of workers for whom the firm
offers a pension or group health insurance plan, as well as the share of workers
who were absent from work or worked part-time last week because they were on
vacation or using personal days. These three measures should each increase as the
amenities for retirement contributions, health insurance, and paid time off, respectively, improve. Since the availability of (and thus likely satisfaction with) fringe
benefits depends on hours worked, employment status controls are not included
in the formal regressions. The first three columns confirm these patterns, with
robustly positive and significant correlations of 0.39, 0.18, and 0.14, respectively,
between the Glassdoor amenities and ASEC measures. Next, I consider whether
actual increased risk of forced job separation by industry-occupation according to
ASEC translates into an increasingly negative amenity for job security in Glassdoor reviews and find a robustly negative correlation of –0.18. Next, I use the
gender and racial composition of employment to examine whether the amenity for
diversity/inclusion captures differences in diversity across labor market opportunities. In industry-occupations with a greater share of workers who are white males,
the diversity/inclusion amenity is increasingly more-negative, with a correlation of
–0.08. In work arrangements where employees spend more hours on the job, we
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would anticipate workers to have less-favorable work-life balance, as they have less
time for leisure. Column 6 confirms that jobs in which workers supply more hours
on average have the dis-amenity of worse work-life balance, with a correlation of
–0.19. Finally, we would anticipate jobs where workers spend more hours on the job
to report greater satisfaction with hours — as they have access to more full-time
labor — but conditional on employment status, e.g. full-time or part-time, workers
that spend increasingly many hours on the job would be more dis-satisfied with the
increased hours they spend on the job. The final two columns confirm this pattern:
In Glassdoor reviews, workers in industry-occupations with more work hours are
significantly more positive about hours, but upon controlling for the distribution
of workers by employment status, workers with longer work hours are significantly
more negative about hours.
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Table A.1: Relating Glassdoor Amenities and Outcomes from the Annual Social
and Economic Supplement (ASEC)
Measure calculated from ASEC

Standardized Glassdoor amenity
Retirement contributions

Share
offers
pension
(%)

Share
Share
using paid
offers
insurance
time off
(%)
(%)

Share
Share
absent due employment
to layoff
white-male
(%)
(%)

Mean weekly time at work
(hours)

0.098∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.040∗∗∗
(0.010)

Health insurance

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

Paid time off

-0.010∗∗∗
(0.002)

Job security

-0.069∗∗∗
(0.017)

Diversity/inclusion

-0.821∗∗∗
(0.175)

Work-life balance

1.348∗∗∗
(0.172)

Hours
Employment status controls
Industry-occupations
Pairwise correlation
R2
Mean ASEC weight
Mean ASEC measure

439
0.385
0.15
17699
0.480

439
0.180
0.03
17699
0.430

439
0.142
0.02
17699
0.033

X
439
-0.184
0.18
17699
0.030

X
439
-0.080
0.22
17699
0.452

X
439
-0.185
0.59
17699
38.80

439
0.352
0.12
17699
38.80

-0.916∗∗∗
(0.167)
X
439
0.352
0.60
17699
38.80

Notes: This table reflects coefficients from regressions of ASEC-level measures on (standardized
normal) Glassdoor amenities at the Glassdoor industry x two-digit SOC occupation. Regressions
are weighted according to the representative ASEC weights. Employment status controls refers
to the share of workers of each employment status in the Glassdoor reviews sample. Industryoccupation pairings restricted to those with at least fifty Glassdoor employer reviews. Significance
levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

A.3

AWCS and Glassdoor Amenities

In this appendix, I detail how amenities from the American Working Conditions
Survey (AWCS) are constructed for comparison with Glassdoor amenities. There is
only one wave of the AWCS that was fielded in 2015, and had 3,131 respondents. I
restrict attention to individuals who are employed, but not self-employed, trimming
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the sample to 2,117 respondents. We obtain the worker’s two-digit North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS) industry code and two-digit standard occupational classification (SOC) occupation. I then exclude any workers for whom
industry or occupation is unavailable, trimming the sample further to 1,725 respondents. To compare with Glassdoor reviews, I map Glassdoor industries into NAICS
codes.86 Each amenity used in Table A.2 is then measured by taking weighted averages (according to representative AWCS weights) by industry-occupation pairing,
where the relevant variables are included in parentheses.
 Autonomy/responsibility: If the respondent is able to choose or change the

order of tasks, the methods of work, and speed/rate of work. We sum these
three indicators. (q50a–q50c)
 On-the-job training: If over the past twelve months, respondents had under-

gone training to improve their skills that was paid for or provided by their
employer or on-the-job training. We sum these two indicators. (q61a,q61d )
 Work-life balance: In general, do your working hours fit, (1) very well, (2)

well, (3) not very well, or (4) not at all well, in with your family or social
commitments outside work? I create an indicator variable for the worker
86

The seventeen industries and corresponding Glassdoor industries listed in parentheses are:
11 (Agriculture and Forestry); 21 (Mining and Metals); 22 (Oil, Gas, Energy and Utilities); 23
(Construction, Repair and Maintenance); 31 (Manufacturing, Aerospace and Defense); 44 (Retail);
48 (Transportation and Logistics); 51 (Media, Telecommunications); 52 (Finance, Insurance); 53
(Real Estate); 54 (Accounting and Legal, Business Services, Information Technology, Biotech and
Pharmaceuticals); 61 (Education); 62 (Health Care); 71 (Arts, Entertainment and Recreation);
72 (Travel and Tourism, Restaurants, Bars and Food Services); 81 (Consumer Services); and 92
(Government).
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responds very well or well. (q41 )
 Short breaks: Whether the respondent can (1) always, (2) most of the time,

(3) sometimes, (4) rarely, or (5) never take breaks when wanted, where the
integral value assigned to each option is included in parentheses. Inverting
the scale, I obtain a metric that is increasing in the degree to which taking
breaks when wanted is permissible. (q51d )
 Work schedule: In response to whether changes to their work schedule occur

often, respondents could say no or yes, with the latter further qualified by
either on the same day, the day before, several days in advance, or several
weeks in advance. We create an indicator variable for the worker responds
no, so that this measure is inversely related to the frequency of scheduling
changes. (q40 )
 Safety: Whether the respondent is exposed to each of the following all of the

time, almost all the of the time, around three-fourths of the time, around
one-half of the time, around one-fourth of the time, almost never, or never:
vibrations - hands tools/machinery, loud noise, high temperatures, low temperatures, breathe smoke/fumes/power/dust, breathe vapors, handling chemical products, breathe tobacco smoke, and handling infectious materials. We
create an indicator for each that the worker is exposed at least one-half of the
time or more. I then sum the nine indicators and multiply by −1 to obtain a
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metric that is increasing in the degree of workplace safety. (q23a-q23i )
 Support: Whether the worker agrees or disagrees with the statement that their

immediate boss provides useful feedback and whether their immediate boss
encourages and supports their development. I create an indicator variable for
each and sum the two. (q58f,q58g)
 Recognition: With regards to their workplace, whether the respondent (1)

strongly agrees, (2) agrees, (3) neither agrees nor disagrees, (4) disagrees,
or (5) strongly disagrees employees are appreciated when done a good job,
where the integral value assigned to each option is included in parentheses.
Inverting the scale, I obtain a metric that is increasing in the degree to which
the workplace offers employees recognition. (q51d )
 Communication: Whether the respondent would describe their work situation

as one in which they (1) always , (2) most of the time, (3) sometimes, (4)
rarely, or (5) never receive contradictory instructions, where the integral value
assigned to each option is included in parentheses. (q52e)
 Pay: With regards to their job, whether the respondent (1) strongly agrees,

(2) agrees, (3) neither agrees nor disagrees, (4) disagrees, or (5) strongly
disagrees that they feel that they get paid appropriately, where the integral
value assigned to each option is included in parentheses. Inverting the scale, I
obtain a metric that is increasing in the degree to which the worker is satisfied
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with pay. (q77b)
I then test whether the Glassdoor amenities reflect patterns observed for these
ten aspects of work in the AWCS. The relations, summarized in Table A.2, confirm that Glassdoor amenities reflect differences in workplace conditions between
industries and occupations. There are particularly strong correlations between the
two datasets. A one-standard-deviation improvement in the Glassdoor amenity is
associated with 0.44 and 0.34 standard deviations improved short breaks and safety
in the AWCS, respectively. For work schedule, autonomy/responsibility, and onthe-job-training, we find robustly positive relations as well, with 0.24, 0.22, and 0.21
standard deviations increases in the AWCS per standard deviation in Glassdoor.
Last, we find noticeably positive albeit weaker significant relations for support,
work-life balance, pay, recognition, and communication between the two surveys
with 0.09–0.13 standard deviations increases in the AWCS per standard deviation
in Glassdoor. In all, this comparison offers further assurance that findings derived
using Glassdoor amenities have real consequence for the U.S. labor market.

A.4

Intra-Industry Wage-Satisfaction Relations

In this appendix, I show that the positive relation observed between a firm’s wage
and its job satisfaction premia does not reflect across-industry differences but holds
within industries as well. First, each firm is mapped a two-digit NAICS industry
according to the mapping from Glassdoor industries to NAICS detailed in Footnote
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Table A.2: Relating Glassdoor and American Working Conditions Survey (AWCS)
Amenities
Amenity in AWCS

Amenity in Glassdoor
Industry-occupations
Pairwise correlation
R2
Mean AWCS weight

Short
breaks

Safety

0.442∗∗∗
(0.047)
203
0.552
0.30
7.589

0.335∗∗∗
(0.057)
204
0.385
0.15
7.588

Autonomy/ On-the-job
Work
schedule responsibility
training
Support

Work-life
balance

Pay

Recognition

Communication

0.241∗∗∗
(0.040)
204
0.395
0.16
7.588

0.131∗∗∗
(0.044)
204
0.203
0.04
7.588

0.122∗∗
(0.047)
204
0.177
0.03
7.588

0.111∗∗
(0.046)
203
0.167
0.03
7.620

0.085∗∗
(0.043)
204
0.139
0.02
7.588

0.216∗∗∗
(0.053)
204
0.275
0.08
7.588

0.208∗∗∗
(0.053)
204
0.266
0.07
7.588

0.133∗∗∗
(0.041)
203
0.224
0.05
7.620

Notes: This table reflects coefficients from regressions of (standardized normal) AWCS amenities
on (standardized normal) Glassdoor amenities at the two-digit NAICS industry x two-digit SOC
occupation. Regressions are weighted according to the representative AWCS weights. Industryoccupation pairings restricted to those with at least fifty Glassdoor employer reviews. Significance
levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
σ w
86. Then, for the set of firms in each NAICS industry σ, I estimate λ̂R
k = ρ λ̂k + υk .

The seventeen coefficients are presented in ascending order in Figure A.1. For most
industries, ρσ is positive, with the most robust relations observed among high-skilled
industries. The standalone exception is Educational Services, for which we instead
observe a sharply negative relation.
From a fixed employer look-up table Glassdoor maintains, I obtain a rich set of
firm characteristics, including firm type, age, and size. With regards to type, firms
are partitioned according to private companies, public companies, subsidiaries, nonprofits, colleges, governments, hospitals, and schools. Partitioning firms by type
allows for a deeper investigation into the negative relation observed within the Educational Services sector. Is this inverse pattern driven by particular firms operating
within education, such as primary and secondary school systems? I partition the
sample into colleges (46 percent of employers), schools (21 percent) and all other
w
education-based firms, and re-estimate the wage-amenity relation λ̂R
k = ρλ̂k + υk
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Figure A.1: Heterogeneity in Slope Between Wage and Rating Premia Within Industries

w
Notes: This figure shows the ρ coefficient from estimating λ̂R
k = ρλ̂k + υk separately within each
industry for the firms in the Full set. Industries reflect two-digit NAICS, and are displayed in
ascending order according to ρ. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

separately for all employers, only colleges, only primary and secondary schools, and
all firms that are neither colleges nor schools. The results are recorded in Table
A.3. Column 1 confirms the stark inverse relation between wages and job satisfaction, but Columns 2–4 reveal that schools and colleges drive this pattern. For
non-college, non-school employers in fact, we observe the positive correlation between wages and job satisfaction observed elsewhere. Learning institutions appear
unique in their offering of improved amenities with lower wages.

A.5

Ratings of Firms’ Benefits Packages Overall

In this appendix, I show further evidence that higher-paying firms are betteramenity firms by narrowing in explicitly on workers’ satisfaction levels with their
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Table A.3: Relation between Firms’ Pay and Satisfaction Premia within Education
Sector
Overall rating premia
All
Wages premia
-0.223∗∗∗
(0.084)
Std. dev. rating premia
0.979
Std. dev. pay premia
0.219
Observations
3715

Colleges
-0.258∗
(0.152)
0.893
0.207
1703

Schools
-0.418∗∗
(0.211)
1.041
0.205
768

Other
0.377∗∗∗
(0.140)
1.027
0.216
1244

Notes: This table reflects regressions of firms’ overall ratings premia on firms’ wage premia within
Educational Services by employer type. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Significance levels: *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

employers’ fringe benefits. When contributing information to the website, a worker
can choose to (separately) rate their employers’ overall fringe benefits package.87
Fringe benefits reviews begin in 2014, and are appreciably thinner in size compared with the wage and job satisfaction data. That said, the data constitute
employee-employer matches and contain job switchers who rate the benefits overall
for multiple firms, and so equation 1.4.1 can be re-estimated with worker i’s benefits
rating for firm k in year t, Bikt , on the left-hand side to obtain firm-specific premia
in fringe benefits satisfaction λ̂B
k for 11,965 firms.
w
Before relating λ̂B
k to the firms’ wage premia λ̂k , I re-estimate the first differences

specification of equation 1.4.2 to see how the change in a workers’ fringe benefits
satisfaction levels (Bik0 t0 − Bikt ) relates to the change in the firms’ wage premia
w
λ̂w
k0 − λ̂k . Panel a of Figure A.2 reveals a clear positive effect: Workers who move

to lower-paying firms on average report worse satisfaction with fringe benefits, and
87

For a further discussion of overall fringe benefits ratings from Glassdoor, see Gadgil and Sockin
(2020).
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vice-versa. Looking instead at whether the worker experiences a decline in benefits
satisfaction, 1(Bik0 t0 < Bikt ), panel b of Figure A.2 reveals that the probability of
experiencing a decline in the quality of fringe benefits rises as workers move to lowerpaying firms. This is true because, as evidenced in Column 1 of Table A.4, firms that
offer relatively greater wages also provide relatively better fringe benefits packages,
consistent with Pierce (2001). That said, consistent with Table 1.5, differences
in fringe benefits play a limited role in explaining firms’ job satisfaction premia:
Incorporating firms’ benefits ratings premia attenuates the slope between the firms’
wage and job satisfaction premia by only 6 percent (Columns 3 and 4). That fringe
benefits explain so little of the job satisfaction premia implies that accounting for
pecuniary differences in fringe benefits across employers would even further widen
firm-level dispersion in total compensation beyond that obtained through gauging
job satisfaction levels.

A.6

Hedonic Approach to Estimating MWP

In this appendix, I estimate workers’ MWP for improved job satisfaction through
a hedonic approach in which job satisfaction is an attribute priced into the wages
workers are willing to accept following the two-way fixed effects methodology of
Lavetti and Schmutte (2018) — though given the thinness of the wage panel, I
do not first residualize workers’ wages by a match fixed effect. The attribute of
interest that should be priced into workers’ accepted wages is R̄ισt , which reflects
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Figure A.2: Growth in Benefits Ratings by the Change in Firm Wage Premia

(a) P(rating decline)
Notes: This figure depicts the average growth rate in workers’ benefits ratings (panel a) and the
probability of a worker experiencing a decline in fringe benefits rating (panel b) when transitioning
between firms that differ in their wage premia (x-axis). Observations are partitioned into twentyfive bins according to the measure on the x-axis.

Table A.4: Firms’ Wage and Job Satisfaction Premia Accounting for Fringe Benefits
Wage premia
Benefits ratings premia

0.015∗∗∗
(0.001)

Overall rating premia
0.077∗∗∗
(0.005)

Wage premia
Average movers from wages
Average movers from overall ratings
Average movers from benefits ratings
Std. dev. benefits ratings
Firms
Adjusted R2

102
58
4
1.013
11965
0.01

102
58
4
1.013
11965
0.01

0.069∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.560∗∗∗
(0.051)
102
58
4
1.013
11965
0.02

0.527∗∗∗
(0.042)
102
58
4
1.013
11965
0.02

Notes: This table displays the coefficients from regressions of the firm fixed effects for job satisfaction on the firm fixed effects for wages incorporating firm-level differences in satisfaction with
fringe benefits. Benefits ratings reflect a one-to-five stars rating scale, with more stars indicating
a greater level of satisfaction. Benefits ratings premia reflect the firm fixed effects from a two-way
fixed effects model (with worker fixed effects) on the rating the worker assigns to the firms’ overall
fringe benefits package. For further description of Glassdoor benefits data, see Gadgil and Sockin
(2020). Standard errors are bootstrapped. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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the three-year rolling average of job satisfaction ratings at year t for each Glassdoor
industry ι and two-digit SOC occupation σ. The hedonic specification is given by

wikt = β R̄ισt + γXit + λi + λk + λσ + λt + εikt .

(A.6.1)

where Xit represents a fourth-order polynomial in years of work experience. Note
that since workers are mapped to industries by the firm, then controlling for industry
is redundant when firm fixed effects are included. The results are presented in Table
A.5.
If job satisfaction is an aspect of work that workers are willing to trade off
with wages, then the coefficient β should be negative. Looking across the pooled
cross-section of workers with multiple wage observations, absent controlling for the
productivity of the worker, the opposite relation is observed (Columns 1 and 2). The
positive coefficients capture how high-wage workers on average also enjoy greater
levels of job satisfaction, not less. When worker fixed effects are included, β now
captures the trade-off the same worker would be willing to make between their
wage and expected level of job satisfaction as captured through differences across
industry-occupations over time. Now, a negative coefficient is observed, consistent
with a compensating differential. After further accounting for time-invariant differences across firms (Column 4), a significant compensating differential is observed,
with the same worker willing to forego about $3,300 (β ∗ w̄) in wages for each additional star of job satisfaction. Since Glassdoor ratings range from one to five
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stars, a worker would forego roughly $13,200, or 18 percent of the average wage,
to transition from a job with the lowest expected level of job satisfaction to one
with the highest. Obtaining a hedonic estimate for MWP that is noticeably below
estimates obtained from a tenure-based approach is not inconsistent with the literature (Dale-Olsen, 2006; Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009; Lavetti and Schmutte, 2018).
However, this could reflect asymmetry in timing: the measure of job satisfaction
used in the hedonic specification is an ex ante expectation for a given labor market
whereas the one used for the tenure-based approach is an ex post realization of the
match. The hedonic methodology reveals that, although there is a compensating
differential for job satisfaction (and thus non-wage amenities), this trade-off is not
observed broadly across workers and firms.
Table A.5: Willingness-to-pay for Improved Employer Quality, Hedonic Approach
Hedonic Specification
Pooled
(1)
Overall rating (3-Yr MA)
0.652∗∗∗
(0.029)
Observations
1239971
R2
0.27
MWP one additional star
47295
95% MWP confidence interval [43242,51348]

+Industry and
Occupation
(2)
0.131∗∗∗
(0.015)
1239971
0.46
9510
[7379,11642]

+Worker
(3)
-0.060∗∗∗
(0.011)
1239971
0.91
-3964
[-4972,-2957]

+Firm
(4)
-0.046∗∗∗
(0.006)
1239971
0.93
-3301
[-4179,-2423]

Notes: This table reflects coefficients from a regression of average overall rating within an industryoccupation pair on wages, where the column headers reflect the level of fixed effects added to the
specification. Mean wage for the sample is $72,494. Industry-occupation pairs with fewer than 50
ratings are excluded. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%,
*** 1%.
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A.7

Description for Each Amenity

In this appendix, I provide the input and output from the Anchored CorEx model
for each of the fifty amenities, along with their respective categories.
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Table A.6: Input and Output from Anchored CorEx Model: Amenities 1–10
#

Category

Amenity

Anchor words

Top twenty words
pay, salary, money, base,
base pay, pay pay, discrepancy, disparity,
way market, low ball, ridiculously low, offer competitive,
making much, quite low, make ton, peanuts,
differential, incredibly low, one lowest, great place work

1

Pay

Pay

pay, salary,
base, base pay, money

2

Pay

Pay
growth

raise, annual raise,
salary increase, pay raise, raise base

3

Fringe
benefits

4

raise, pay raise, salary increase, annual raise,
raise base, yearly review, annual pay, infrequent,
get cent, years without, room advancement, hard come,
keep inflation, room growth, eyebrow, miniscule,
minimal pay, chance advancement, little room growth, room promotion

Bonuses

bonus, performance,
cash, stock option

bonus, performance, cash, stock option,
bonus base, payouts, cow, make extra,
appraisal, rsu, cows, low raise,
bonus good, advancement base, eoy, hard achieve,
quartly, quaterly, recognition job, sti

Fringe
benefits

Commissions

sales, commission,
quota

sales, commission, quota, selling,
sale, sales rep, territory, sales job,
sales people, salesperson, base salary, cold calling,
commission structure, sales manager, sales goal, make sales,
cold call, sales training, sales position, sales person

5

Fringe
benefits

Paid
time off

6

Fringe
benefits

Health
insurance

7

Fringe
benefits

Retirement
contributions

8

Fringe
benefits

Employee
discounts

9

Fringe
benefits

Free
food

Working
10
conditions

Work-life
balance

leave, pto, vacation, pay time off,
sick days, bereavement, pto sick, benefit unlimited,
good amount, must use, paternal, lot desire,
generous amount, benefit pay, accumulation, hard take,
maternal, benefit generous, vto, pay time off sick

vacation, pto,
sick days, leave, pay time off

insurance, health insurance, vision, dental,
offer health, health vision, pricey, medical vision,
cost health, affordable health, tunnel, pto health,
poor health, heath, excellent health, could better,
insurance dental, good medical, dental health, unaffordable

insurance, health insurance,
dental, vision

401k, contribution, retirement, pension,
year, include, plan, benefit,
state, increase, le, cover,
high, area, policy, 401k match,
average, option, match, holiday

retirement, 401k,
pension, contribution

discount, perk, employee discount, merchandise,
clothes, clothing, coupon, gratis,
credit cards, accessory, concession, merch,
apparel, full price, jewelry, sale item,
retail job, free movie, phone plan, cute clothes

employee discount, discount,
perk

free, food, lunch, cater lunch,
tip, eating, massage, breakfast,
occasional free, cook, delicious, free food,
half off, get free, free breakfast, donut,
salad, sandwich, menu, free drink

lunch, food,
free, cater lunch

work life balance, work life, balance ability, maintain healthy,
promote healthy, balance none, balance limited, hard balance,
imbalance, difficult maintain, culture good, hard maintain,
good balance, culture benefit, balence, long hours little,
balace, benefit culture, flexibility good, ballance

work life balance, work life

Notes: This table details the anchor words and resulting topics from the Anchored CorEx model.
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Table A.7: Input and Output from Anchored CorEx Model: Amenities 11–20
#

Category

Amenity

Anchor words

11

Working
conditions

Hours

hours, full time,
part time

Top twenty words
hours, full time, part time, work full time,
part timer, part time employee, college student, get hours,
seasonal, get full time, cut hours, position available,
full time position, hours cut, require long, normal business,
part time job, work part time, hours hours, benefit flexible

Working
12
conditions

Work
schedule

hours, shift,
schedule, flex time

hours, schedule, shift, flex time,
scheduling, availability, hour shift, early morning,
pick extra, swap, pay flexible, monday friday,
late night, inflexible, super flexible, offer flexible,
night shift, extremely flexible, schedule change, week advance

Working
13
conditions

Short
breaks

break, rest,
bathroom, lunch

break, lunch, rest, bathroom,
take lunch, minute break, two minute, half hour,
one hour, min lunch, laurels, hour long,
min break, get break, pay lunch, break time,
minute lunch, long lunch, 30min, unpaid lunch

Working
14
conditions

Office
space

office, desk,
cubicle, cramp, building

office, building, desk, cubicle,
cramp, quiet, windows, amenities,
renovate, spacious, elevator, dallas,
cube, remodel, natural light, beautiful new,
renovation, noisy, layout, open floor plan

15

Working
conditions

16

Working
conditions

17

Working
conditions

Commuting

Teleworking

drive, parking, commute, bus,
traffic, downtown, shuttle, throw people,
garage, public transportation, distance, depend live,
long distance, valet, rush hour, parking spot,
location free, locate downtown, meter, underground

commute, parking,
bus, drive

telecommute, telework,
work home, home office, remote

work home, remote, home office, telework,
telecommute, one day week, flexible work, schedule ability,
set hours, flexible work schedule, option available, flex schedule,
days per week, hours ability, make schedule, equipment provide,
flexibility ability, provide equipment, remote position, benefit ability

Location

city, location,
metro

location, city, metro, rural,
location location, salt lake, twin, suburb,
geographic, culver, small town, jersey,
inner, midtown, redwood, suburban,
geographical, one location, satellite, philadelphia

18

Working
conditions

Autonomy/
responsibility

autonomy, independence,
responsibility

responsibility, autonomy, independence, given lot,
take additional, give lot, shirk, lots flexibility,
shirking, variety task, lots freedom, many responsibility,
deal flow, minimal supervision, kind coworkers, variety job,
work pace, schedule lots, supportive coworkers, atmosphere lots

19

Working
conditions

Respect/
abuse

20

Working
Communication
conditions

respect, abuse, hostile, harass,
reason, lie, joke, upper management,
write, literally, dignity, quit,
unless, promise, woman, speak,
blame, absolutely, claim, ignore

respect, dignity,
abuse, harass, hostile

issue, communication, meeting, concern,
resolve, voicing, open line, meeting meeting,
management listen, sometimes lack, get resolve, resolving,
unresolved, many meeting, poor internal, inter department,
inter departmental, need improvement, townhall, need improve

communication, issue,
concern, meeting

Notes: This table details the anchor words and resulting topics from the Anchored CorEx model.
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Table A.8: Input and Output from Anchored CorEx Model: Amenities 21–30
#

Category

Amenity

21

Working
conditions

Support

help, support,
supportive, encourage

Difficulty

challenge, growing pains,
difficult, easy

Working
22
conditions

Anchor words

Top twenty words
help, support, encourage, supportive,
always available, always ready, always happy, nice willing,
student need, worker willing, manager willing, available need,
wiling, pay school, further education, class size,
support teacher, assist need, lots training, administrative support
challenge, easy, difficult, growing pains,
job fairly, application process, peasy, getting time off,
work life balance sometimes, communication sometimes, simple job, balancing work,
job simple, mindless work, simple work, everyday different,
decal, breezy, quick money, working public

Working
23
Requirements
conditions

require, requirement,
mandatory, optional

require, requirement, mandatory, optional,
weekend work, five words, time commitment, weekend hours,
pay low amount work, physical labor, heavy lift, extensive travel,
low pay amount work, billables, lot travel, high productivity,
memorization, lot paperwork, weekend require, exertion

Working
24
conditions

stress, pressure,
high stress, high pressure

stress, pressure, high stress, high pressure,
undue, cooker, environment high, environment low,
unneeded, environment little, reliever, lot unnecessary,
stress high, heavy workload, much pressure, lots pressure,
schedule low, high pressure environment, lots stress, heavy work

Working
25
conditions

Working
26
conditions

Working
27
conditions

Working
28
conditions

Working
29
conditions

Working
30
conditions

Stress

Pace

Safety

Recognition

Morale

fast pace, pace, speed, super fast,
busy fast, snail, challenge fast, excite fast,
breakneck, really fast, working fast, growing rapid,
environment always, glacial, never boring, environment lots,
dynamic fast, environment challenge, environment lot, learn fast

pace, fast pace,
speed

injury, dangerous,
safety, conditions, workplace

workplace, safety, conditions, dangerous,
injury, unsafe working, hazard, precaution,
hazardous, chemical, ppe, safety employee,
employee safety, safety culture, number one priority, weather conditions,
safety first, extremely hot, safe work, fatality

hard work, effort,
reward

reward, hard work, effort, unnoticed,
recognize reward, put forth, get reward, go unnoticed,
make every, unrecognized, get recognize, recognize appreciate,
always recognize, reward recognize, challenge yet, duplication,
handsomely, management recognize, little recognition, working child

morale, atmosphere

atmosphere, morale, family type, upbeat,
easy going, good working, booster, family friendly,
relax work, positive work, family orient, good team,
friendly family, friendly work, low staff, turnover low,
family style, casual work, friendly fun, friendly relax

Fun

fun, boring,
mundane, tedious

fun, boring, tedious, mundane,
repetitive, lively, monotonous, interactive,
chill, make coming work, fun fun, numbingly,
lay back, company activity, summer job, get bit,
work repetitive, repetitive work, get repetitive, interact customer

Culture

culture, values,
environment, society, mission

culture, environment, mission, values,
society, strong core, unsafe work, noble,
cutthroat, fun office, pace work, comfortable working,
amaze work, fantastic work, work fast pace, dog eat dog,
relax office, highly political, like fast pace, great workplace

Notes: This table details the anchor words and resulting topics from the Anchored CorEx model.
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Table A.9: Input and Output from Anchored CorEx Model: Amenities 31–40
#

Category

Amenity

31

Working
conditions

Diversity/
inclusion

32

Working
conditions

Leadership

33

Working
conditions

Office
politics

34

Working
conditions

Change

change

change, slow make, enact, resist,
many change, lots change, averse, adverse,
slow adapt, nothing would, slow implement, management change,
schedule always, always change, abrupt, much change,
scenery, chump, structure change, student life

35

Working
conditions

Job
security

layoff, lay off,
turnover

turnover, layoff, lay off, severance,
furlough, severance package, due covid, get lay off,
result high, lead high, high rate, people lay off,
reorgs, super high, lay off people, instability,
downsizing, lay off employee, company lay off, layoff happen

36

Human capital

Career
concerns

career, grow,
improve, growth

growth, career, grow, improve,
always room, tons room, personal career, due rapid,
benefit room, room professional, communication could, ton room,
real room, opportunity personal, great company, help advance,
absolutely room, enough room, good place, place build

promotion, promote,
job title

promote, promotion, job title, merit base,
base merit, much room, internal candidate, promotion process,
base know, hike, promote quickly, limited opportunity,
tough get, come promotion, take long time get, promotion system,
quick promotion, salary hike, promotion hard, lack promotion

Experience

experience

experience, opportunity gain, lots hands, looking gain,
make break, learn gain, memorable, none great,
gain lots, really depend, able gain, place gain,
gain much, lot hands, improve customer, help gain,
highly dependent, unforgettable, without prior, courtroom

Skill
development

develop, skill

skill, develop, sharpen, help develop,
develop new, hone, learn valuable, marketable,
gain new, critical thinking, learn many, learn develop,
opportunity develop, public speaking, transferrable, communication skill,
develop professional, improve communication, transferable, lots opportunity learn new

train, training

training, train, trainer, sink swim,
pay training, opportunity cross, throw wolf, shadowing,
online training, training training, intensive, cpr,
expect know everything, informative, management need, lack formal,
cdl, provide adequate, provide proper, training do

37 Human capital

38 Human capital

39

Human capital

40 Human capital

Promotions

On-the-job
training

Anchor words

Top twenty words
diversity, diverse, inclusive, inclusion,
equality, lgbtq, multicultural, ethnic,
gender, diversity equity, lack diversity, ethnicity,
inclusivity, focus diversity, commitment diversity, race gender,
patient population, inclusiveness, nationality, student body

diversity, ethnic,
multicultural, inclusive, lgbtq,
inclusion, equality, diverse

management, leadership, hands off, ceo upper,
change upper, poor senior, overbear, upper middle,
transparency upper, access senior, access upper, many level,
lack strong, lack direction, exposure senior, support senior,
lack true, direction upper, communication senior, poor middle

leadership, management

politics, bureaucracy, office politics, red tape,
get way, big company, politics politics, lots internal,
lot internal, slow move, typical corporate, many layer,
inter office, mire, typical large, interoffice,
difficult navigate, lots red tape, lot bureaucracy, lots bureaucracy

politics, bureaucracy,
red tape, office politics

Notes: This table details the anchor words and resulting topics from the Anchored CorEx model.
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Table A.10: Input and Output from Anchored CorEx Model: Amenities 41–50
#

Category

41 Human capital

42

43

44

Human capital

Human capital

Human capital

Amenity

Anchor words

Mentoring

intern, internship,
mentor

Recruiting

hire, recruit,
interview, learn

Contracting

Industry

Top twenty words
intern, internship, mentor, internship program,
learn lot, intern program, intern get, internship experience,
intern work, great experience, intern event, hands experience,
busy work, intern given, summer internship, even intern,
unpaid internship, internship unpaid, end internship, intern project
hire, learn, interview, recruit,
always something new, interviewer, phone interview, almost anyone,
spree, recruit process, without experience, program new,
lot information, lots things, multitask, informational,
useful skill, service skill, quick hire, req
offer, contract, sign, renew,
non compete, contracting, contract end, contract work,
clause, rescind, new contract, contract employee,
contract company, month contract, contract position, contract hire,
year contract, nda, contract sign, perm

contract, offer,
sign

industry, product, project, organization,
technology, market, design, startup,
strategy, exposure, beauty, best product,
bench, cannabis, manufacture, really interest,
volatile, aerospace, bleeding edge, saturate

industry, market,
startup, organization, project,
product, technology, strategy,
design

manager, ceo, owner, boss,
micromanager, franchise, great guy, good manager,
manager assistant, assistant store, good guy, absentee,
difficult work, manager district, asst, manager need,
need training, district regional, manager micro, manager good

boss, manager,
ceo, owner

45

Relationships

Managers

46

Relationships

Coworkers

47

Relationships

Teams

team, teamwork,
collaborative

team, teamwork, collaborative, depend team,
immigration, feel part, value member, happy part,
orientate, supportive leadership, interdisciplinary, great support,
amaze leadership, experience depend, multidisciplinary, cooperative,
excellent leadership, excellent management, work life balance depend, approachable management

48

Relationships

Customers

customer, client

customer, client, servicing, many client,
client want, client client, working client, care client,
one client, dealing angry, customer get, building relationship,
impatient, client staff, many customer, deal rude,
deal angry, customer customer, every client, caregiver

49

Residual

Residual I

–

work, make, like, tell,
say, time, know, job,
come, working, want, way,
day, place, use, start,
ask, month, expect, things

50

Residual

Residual II

–

company, employee, business, role,
create, new, result, process,
focus, provide, level, truly,
idea, individual, opportunity, continue,
success, bring, allow, means

people, family, coworkers, colleague,
friend, coworkers become, become close, make feel like part,
get meet, meet best, mostly good, working smart,
meet wonderful, good hard working, need hire, meet awesome,
worker become, meet great, hire enough, generally nice

coworkers, people,
friend, family, colleague

Notes: This table details the anchor words and resulting topics from the Anchored CorEx model.
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A.8

Additional Figures and Tables for Chapter 1
Figure A.3: Job Satisfaction and Hourly Wage from NLSY97

Notes: This figure depicts the average job satisfaction for each job held by respondents in the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 against the workers’ log hourly wage.

Figure A.4: Log Wages and Overall Ratings Distributions

(a) Log wages

(b) Overall ratings

Notes: The figure plots the distribution of log wages (panel a) and overall ratings (panel b).
Samples are restricted to the panel of workers with multiple wages or multiple reviews, respectively.
Dashed blue vertical lines reflect the sample means of 11.042 and 3.053 for log wages and overall
ratings, respectively.
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Figure A.5: Firm FE for Overall Rating with Sample Truncation

(a) Wage variance

(b) Ratings variance

(c) Slope for rating-wage firm FE
Notes: This figure depicts the share of the variance explained in wages (panel a), the share of the
w
variance explained in overall ratings (panel b), and the coefficient ρ from estimating λ̂R
k = ρλ̂k +υk
(panel c) when the share of movers for each firm varies from 20 percent of the movers in the full
sample to 100 percent. The sample of firms is restricted to those in the Connected sample. For
each percentile of firm’s movers kept, a random sample of movers is drawn fifty times and for each
draw, the two-way fixed effects model of equation 1.4.1 is re-estimated. The firm fixed effects are
then averaged across the fifty draws.
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Figure A.6: Incidence of Each Amenity in Workers’ Reviews

Notes: The figure presents, for each of the fifty amenities, the share of reviews that mention
the amenity. Sample is restricted to the panel of workers with multiple reviews. An amenity is
considered to be mentioned in a review if |qra | ≥ 0.01, and not mentioned otherwise. Amenities
are listed in ascending order according to the rate of incidence.
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Figure A.7: Firm Premia and Average Labor Productivity from Compustat

(a) Wages FE

(b) Overall ratings FE

Notes: This figure plots the firm fixed effects for wages (panel a) and job satisfaction (panel b)
against the firms’ average labor productivity (log sales per worker). Log sales per worker available
for public firms in Compustat, and so the sample of firms is restricted to public firms that can
be matched from Glassdoor to Compustat. Observations are partitioned into twenty-five bins
according to the measure on the x-axis.

Table A.11: Summary Measures for Wages and Ratings Samples in AKM Framework
Log wages
Panel measure
Worker-year observations
Years between observations
Growth between observations
Experiences negative growth
Worker switches firm
Current employee at origin firm

Overall ratings

N

mean

std. dev.

N

mean

std. dev.

2.51
1.34
1.33
1.33
1.34
1.34

2.24
2.48
0.15
0.29
0.78
0.65

0.62
1.91
0.34
0.45
0.42
0.48

1.45
0.80
0.80
0.80
0.80
0.80

2.38
2.01
-0.03
0.32
0.80
0.48

0.86
1.78
1.72
0.47
0.40
0.50

Notes: This table displays the variance decomposition for low wages and overall ratings for the
Full sample of firms (all firms) and the Connected sample of firms (firms represented by at least
fifteen movers). Sample sizes (N) are listen in millions.
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Table A.12: Wage Growth Among Job Transitions by Firms’ Rankings
Origin
Firm Decile
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Destination Firm Decile
1
2
3
4
-0.06 -0.11 -0.20 -0.29
0.11 -0.06 -0.09 -0.14
0.18 0.04 -0.05 -0.07
0.27 0.11 0.03 -0.05
0.34 0.18 0.09 0.03
0.42 0.22 0.13 0.07
0.46 0.27 0.17 0.10
0.57 0.35 0.25 0.17
0.72 0.48 0.35 0.26
0.95 0.69 0.53 0.40

5
-0.36
-0.18
-0.11
-0.06
-0.04
0.02
0.05
0.11
0.19
0.32

6
-0.40
-0.21
-0.13
-0.08
-0.03
-0.07
0.03
0.08
0.15
0.28

7
-0.44
-0.25
-0.17
-0.10
-0.06
-0.03
-0.04
0.05
0.12
0.24

8
-0.54
-0.31
-0.20
-0.14
-0.09
-0.06
-0.04
-0.03
0.06
0.16

9
-0.68
-0.41
-0.29
-0.20
-0.14
-0.09
-0.07
-0.02
-0.01
0.11

10
-0.86
-0.64
-0.49
-0.38
-0.28
-0.23
-0.19
-0.12
-0.05
-0.02

Notes: This table presents the mean wage growth for job transitions based on the rankings of the
origin (initial) firm and destination (terminal) firm, where the firm rankings reflect deciles based
on the firm fixed effects for wages obtained from equation 1.4.1. Sample wage growth is demeaned
and residualized by the first difference in experience and years between observations.

Table A.13: Change in Overall Rating Among Job Transitions by Firms’ Rankings
Destination Firm Decile

Origin
Firm Decile

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

-0.2
0.8
1.3
1.7
1.9
2.0
2.4
2.7
3.1
3.6

-0.8
-0.3
0.4
0.7
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.8
2.4
3.1

-1.2
-0.4
-0.2
0.3
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.4
1.8
2.6

-1.5
-0.7
-0.2
-0.2
0.2
0.4
0.7
1.0
1.5
2.4

-1.8
-0.9
-0.5
-0.2
-0.2
0.2
0.4
0.8
1.2
2.1

-2.1
-1.1
-0.7
-0.4
-0.2
-0.2
0.3
0.6
1.1
1.9

-2.2
-1.3
-0.9
-0.6
-0.3
-0.2
-0.2
0.4
0.8
1.7

-2.6
-1.7
-1.2
-0.9
-0.7
-0.5
-0.2
-0.2
0.5
1.3

-2.8
-2.2
-1.7
-1.3
-1.1
-0.9
-0.7
-0.3
-0.2
0.9

-3.4
-3.1
-2.6
-2.3
-2.1
-1.9
-1.6
-1.3
-0.8
-0.2

Notes: This table presents the mean growth in job satisfaction rating for job transitions based on
the rankings of the origin (initial) firm and destination (terminal) firm, where the firm rankings
reflect deciles based on the firm fixed effects for overall rating obtained from equation 1.4.1. Sample
ratings growth is demeaned and residualized by the first difference of years between observations.
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Table A.14: Firms’ Wage Premia and Probability of Rating Decline

First-difference firm FE wages
Mean probability rating decline
Std. dev. pay premia
Observations

Full
sample
-0.105∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.327
0.185
614244

Tenure at
former job
0–1 years
-0.139∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.337
0.198
115946

Tenure at
former job
5+ years
-0.109∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.312
0.153
86055

Job title
stayer
-0.117∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.274
0.112
47847

Becomes a
manager
-0.120∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.293
0.170
53681

Switched
full-time to
part-time
-0.060∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.308
0.211
12800

Switched
part-time to
full-time
-0.076∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.406
0.227
31022

Notes: This table records the point estimate from equation 1.4.2 for different types of job transitions in the ratings panel. A managerial role refers to job titles that pertain to managers,
presidents, directors, chiefs, supervisors, and principals. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Table A.15: Change in Firms’ Pay Premia and Workers’ Sub-Ratings
Compensation
Culture
Work-life
Career
Senior
opportunities and benefits and values management balance
First-difference firm FE wages
0.848∗∗∗
1.569∗∗∗
0.555∗∗∗
0.581∗∗∗
0.414∗∗∗
(0.015)
(0.014)
(0.016)
(0.014)
(0.016)
Std. dev. rating
1.554
1.410
1.638
1.628
1.521
Std. dev. pay premia
0.133
0.133
0.133
0.133
0.133
Observations
479052
479052
479052
479052
479052

Notes: This table displays coefficients from regressions of the first-difference in the ratings workers
leave for their employers along five sub-dimensions and the first-difference in the firm fixed effects
for wages. The first difference in the number of years between observations included as a control.
Standard errors are bootstrapped. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Table A.16: Firms’ Wage and Job Satisfaction Premia
Overall rating premia
Wage premia
Sample
Industry FE
Average movers from wages
Average movers from reviews
Std. dev. rating premia
Std. dev. pay premia
Firms
Adjusted R2

0.468∗∗∗
(0.017)
Full
26
17
1.026
0.220
70118
0.01

0.419∗∗∗
(0.019)
Full
X
28
18
1.010
0.217
62421
0.02

0.716∗∗∗
(0.043)
Connected
113
62
0.570
0.148
10737
0.03

0.803∗∗∗
(0.050)
Connected
X
115
63
0.570
0.149
10338
0.08

Notes: This table displays the coefficients from regressions of the firm fixed effects for job satisfaction on the firm fixed effects for wages. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Significance levels:
* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table A.17: Firms’ Pay and Satisfaction Premia Over Time
Overall rating premia
Wage premia

0.353∗∗∗
(0.024)

0.085∗∗∗
(0.026)

Year FE
Firm FE
Firm-years
Adjusted R2

X

X
X
77556
0.31

77556
0.01

Notes: This table reflects regressions of the firm-year fixed effects for job satisfaction on the firmyear fixed effects for wages. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, **
5%, *** 1%.

Table A.18: Firms’ Wage and Satisfaction Premia, Incorporate Interview Process
Wage premia

Overall rating premia

Probability of offer premia

-0.053∗∗∗
(0.006)

-0.128∗∗∗
(0.017)

-0.088∗∗∗
(0.019)

Interview difficulty premia

0.052∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.122∗∗∗
(0.011)

0.082∗∗∗
(0.009)

Wage premia
Average movers from wages
Average movers from overall ratings
Average movers from interviews
Std. dev. probability of offer
Std. dev. interview difficulty
Firms
Adjusted R2

97
57
9
0.325
0.696
13959
0.05

97
57
9
0.325
0.696
13959
0.02

0.835∗∗∗
(0.039)
97
57
9
0.325
0.696
13959
0.05

0.749∗∗∗
(0.045)
97
57
9
0.325
0.696
13959
0.05

Notes: This table displays the coefficients from regressions of the firm fixed effects for job satisfaction on the firm fixed effects for wages incorporating firm-level differences in the interview
process. Interview difficulty reflects a one-to-five stars rating scale, with more stars indicating a
greater level of difficulty. Interview difficulty premia reflect the firm fixed effects from a two-way
fixed effects model (with worker fixed effects) on the difficulty rating the jobseeker assigns to interviewing with the firm. Probability of offer premia reflect the firm fixed effects from a two-way
fixed effects model (with worker fixed effects) on a dummy variable for the jobseeker received an
offer from the firm. For both two-way fixed effects models, the logarithm of months between the
date of the interview and the date submitted to Glassdoor is included as a control variable. For
further description of Glassdoor interviews data, see Sockin and Zhao (2020). Standard errors are
bootstrapped. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table A.19: Wages and Amenities Across Firms, Unweighted Amenities

Standardized amenity
Pay
Residual I
Residual II
Pay growth
Respect/abuse
Short breaks
Managers
Culture
Teleworking
Industry
Leadership
Free food
Coworkers
Safety
Health insurance
Office politics
Teams
Support
Paid time off
Diversity/inclusion
Autonomy/responsibility
Career concerns
Commissions
Promotions
Office space

Slope
Slope
Overall
Overall
rating
rating
with
with
weight wage FE Standardized amenity
weight wage FE
0.14
0.30*** Recognition
0.09
0.04**
0.44
0.23*** Retirement contributions
0.08
0.03*
0.20
0.03**
0.38
0.16*** Mentoring
0.09
0.14*** Location
-0.09
0.03
0.61
0.13*** Commuting
-0.06
0.03
0.03
0.03
-0.01
0.13*** Employee discounts
0.29
0.12*** Experience
0.03
0.02
0.07
0.02
0.33
0.10*** Customers
0.03
0.09*** Bonuses
0.08
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.12
0.09*** Contracting
0.42
0.09*** Work-life balance
0.38
0.01
-0.11
0.01
-0.02
0.09*** Requirements
0.15
0.09*** On-the-job training
0.16
0.01
0.17
0.00
0.11
0.08*** Fun
0.27
0.00
0.10
0.08*** Morale
0.17
0.08*** Work schedule
0.07
-0.01
0.16
0.08*** Communication
0.02
-0.01
0.06
-0.01
0.21
0.08*** Recruiting
0.03
0.06*** Hours
0.00
-0.01
0.21
0.05** Change
-0.07
-0.01
0.07
-0.02
0.10
0.05*** Stress
0.14
0.05*** Skill development
0.06
-0.02
0.12
0.05*** Pace
0.05
-0.03
0.19
-0.08***
0.04
0.05*** Job security
-0.02
0.04** Difficulty
-0.19
-0.10***

Notes: This table reflects coefficients from a linear regression of the firm fixed effects for each
amenity on the firm fixed effects for wages, where amenities for each review are calculating without
the review-based weights ωr . Standard errors are bootstrapped. Overall rating weights reflect the
first column of Table 1.3. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Table A.20: Pass-Through of Sub-Category Ratings to Overall Ratings
Relation to first difference on overall rating

First difference sub-category rating

Career
opp.
0.233∗∗∗
(0.001)

Comp.
and
benefits
0.107∗∗∗
(0.001)

Culture
and
values
0.280∗∗∗
(0.001)

Senior
mgmt.
0.275∗∗∗
(0.002)

Work
life
balance
0.120∗∗∗
(0.001)

Notes: This table displays the coefficients from regressing the change in star rating for the five
subcategories collectively on the change in overall star rating for the panel of workers with multiple
employer reviews. Sample consists of 587,626 review pairs, and the R2 is 0.80. Standard errors
are bootstrapped. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table A.21: Willingness-to-Pay for Improved Job Satisfaction Using Reported
Wages
1st Wage
Quintile

2nd Wage
Quintile

3rd Wage
Quintile

4th Wage
Quintile

5th Wage
Quintile

Overall rating

0.054∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.062∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.076∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.106∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.139∗∗∗
(0.003)

Log wage

0.642∗∗∗
(0.027)

1.115∗∗∗
(0.047)

0.778∗∗∗
(0.035)

0.668∗∗∗
(0.033)

0.464∗∗∗
(0.017)

69124
.084
25166
2103

68959
.055
35806
1979

69157
.098
45342
4430

69725
.159
63213
10027

68241
.3
108619
32628

Observations
Ratio of coefficients
Mean wage
MWP one additional star

Notes: This table reflects ordered probit models of wages and overall job satisfaction ratings on
firm tenure following equation 1.6.1. Workers are partitioned into quintiles by their (imputed)
wages. Sample is restricted to completed job spells for full-time workers. Standard errors are
clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Table A.22: Willingness-to-Pay for Improved Job Satisfaction, Add Occupation
1st Wage
Quintile

2nd Wage
Quintile

3rd Wage
Quintile

4th Wage
Quintile

5th Wage
Quintile

Overall rating

0.065∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.067∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.082∗∗∗
(0.003)

0.105∗∗∗
(0.004)

0.132∗∗∗
(0.004)

Log wage

0.558∗∗∗
(0.032)

0.901∗∗∗
(0.066)

0.849∗∗∗
(0.047)

0.609∗∗∗
(0.046)

0.456∗∗∗
(0.021)

52608
.116
23992
2791

50945
.074
33541
2491

51776
.097
44688
4338

51799
.172
62082
10666

51750
.288
106569
30740

Observations
Ratio of coefficients
Mean wage
MWP one additional star

Notes: This table reflects ordered probit models of wages and overall job satisfaction ratings on firm
tenure following equation 1.6.1 but adding fixed effects for two-digit SOC occupation. Workers are
partitioned into quintiles by their (imputed) wages. Sample is restricted to completed job spells
for full-time workers for whom their job title can be matched to an SOC occupation. Standard
errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table A.23: Relation between Wages and Amenities Across Jobs Within Firms
Standardized amenity
Customers
Pay
Commissions
On-the-job training
Respect/abuse
Residual II
Pay growth
Work schedule
Short breaks
Coworkers
Support
Stress
Hours
Safety
Autonomy/responsibility
Contracting
Location
Recruiting
Requirements
Promotions
Office space
Leadership
Fun
Work-life balance
Recognition

Log wage
coefficient
0.115***
0.109***
0.102***
0.098***
0.097***
0.097***
0.083***
0.078***
0.060***
0.059***
0.045***
0.044***
0.043***
0.042***
0.040***
0.034***
0.032***
0.029***
0.027***
0.027***
0.019***
0.018***
0.018***
0.018***
0.016***

Log wage
Standardized amenity
coefficient
Managers
0.015***
Career concerns
0.015***
Communication
0.014***
Residual I
0.009*
Teams
0.008
Commuting
0.006
Mentoring
0.006
Diversity/inclusion
0.006
Pace
0.003
Experience
0.002
Skill development
-0.002
Free food
-0.002
Change
-0.003
Paid time off
-0.004
Morale
-0.012**
Retirement contributions -0.015***
Bonuses
-0.017***
Culture
-0.017***
Teleworking
-0.019***
Difficulty
-0.031***
Industry
-0.034***
Employee discounts
-0.034***
Health insurance
-0.035***
Job security
-0.054***
Office politics
-0.086***

Notes: This table reflects coefficients from a regression of log wages on each amenity’s quality
(standardized normal) separately. Sample is the pooled cross-section of workers with both a
review and a wage . Standard errors are bootstrapped. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Table A.24: Coefficients for the Order of Each Observation, Wages and Ratings
Arrival order of workers’ observations
Log wages

Overall ratings

2nd
0.039∗∗∗
(0.001)
[46.5]

3rd
0.080∗∗∗
(0.001)
[5.7]

4th
0.115∗∗∗
(0.002)
[1.1]

5th
0.143∗∗∗
(0.004)
[0.3]

6th
0.147∗∗∗
(0.008)
[0.1]

7th
0.157∗∗∗
(0.012)
[0.0]

8th
0.181∗∗∗
(0.020)
[0.0]

9th
0.162∗∗∗
(0.038)
[0.0]

10th
0.166∗∗∗
(0.061)
[0.0]

-0.102∗∗∗
(0.004)
[45.1]

-0.126∗∗∗
(0.007)
[7.1]

-0.159∗∗∗
(0.012)
[1.7]

-0.184∗∗∗
(0.019)
[0.6]

-0.196∗∗∗
(0.030)
[0.2]

-0.154∗∗∗
(0.046)
[0.1]

-0.217∗∗∗
(0.063)
[0.0]

-0.265∗∗∗
(0.095)
[0.0]

-0.514∗∗∗
(0.153)
[0.0]

Notes: This table displays the coefficients on indicators for the order in which the observation is
observed when added to equation 1.4.1 for log wages and ratings. Point estimates are relative to
the first observation. Numbers in brackets refer to the percent of the sample attributable to each
order position. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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APPENDIX B
Additional Results for Chapter 2

B.1

Search activity dataset construction

On Glassdoor, workers can also search for and apply to jobs. Glassdoor collects job
postings from three main sources—online job boards, applicant tracking systems,
and company websites—and captures about 81 percent of total U.S. job openings,
as measured in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey conducted by the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Chamberlain and Zhao, 2019). When searching,
jobseekers are presented with a list of postings that display the following information: name of employer, job title, location of employment opportunity (city and
state), a pay estimate range based on Glassdoor salary reviews (if available), and
the overall employer rating based on U.S. employee reviews.
A job posting’s showing up in a user’s display constitutes an “impression”—
regardless of whether the user chooses to explore the job posting further. If the
jobseeker clicks on the listing and decides she would like to submit an application,
then she can click again to start an application, which constitutes an “apply.” For
each job posting listed on Glassdoor’s website from January 2017 through August
2019, we measure the total number of unique, user-specific impressions and applies
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that are recorded over a 72-hour window beginning from when the job posting first
appears on the website.88
Looking at unique, user-specific measurements means that each user can record
at most one impression and apply for each posting, reducing the influence that any
single user can have on our job posting-specific estimates. Here, a user is defined as
a jobseeker who has a registered profile on the website and can thus be identified
across sessions. We restrict our attention to a 72-hour window after a job posting
is listed.89 In addition, we restrict our attention to job listings that receive at least
5 unique user impressions to ensure our results are not driven by job postings that
receive minimal jobseeker attention.
Last, we merge the job posting search totals with weekly recorded data that
contain the overall rating and the number of reviews submitted thus far for each
employer with at least 10 reviews submitted by that year-week. The weekly rating
and review count dataset records a new reading on the Sunday of each week. Given
our three-day window for capturing a job posting’s total impressions and applies, we
assign each job posting to the Sunday for which the window is closest. Consequently,
job postings originating on Wednesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, and Saturdays are
88

Sockin and Sockin (2019b) use a similar dataset to analyze gender differences in search preferences.
89
We do so for two reasons. One, establishing a fixed window mitigates any trends in job-search
intensity that may materialize over the life cycle of a job posting. Two, given the sheer size of
the data and memory limits on the SQL query server, there is a trade-off between the length of
the horizon window and our computational ability to complete this process for each calendar day.
The process we implement first chooses a day of the year; then determines all job postings that
originate on the website that day; and finally calculates unique impressions and applies for each
posting. Choosing a 72-hour window results excluding only about 17 percent of days over the time
horizon, most of which are concentrated in September to December 2018.
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assigned to the following Sunday, and those on Mondays are assigned to the Sunday
before. Job postings originating on Tuesdays would be equally split in coverage
between Sundays and, thus, are entirely excluded from the dataset. We drop job
postings for which neither an employer overall rating nor a metropolitan area is
available. Employer ratings are displayed to the tenth-digit on job postings (Figure
B.1), but calculated with more precision. We restrict our attention to postings for
which the employer rating is within a 0.01 bandwidth of a #.#5 rounding cutoff,
resulting in a sample of 2,291,920 job listings (Table B.1).
Figure B.1: Example Search Result List and a Posting’s Detail with Apply Button

Notes: Figure is a screenshot image of results from a search for postings for licensed practical
nurse jobs in Minnesota. Each posting in the left column is an impression, because it is shown to
a jobseeker. The jobseeker can click on an impression to see a posting’s details, as shown on the
right. Then, the jobseeker decides whether to press the Apply Now button to begin an application,
usually on the employer’s site.

B.2

Report-Retaliate game

This game describes how workers with private information from working at a firm
decide whether to contribute to a public reputation system, how firms affect that
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics for Search Activity Dataset
Summary Statistics
Measure of Interest
N

mean

standard
deviation

min

p10

median

p90

max

Impressions

2,291,920

20.4

35.2

5

5

11

41

5962

Applies

2,291,920

0.16

0.65

0

0

0

1

106

Applies per 100 impressions

2,291,920

0.76

1.97

0

0

0

2.63

60

Firm rating

2,291,920

3.41

0.51

1.06

2.76

3.35

4.05

4.96

Review count

2,291,920

1163

2968

10

21

235

2615

38097

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the data on user search activity for job listings on
the website Glassdoor from January 2017 through August 2019. Sample of job postings restricted
to those for which the employer rating is within a 0.01 bandwidth of a #.#5 rounding cutoff.
Summary statistics for “applies per 100 impressions” are weighted calculations using each job
posting’s impression total. Sample covers vacancies for 154,659 unique job titles posted by 39,400
employers in 858 metros.

decision through potential retaliation, equilibria that can emerge, and how this
interplay determines the information that is available to jobseekers. Suppose there
is a continuum of workers W, where each worker is denoted by i, and a continuum of
firms F, where each firm is denoted by j. Each firm has quality µj , which expresses
the probability that a worker will have a good experience working for j.90 Each
worker prefers higher quality firms.
Workers play two separable roles in the model: (1) an employee of a particular
firm j deciding whether and how to rate j in a public, employer reputation system
and (2) jobseekers trying to discern the quality of potential employers using the
reputation system. Workers do not observe each firm’s true quality µj . Rather,
jobseekers observe public signals of quality for each firm, σ j , based on the average
90
For the purposes of our model, we assume that µj is exogenous. An alternative approach
would be to endogenize µj and allow firm j to first choose a level of investment that would
produce quality µj before Nature decides if worker i has a positive or negative experience. Given
our focus on the role retaliation risk plays in the disclosure of inside scoops, this extension felt
extraneous. We leave this interesting possibility though for future researchers to explore.
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rating that firm-j insiders supplied. We assume that the only publicly available
information about j is σ j . Jobseekers do not know how many total workers have
employment experience with each firm.91 We first describe the interaction between
a firm and an employee that models the insider’s decision to rate the firm. Then, we
describe how signals are aggregated, possible equilibria, and how this interaction
between employees and their firm affects a jobseeker’s ability to overcome their
information problem with respect to unobserved firm quality.
Consider a worker (Wi ) who starts employment with a firm (Fj ). They play
the Report-Retaliate game detailed in Figure B.2. Nature first decides whether Wi
has a good or bad experience at Fj . With probability µj — the firm’s quality —
the worker has a good experience. And with probability 1 − µj , the worker has
a bad experience. After her private experience with the firm, Wi decides whether
to volunteer her inside scoop on Fj . Wi can either leave a positive rating for the
firm (assume a value of +1), a negative rating for the firm (assume a value of
0), or choose not to leave a rating at all. The worker’s action set is thus aW =
{Rate P ositive, Rate N egative, Don0 t}. If Wi leaves a negative rating, then Fj can
decide whether to try and retaliate against the worker. The firm’s action set is thus
aF = {Retaliate, Don0 t}. If the firm is successful in retaliating, then the firm is
able to identify the worker and get the negative rating removed. If the retaliation
91

This assumption sidesteps the concern that workers could further infer a firm’s quality by
additionally knowing what share of workers have chosen not to leave a rating for the firm. In
reality, even knowledge of firm age and size does not reveal a firm’s total number of former and
current employees because of differences in firms’ hard-to-observe turnover-rate histories.
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attempt is not successful, the worker is not hurt and the negative rating stands.
Footnote 46 highlights how firms threaten lawsuits to this end.
Assume that the probability mass distribution of workers is given by I(·). We
assume that the parameters of the model detailed below are primitives known to
Wi and Fj .
 g i : the payoff to the worker from having a good work experience
 aiP : altruism benefit from providing honest positive rating for others to con-

sume
 aiN : altruism benefit from providing honest negative rating for others to con-

sume
 ciW : direct cost of writing any review
 ρj : probability that the firm’s effort to retaliate succeeds
 cij
R : cost to the worker if the firm successfully retaliates
 ej : the firm’s expenditures to attempting retaliation
 πPj : gain to the firm from marginal positive rating
j
 πN
: loss to the firm from marginal negative rating

For expositional simplicity, we drop i and j superscripts from the game tree.
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Nature
Good
Experience
(µ)

Bad
Experience
(1 − µ)

W

Rate
Pos.



W Payoff
F Payoff

 

g + aP − c W
πP

Rate
Neg.



Retaliate



W

g − cW − ρcR
−e − (1 − ρ)πN

Don’t

F

Rate
Pos.

Rate
Neg.

  

g
−cW
0
πP
Don’t



g − cW
−πN

Don’t

F

Retaliate



aN − cW − ρcR
−e − (1 − ρ)πN

 
0
0
Don’t



aN − c W
−πN

Figure B.2: Report-Retaliate Game

To solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium, consider the following cases. Following a good experience, W will choose Rate P ositive if her benefit from volunteering exceeds her cost of supplying the review (aP ≥ cW ), otherwise W will
choose Don0 t. Rate N egative is strictly dominated by Rate P ostive because W
does not receive the altruism benefit from supplying a dishonest review. Next, consider W ’s decision following a bad experience. W will never choose Rate P ositive
since without the altruistim benefit, this strategy is strictly dominated by Don0 t.
W though anticipates F ’s strategy. F will Retaliate if the gain from retaliatory
behavior exceeds the cost (e ≤ ρπN ). Otherwise (e > ρπN ), F chooses Don0 t. In
this no-retaliation case, W discloses the negative rating if and only if her private
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payoff covers her cost, aN ≥ cW . But, if e ≤ ρπN , then W anticipates that F
will try to retaliate. W must choose between Rate N egative which has a payoff
of aN − cW − ρcR and Don0 t which as a payoff of 0. So, W will choose to disclose
despite F ’s retaliatory stance if and only if W 0 s benefit from providing negative information exceeds the total cost from writing and the risk of retaliation succeeding
(aN ≥ cW + ρcR ).
We highlight two key takeaways. Assuming F would retaliate,
 ∃ρ∗ =

aN −cW
cR

where W keeps private a bad experience if ρ ≥ ρ∗ and discloses

if ρ < ρ∗ . As the probability that a retaliatory attempt by F is successful
rises, e.g., F can infer W ’s identity more easily, W is less likely to supply
negative information.
 ∃c∗R =

aN −cW
ρ

where W keeps private a bad experience if cR ≥ c∗R and discloses

if cR < c∗R . As W ’s cost of successful retaliation by F rises, e.g., current
employees potentially facing lower wages or hours, newfound workplace abuse,
or forced separation relative to former employees, then W is less likely to
supply negative information.
The game above describes the experience between a single firm F and a single
worker W . To understand how this aggregates into a signal for each firm j in
the public reputation system, consider the set of workers who have been employed
with j, {W }j , and their collective employment experiences. The signal of firm j’s
quality is the average score from the set of positive and negative ratings submitted
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by {W }j :

σ

j

=

=

µj P r(Rate|Good)j
µj P r(Rate|Good)j

+ (1 − µj )P r(Rate|Bad)j

R
µj {W }j 1(aiP ≥ ciW )dI
h
i
R
j
ij
j R
µj {W }j 1(aiP ≥ ciW )dI + (1 − µj ) 1(ej ≤ πN ) {W }j 1(aiN ≥ ciW + ρj cR )dI + 1(ej > πN ) {W }j 1(aiN ≥ ciW )dI
R

Consider a jobseeking worker trying to use these signals to understand prospective
employers. She observes σ j for each firm j. If the worker takes a job with some
firm, then she will play the role of W and the firm will play the role of F in Figure
B.2. Because workers prefer good experiences to bad ones (g > 0), the jobseeker
will look to find the firm with the highest µ, but only has the publicly-available
signals {σj } at her disposal.

Collapse of reputation system: Suppose that the cost of supplying ratings was
prohibitively high such that ∀i, ciW ≥ max{aiP , aiN }. That is, the altruistic benefit
workers receive from providing their inside scoops for others falls short of the (time
and effort) costs that come with doing so. Then, following both good and bad experiences, workers will optimally choose Don0 t, in which case no ratings are supplied
and there are no public signals of firm quality for workers to observe.

Completely uninformative signals: Suppose the optimal strategies following a
j
bad experience are that each firm retaliates (∀j, ej ≤ ρj πN
) and no workers review
i
i
j
(∀i, ρj cij
R + cW ≥ aN ). Then, no negative ratings are submitted and so ∀j, σ = 1.
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The signals are then uninformative of underlying firm quality µj .

Perfectly-informative equilibrium absent retaliation: If F ’s gain from retaliation
was eliminated because negative ratings had little consequence or retaliation was
j
ineffective at mitigating negative reviews (ρj πN
< ej ), then assuming aiP ∼ aiN , it

follows that the probability of disclosing a negative rating following a bad experience would be roughly the same as the probability of disclosing a positive rating
following a good experience. Then, σ j ∼ µj and the signal is highly informative of
the true probability of a good experience with F .

Inability to separate firm quality from retaliation risk : In the presence of firm
retaliation, not all workers will supply a negative rating following a bad experience.
i
0
j ij
i
i
i
Workers will choose Rate N egative if ρj cij
R + cW ≤ aN and Don t if ρ cR + cW > aN .

Assuming that aiP 6 aiN , it follows that

∃λij =

P r(Rate N egative|Bad)ij
∈ [0, 1).
P r(Rate P ositive|Good)ij

ij
As W ’s retaliation risk (ρj cij
R ) increases, λ falls. If the cost of writing a review is

relatively low such that all workers leave a positive rating following a good experi-
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ence, then the signal of firm quality for j would be given by

µj P r(Rate|Good)j
µj
R
σ = j
= j
> µj
j
j
j
j
ij
µ P r(Rate|Good) + (1 − µ )P r(Rate|Bad)
µ + (1 − µ ) {W }j λ dI
j

Firm retaliation thus biases the signal of firm quality upward. With jobs as experience goods, jobseekers do not know each firm’s true (µj , ρj ) nor do they know {W }j
— the set of workers who have worked for firm j —so they cannot separate firm
quality from the distorting effect of retaliation risk. The jobseeker’s information
problem is that a particular firm could have high ratings because of high µj or high
ρj .
This inability to distinguish between better firm quality and stronger retaliatory
risk can give rise to a pooling equilibrium unfavorable for jobseekers. Suppose there
are two types of firms. The first is “high-road” firms that treat their workers well,
characterized by high quality and low propensity for retaliation (µH , ρL ). The second is “low-road” firms that treat their workers poorly, characterized by low quality
and high propensity for retaliation (µL , ρH ). Both types will have signals that are
not only very positive, but impossible to distinguish. In turn, this creates a perverse
incentive whereby a firm can obtain the benefits of having a positive signal by investing in a strong retaliatory stance rather than improved quality. While we do not
endogenize the firm’s decision to choose a level of quality and a retaliatory stance
— and do not allow the firm’s choice to retaliate to become public and thereby
potentially influence future jobseekers’ decisions — we note that these would make
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for interesting extensions and leave them for future researchers to explore.

Negative reviews are especially helpful to jobseekers: Each worker i has her own
threshold for retaliation risk at firm j ρ∗ij =

aiN −ciW
cij
R

. The degree of censoring of

negative ratings will then depend on the share of workers willing to tolerate the
risk of retaliation. If ρj < ρ∗ij , the worker will not censor a negative rating. But,
if ρj > ρ∗ij , the worker will censor her negative rating. If no workers censor, then
σ j will reflect true quality µj . But, if some workers censor, then signal σ j will be
positively biased and jobseekers will struggle to distinguish high µ-low ρ firms from
low µ-high ρ ones. In this light, a negative review is more informative to jobseekers
about true firm quality µ than a positive review because it runs counter to the
upward bias. The unknown degree of missing negative reviews — since jobseekers
can only consume volunteered information — should heighten the relative value of
arriving negative information. Incorporating jobseeker risk aversion adds an additional channel by which negative reviews could be extra helpful.

Allowing for identity concealment: Finally, suppose now that in addition to observing the public signal σ j , workers could also observe which workers left positive
ratings and which workers left negative ratings. We can then layer in W i ’s decision
on whether to conceal aspects of their identity. This could be considered two additional strategy option for W at each decision node, {Rate Positive Openly, Rate
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Positive Concealed, Rate Negative Openly, Rate Negative Concealed, Don’t}. Identity concealment has two effects. First, it reduces the probability that the firm could
successfully retaliate (ρjO ≥ ρjC ), reducing a cost of supplying negative information.
This is only relevant in the bad-experience state. Second, concealment reduces the
value of a review to jobseekers by eroding their ability to assess its relevance to
their own situation and so, reduces W i ’s altruistic benefit from supplying negative
information (aiN,O ≥ aiN,C ). This latter channel explains why not all volunteers
relaying a bad experience choose to conceal.
Relative to an open rating, supplying a negative rating with identifying aspects
concealed is a strategy with lower cost, but also lower benefit. W i will choose
to disclose a negative rating and conceal if the cost of writing a review is not
too prohibitive, aiN,C ≥ ciW + ρjC cij
R , and if the gain from lower retaliation risk
i
i
outweighs the loss in altruism from partial disclosure, (ρjO − ρjC )cij
R > aN,O − aN,C .

We can see how, even for the same firm, workers may optimally choose to disclose
openly, disclose with concealment, or not disclose at all following a bad experience.
Conditional on a bad experience, the share of workers that would choose each action
would be

P r(Rate N egative Openly|Bad)j =

Z

P r(Rate N egative Concealed|Bad)j =

Z

{W }j

{W }j

P r(Don0 t|Bad)j =

Z
{W }j



j
j
ij
i
i
1 aiN,O ≥ ciW + ρjO cij
R , (ρO − ρC )cR ≤ aN,O − aN,C dI


j
j
ij
i
i
1 aiN,C ≥ ciW + ρjC cij
R , (ρO − ρC )cR > aN,O − aN,C dI


j ij
i
1 ciW ≥ max{aiN,O − ρjO cij
R , aN,C − ρC cR } dI
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Workers provide negative ratings openly only when their altruistic benefit of
writing an open, negative review outweighs their cost of writing and of facing retaliation with the higher risk of rating openly, and when the marginal altruism
payoff from openness (aiN,o − aiN,c ) exceeds the marginal cost increase in retaliation risk (ρjO − ρjC )cij
R . This can be reduced to Rate Negative Openly if and only
j ij i
i
if aiN,O − ρjO cij
R ≥ max{aN,C − ρC cR , cW }, where Rate Negative Openly’s benefits

exceed the benefits of the other two options. The other cases follow related logic.
We use current versus former employees and workers in smaller versus larger
firms as proxies for higher retaliation risk ρj cij
R . Current employees face greater
j
cij
R than former employees, and workers in smaller firms face higher ρ . Assume

that (aiN,O − aiN,C ) is more similar between former and current employees than is
(ρjO −ρjC )cij
R , so that concealment reduces altruism benefits similarly between former
and current employees but reduces retaliation risk more for current employees. Then
current employees should be associated with higher rates of concealment than former
employees when disclosing negative ratings.
Workers in smaller firms face greater retaliation risks than workers from larger
firms as the former have a thinner pool of candidates among whom to blend. How
the altruistic benefits compare between workers at smaller and larger firms though is
less clear. On one hand, a rating for a larger firm will contribute to informing more
jobseekers than a rating from a smaller firm (less benefit). But, smaller firms have
smaller workforces — in our model, smaller cardinality of {W }j — meaning each
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individual rating will be more pivotal in measuring σ j (more benefit). Nevertheless,
if concealment reduces the retaliation risk by more than it affects the altruistic
benefits, then workers in smaller as opposed to larger firms would be more likely to
choose concealment when relaying negative ratings.

B.3

Review helpfulness

The first employer reviews uploaded on the Glassdoor website are from mid-2008.
At that time, users of the website could up-vote an employer review as helpful or
down-vote the review as unhelpful, if they wanted to provide feedback for other
users on the site about how they valued the information. The combination of these
two measures—helpful and unhelpful votes—provides a review-specific metric of
how helpful the review’s content was to jobseekers. Starting in 2015, however,
the option to down-vote an employer review as unhelpful was phased out on the
website. Looking at the share of total helpfulness votes submitted each year that
were attributable to unhelpful votes shows a clear structural break at the end of
2014 (Figure B.3). This motivates the decision to restrict the sample of reviews for
which the share helpful,

#helpf ul
,
#helpf ul+#unhelpf ul

is the measure of interest to pre-2015.

The ability to submit unhelpful votes was not completely eliminated from the
platform, however. As evidenced in Figure B.3, unhelpful votes still accounted for a
sliver of total helpfulness votes submitted (under 2 percent) from 2015 through the
first half of 2017. These unhelpful votes were generated through users submitting
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down-votes through Glassdoor’s mobile application, which is accessible via phone or
tablet. The dataset that tracks individuals’ helpfulness votes stems from this period.
By the end of 2017, the option to down-vote an employer review as unhelpful was
completely phased out.
Figure B.3: Share of Total Votes Unhelpful over Time

Notes: When reading a user-written review of an employer on the Glassdoor website, the reader can
signal to others that the review supplied (un)informative information by submitting a (un)helpful
vote for the review. This figure calculates the fraction of submitted votes that were unhelpful
votes, partitioning reviews into half-years bins based on the date the review was submitted.
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B.4

Additional Figures and Tables for Chapter 2
Table B.2: Summary Statistics for Employer Reviews Dataset

Measure of interest

N

Standard
Mean deviation

p10

p90

Measure of interest

N

A. Dependent variables

Mean

Standard
deviation

p10

p90

0.723

E. Text-based variables

Star rating

6,809,319

3.35

1.40

1

5

Pro share of text

6,809,319

0.468

0.196

0.191

Helpful votes

6,809,319

1.24

3.99

0

4

Character length

6,809,217

336.5

420.8

78

706

685,505

2.76

6.59

1

6

Polarity of text

6,809,217

0.22

0.24

-0.04

0.52

Unhelpful votes pre-2015

685,505

0.34

1.09

0

1

Subjectivity of text

6,809,217

0.54

0.17

0.35

0.75

Share helpful votes pre-2015

685,505

0.86

0.31

0.29

1

Flesch Kincaid grade

6,158,522

9.2

4.1

4.4

15.1

Language concreteness

1,409,215

2.946

0.132

2.778

3.102

–

Helpful votes pre-2015

B. Firm characteristics

F. Dummy variables

Firm age (years)

5,334,194

56.3

51.8

10

131

Firm employment (1000s)

6,408,571

53.8

199.6

37.0

140.0

C. Panel of users with multiple reviews

Would recommend to a friend

5,621,590

0.5961

–

–

Approves of the CEO

4,157,888

0.4822

–

–

–

Positive business outlook

5,065,925

0.4815

–

–

–

Current employee

6,809,319

0.5229

–

–

–

Next star rating

441,570

2.91

1.60

1

5

Job title blank

6,809,319

0.4401

–

–

–

Delta star rating

441,570

0.002

1.84

-2

2

Job title anonymized

6,809,319

0.0057

–

–

–

Delta helpful votes pre-2015

47,981

0.812

7.41

-3

5

Location blank

6,809,319

0.4222

–

–

–

Delta share helpful pre-2015

18,592

2.79

34.5

-20.0

40.0

Conceal either

6,809,319

0.5328

–

–

–

1.73

3.5

7.8

D. Individual (un)helpful votes

G. Labor market conditions

Voted helpful

182,410

0.852

–

–

–

Review’s rating of employer

182,410

2.34

1.39

1

5

State unemployment rate

1. Cross-section of employer reviews
Dimension of interest
Horizon window
Reviews (pre-2015)
Users

3,929,775

5.29

2. Individual (un)helpful votes

Sample coverage

Dimension of interest

Sample coverage

2008-23 to 2019-35

Horizon window

6,809,319 (1,417,494)

Voted on reviews

92,320

Reviewed employers

10,117

6,201,251

Jan 2015–Sep 2017

Employers

463,968

Voting users

6,396

Job titles

400,279

Helpful votes

155,490

Unhelpful votes

26,920

Helpful votes (pre-2015)

8,459,920 (1,895,376)

Unhelpful votes pre-2015

231,837

Notes: This table reports summary statistics and group counts for user-submitted employer reviews on the website Glassdoor. Panel of users with multiple reviews excludes job stayers as well
as job switchers who submit both reviews in the same year-week. Individual (un)helpful votes
comprised of a subsample of voters for whom: (i) data on each up-vote and down-vote are available, and (ii) an employer review was also submitted on the website before submitting the up- or
down-vote.
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Table B.3: Likelihood of Concealing Identifying Information by Employer Rating
1{Conceal aspect of identity}
Star rating

-0.013∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.012∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.026∗∗∗
(0.001)

-0.025∗∗∗
(0.001)

Current employee

0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.009∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.043∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.044∗∗∗
(0.002)

——— x 1{1–2 star rating}
Log(employment)

0.039∗∗∗
(0.001)
-0.007∗∗∗
(0.000)

——— x 1{1–2 star rating}
Worker FE
Sample mean
N
Adjusted R2

-0.008∗∗∗
(0.000)

0.014∗∗∗
(0.003)
-0.015∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.015∗∗∗
(0.000)

X
0.480
989996
0.26

-0.010∗∗∗
(0.001)
X
0.480
989996
0.26

-0.012∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.532
6372821
0.04

0.532
6372821
0.05

Notes: The table above shows that current employees and workers from small firms are increasingly
likely to conceal aspects of their identity when they are supplying negative information. Overall
star rating, dummy for is current employee, and the logarithm of employment are demeaned by
their sample averages. Each specification includes volunteer, industry and year-month fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the employer level. One, two, and three stars denote significance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table B.4: Dates and Directions of Concealment Probability Shifts: Instrument
Definitions
1(Concealment More Available)
Probability Shift?

Job Title

Location

Year-Week Job Title Location Before After Before
2009w18
Up
No
0
1
0
2009w22
No
Up
0
0
0
2009w48
No
Down
0
0
1
2012w21
Down
No
1
0
0
2013w3
Up
Up
0
1
0

After
0
1
0
0
1

Notes: The table lists the dates when discontinuous changes in job title or location concealment
probabilities occurred, which we exploit for the quasi-experimental analysis in Table 2.5 and
Figure 2.6 that focuses on the sample of reviews submitted within a given bandwidth of weeks
around these dates. The definitions for two instrumental variables based on reviews arriving on
either side of the five dates are shown.
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Table B.5: Option to Conceal and Actual Concealment, First Stage of IV
1{Conceal aspect of identity}
(1)

(2)

(3)

0.230∗∗∗
(0.004)

Conceal either more available

Conceal location more available

0.111∗∗∗
(0.007)

Conceal job title more available

0.176∗∗∗
(0.005)

Conceal job title more available only

0.133∗∗∗
(0.010)

Conceal location more available only

0.183∗∗∗
(0.006)

Conceal both more available

0.284∗∗∗
(0.005)

N
Adjusted R2

77176
0.06

77176
0.06

77176
0.06

Notes: The table above shows the effect that having the option to conceal identifying aspects
has on the rates at which workers conceal identifying aspects, i.e. the first stage of the IV regression. Sample is restricted to reviews that arrive within four weeks before and after each
removal/introduction of a concealment option. Standard errors are clustered by firm. One, two,
and three stars denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table B.6: When Employees Conceal Identity, Robustness in Choice of Instruments
1{Current employee}

Star rating

Conceals aspect of identity

Log(employment)

Share of review votes helpful

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.275∗∗∗
(0.051)

-0.260∗∗∗
(0.052)

-0.261∗∗∗
(0.051)

0.058∗∗∗
(0.019)

0.043∗∗
(0.019)

0.044∗∗
(0.019)

-0.626∗∗∗
(0.130)

-0.484∗∗∗
(0.122)

-0.499∗∗∗
(0.122)

-0.021
(0.022)

-0.032
(0.022)

-0.030
(0.022)

-0.105∗∗∗
(0.003)

-0.105∗∗∗
(0.003)

-0.105∗∗∗
(0.003)

IV
39119
0.17
216.73
0.88

IV
39119
0.17
220.12
2.82

IV
39119
0.17
219.21
4.74

Star rating
Specification
N
Adjusted R2
F statistic
Anderson-Rubin chi-sq

IV
77176
-0.00
18.10
29.87

IV
77176
0.00
18.74
29.91

IV
77176
0.00
18.76
31.12

IV
77176
0.00
31.18
9.19

IV
77176
0.00
30.08
28.32

IV
77176
0.00
30.14
28.39

IV
71368
0.02
60.59
22.77

IV
71368
0.02
58.03
16.66

IV
71368
0.02
58.26
26.18

Notes: The table above repeats the IV regressions from Table 2.5 using each of the combination of
instruments in Table B.5, where each set of instruments is demarcated by the respective column
number. Sample is restricted to reviews that arrive within four weeks before and after each
removal/introduction of a concealment option. Standard errors are clustered by firm. One, two,
and three stars denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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Table B.7: Predicting Helpful Vote Count of Volunteer’s Review
Logarithm of helpful votes + 1
Star rating

-0.157∗∗∗
(0.002)

-0.094∗∗∗
(0.001)
-0.453∗∗∗
(0.007)

Would recommend employer to friend

-0.198∗∗∗
(0.005)
-0.312∗∗∗
(0.006)

Approves of the CEO

-0.024∗∗∗
(0.001)
-0.321∗∗∗
(0.005)

Positive business outlook for the firm

-0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)
-0.860∗∗∗
(0.009)

Pro share of review text

Polarity of text

-0.321∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.270∗∗∗
(0.005)

0.005∗∗∗
(0.002)

Log character length of review

0.190∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.194∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.236∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.224∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.189∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.226∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.187∗∗∗
(0.002)

Flesch-Kincaid reading grade

-0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.003∗∗∗
(0.000)

-0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)

Subjectivity of text

0.003∗∗
(0.001)

-0.014∗∗∗
(0.002)

-0.035∗∗∗
(0.002)

-0.027∗∗∗
(0.002)

-0.020∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.048∗∗∗
(0.002)

0.003
(0.002)

Employer, year-month FE
N
Adjusted R2

X
5958112
0.47

X
4849978
0.47

X
3642220
0.42

X
4373338
0.44

X
5958112
0.44

X
5958112
0.39

X
3191431
0.50

Notes: The table above predicts the helpfulness of an employer review using the logarithm of
review votes helpful plus one as the dependent variable. Sample is restricted to reviews for which
the Flesch Kincaid reading grade is non-negative and no greater than 20. Polarity and subjectivity
of each review are measured through natural language processing using the TextBlob library in
Python. Standard errors clustered at the employer level. One, two, and three stars denote
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For a summary of the dataset, see
Table B.2.
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Figure B.4: Alternative Specifications for Effect of 0.1-Star Higher Rating on Apply
Rate

(a) Bandwidth of ±0.01 with reverse ordering of review-count quantiles

(b) Bandwidth of ±0.02

(c) Bandwidth of ±0.04 with pre- and post-cutoff slope parameters in running variable
Notes: Sample is restricted to job postings for which the employers’ weekly rating’s hundredths
places falls within bandwidth of a #.#5 cutoff. Running variable refers to the difference between
employer rating and the nearest cutoff. Each job posting is weighted by its impression total.
Regressions include employer, job title, metro, day-of-posting, and #.#5 threshold fixed effects.
Vertical red bars indicate a 95% confidence interval around each point estimate. Standard errors
clustered by firm.

207

Figure B.5: Effect of 0.1-Star Higher Rating on Apply Rate Partitioned by Employer
Rating Among Job Postings in Bottom Quintile of Review Count

Notes: Sample is restricted to the bottom quintile by review count of job postings for which the
employers’ weekly rating’s hundredths places falls within a ±0.01 bandwidth of a #.#5 cutoff.
Numbers on the x-axis refer to the maximum employer rating percentile included in the regression
sample. Each job posting is weighted by its impression total. Regressions include employer, job
title, metro, day-of-posting, and #.#5 threshold fixed effects. Vertical red bars indicate a 95%
confidence interval around each point estimate. Standard errors clustered by firm.

Figure B.6: Effect of 0.1-Star Higher Rating on Apply Rate Partitioned by Employer
Rating Among Job Postings in Bottom Quintile of Review Count

Notes: Sample is restricted to the bottom quintile by review count of job postings for which the
employers’ weekly rating’s hundredths places falls within a ±0.01 bandwidth of a #.#5 cutoff.
Numbers on the x-axis refer to the maximum employer rating percentile included in the regression
sample. Each job posting is weighted by its impression total. Regressions include employer, job
title, metro, day-of-posting, and #.#5 threshold fixed effects. Vertical red bars indicate a 95%
confidence interval around each point estimate. Standard errors clustered by firm.
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Figure B.7: Share Helpful Votes by Review’s Rating and Firm Demographics

(a) Firm age

(b) Firm overall rating

(c) Firm review count

(d) Firm FE for base pay

Notes: Figures display the average share helpful votes across firms partitioned by the star rating
of the review. Firm age is calculated as the difference between the year in which the review is
submitted and the year in which the firm was founded (which is recorded in an employer lookup
table from 2019). Sample is restricted to reviews submitted before 2015 (see Appendix B.3).
Sample for panels (b) and (c) restricted to reviews submitted for firms that have had at least
10 reviews submitted prior. Firm FE for base pay, derived using Glassdoor pay data, are from
a regression of annualized log base pay on a quadratic in years of specific experience and fixed
effects for year, state, gender, educational attainment, pay frequency, industry-job title pairing,
and employer. Firm age is grouped into five-year bins. Firm overall rating is grouped into bins
rounded to the nearest tenth. Firm FE for base pay is grouped into 0.04 bins. For each panel,
bins in which one of the five ratings represents fewer than 150 unique reviews are excluded.
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Figure B.8: Relationships Between Probability of Identity-Aspect Concealment and
Leaving a More-Negative Review by Measures of Retaliation Risk

(a) Employer size

(b) Current employee

Notes: The figures above detail the rate at which volunteers conceal potentially identifying information depending upon the size of their employers (panel a) or whether they are current employees
(panel b). We first residualize an indicator for concealing on the main effects of review rating, log
firm size, a current employee indicator, and fixed effects for the volunteer, the year–month, and
the firm’s industry. We also include the interaction of the other retaliation risk measure—current
employee status for panel (a) and firm size for panel (b)—with an indicator of negative review.
Only the interaction term between an indicator of a negative review and the focal measure of
retaliation risk—log firm size for panel (a) and current employee status for panel (b)—is excluded
from the model. Regressions are implemented bin-wise by the residualized interaction between
the focal measure of retaliation risk and the indicator for leaving a negative review. Sample of
volunteers is restricted to those who leave multiple reviews. Negative reviews (red diamonds) refer
to one- and two-star reviews while non-negative reviews (blue circles) refer to four- and five-star
reviews. Solid lines reflects linear lines of best fit and shaded regions reflect 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.9: Rates of Job Title and Location Concealment, Full Date Range

Notes: The figure above plots the shares of reviews in each calendar year-week that conceal each
identity aspect, job title or location. The sample window spans from the twenty-fourth week of
2008 through the final week of 2018.
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Figure B.10: Robustness to Varying the Bandwidth for IV Specifications

(a) Overall rating

(b) Current employee

(c) Log employment
Notes: Sample is restricted to reviews that arrive within ± bandwidth weeks before/after each
increase/decrease in the availability of identity concealment options. Vertical red bars indicate
a 95% confidence interval around each point estimate. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
Regressions with a bandwidth of ±4 are analogous to the results displayed in Table 2.5.
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APPENDIX C
Additional Results for Chapter 3

C.1

Scandal Information

In this appendix, we further describe the construction of our corporate scandals
sample. We first aggregate annual lists of “corporate misdeeds” published by Fortune Magazine and Yahoo! Finance. We are unable to locate such a list for the
year 2014, so we utilize a list published by Inc. Magazine instead. We supplement
these events with allegations of sexual harassment levied against corporate CEOs
and chairmen documented by the New York Times in 2018. We then apply a set
of filters to ensure that our scandals are legitimate shocks to firm reputation. We
exclude events that do not involve any wrongdoing (e.g. the relationship between
Sergei Brin and a Google employee), impact several firms, or are continuations of
prior events (e.g. J.P. Morgan paying fines for past transgressions). When a firm
appears on multiple lists, we use the first event that satisfies the aforementioned
criteria. While the persistence of our results may be partially driven by this restriction, the majority of firms in our sample only suffer a single scandal. Furthermore,
subsequent events are often directly related to the first or come to light precisely
because of the increased scrutiny brought about by the initial scandal. Finally,
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we exclude events involving firms that do not have an appreciable presence in any
segment of Glassdoor data. Table C.1 provides links to news articles summarizing
each event as well as the underlying list from which each event was pulled.
Table C.1: Corporate Scandal Background Information
Company

Date Public

Background Article

Carnival Cruise
lululemon
GlaxoSmithKline
Macy’s
Sony
Toshiba
Volkswagen
Valeant
Fox
Mylan Inc
Samsung
Wells Fargo
Uber
United Airlines
Equifax
Apple
Wynn Resorts
Guess?
Google
Facebook
CBS
Tesla
Nissan

02-10-2013
03-18-2013
07-11-2013
10-24-2013
12-02-2014
07-20-2015
09-18-2015
10-21-2015
07-06-2016
08-18-2016
09-02-2016
09-08-2016
02-19-2017
04-10-2017
09-07-2017
12-20-2017
01-25-2018
02-01-2018
03-06-2018
03-15-2018
07-27-2018
08-07-2018
11-19-2018

Passengers Face Two More Days of Squalor on Carnival Ship Stranded in the Gulf
Recall Is Expensive Setback for Maker of Yoga Pants
GlaxoSmithKline Accused of Corruption by China
Profiling Complaints by Black Shoppers Followed Changes to Stores’ Security Policies
Sony Films Are Pirated, and Hackers Leak Studio Salaries
Scandal Upends Toshiba’s Lauded Reputation
VW Is Said to Cheat on Diesel Emissions; U.S. to Order Big Recall
Valeant’s Shares Fall on Report’s Fraud Claim
Gretchen Carlson of Fox News Files Harassment Suit Against Roger Ailes
Mylan Raised EpiPen’s Price Before the Expected Arrival of a Generic
Samsung to Recall 2.5 Million Galaxy Note 7s Over Battery Fires
Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts
Uber Investigating Sexual Harassment Claims by Ex-Employee
United Airlines Passenger Is Dragged From an Overbooked Flight
Equifax Says Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the U.S.
Is Apple Slowing Down Old iPhones? Questions and Answers
Stephen Wynn, Casino Mogul, Accused of Decades of Sexual Misconduct
Guess Inc. responds to sexual harassment allegations against co-founder Paul Marciano
Google Is Helping the Pentagon Build AI for Drones
Facebook’s Role in Data Misuse Sets Off Storms on Two Continents
Les Moonves and CBS Face Allegations of Sexual Misconduct
Elon Musk Says Tesla May Go Private, and Its Stock Soars
Nissan Chairman, Carlos Ghosn, Is Arrested Over Financial Misconduct Allegations

Source
Fortune
Fortune
Fortune
Fortune
Inc.
Fortune
Fortune
Fortune
Fortune
Fortune
Fortune
Fortune
Fortune
Fortune
Fortune
Fortune
New York Times
New York Times
Yahoo! Finance
Yahoo! Finance
New York Times
Yahoo! Finance
Yahoo! Finance

Notes: This table provides additional information on the corporate scandals in our sample. It
includes links to articles from the popular press detailing each event and the list from which each
event was pulled.

C.2

Composition of Reviewers

Further evidence that our results are not driven by a compositional shift can be seen
by re-estimating our differences-in-differences specifications with employee characteristics as our outcomes of interest. Using the wage dataset, we first test whether
there is a shift in average worker quality following a scandal by testing whether the
scandal causes a shift in workers’ average human capital — as measured through
years of actual experience or potential experience (age). Finding no significantly
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negative effect in Table C.2 suggests that the sample of firms’ workers following
the scandal are no less productive than those who were employed beforehand. For
employee reviews, we test whether the sample of reviewers changes after a scandal
by using the age of the reviewer (when available), along with indicators for whether
the worker is a current employee, has been employed with the firm at most two
years (low tenure), or conceals aspects of their identity (job title or location) when
disclosing.92 Interestingly, we do find a slight shift toward older and longer tenured
workers, suggesting that these employees may feel most compelled to voice themselves after or most affected by corporate misconduct; however, the shift is also
accompanied by an increased propensity to conceal self-identifying characteristics,
suggesting some concern with being identified for speaking out.
Table C.2: Observable Characteristics of Reviewers After Scandals
Junior
position

Works
at HQ

Female

Age

Long
tenure

Conceal
info

After scandal

-0.013
(0.009)

-0.017
(0.013)

-0.002
(0.008)

0.374∗∗∗
(0.121)

0.023∗∗
(0.009)

0.017∗∗
(0.007)

Pre-scandal mean
N
Scandal firm N
Adjusted R2

0.66
2390417
21213
0.18

0.20
2848365
25881
0.45

0.26
4473879
44738
0.10

31.50
1302412
14883
0.16

0.42
3106816
27605
0.09

0.51
4872600
46803
0.07

Notes: This table reports coefficients when re-estimating difference-in-differences on the worker
observable listed in each column. Regressions include firm and industry x year-month fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

92

Respondents who conceal aspects of their identity may by particularly concerned with retaliation risk (Sockin and Sojourner, 2020) and, thus, systematically differ from non-concealers.
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Table C.3: Difference-in-Difference Results for Scandals, Additional Heterogeneity
Overall
rating

Culture
and values

Senior
management

Panel A: Job seniority
Total effect: junior positions

Total effect: senior positions

-0.065∗
(0.039)
[7858]
-0.078
(0.056)
[3944]

-0.114∗∗∗
(0.034)
[7126]
-0.134∗∗
(0.063)
[3656]

-0.108∗∗∗
(0.033)
[7054]
-0.096∗
(0.055)
[3642]

-0.195∗∗∗
(0.066)
[2275]
-0.099∗∗∗
(0.032)
[10415]

-0.088
(0.059)
[2258]
-0.096∗∗∗
(0.028)
[10337]

Panel B: Location
Total effect: headquarters

Total effect: non-headquarters

-0.062
(0.068)
[2429]
-0.072∗∗∗
(0.028)
[11188]

Panel C: Employee gender
Total effect: females

-0.065
(0.042)
[7201]
-0.069∗∗∗
(0.019)
[16662]

Total effect: males

-0.102∗∗
(0.042)
[6156]
-0.124∗∗∗
(0.026)
[13957]

-0.089∗∗
(0.040)
[6071]
-0.096∗∗∗
(0.023)
[13870]

Panel D: Employee age
-0.047∗
(0.024)
[4312]
-0.100∗∗∗
(0.035)
[3163]

Total effect: younger

Total effect: older

-0.092∗∗∗
(0.033)
[3584]
-0.120∗∗
(0.054)
[2794]

-0.052
(0.036)
[3553]
-0.104∗∗
(0.051)
[2784]

Panel E: Firm tenure
Total effect: short tenure

Total effect: long tenure

-0.059
(0.040)
[9204]
-0.087∗∗∗
(0.030)
[6277]

-0.095∗∗
(0.044)
[8396]
-0.137∗∗∗
(0.029)
[5889]

-0.050
(0.044)
[8299]
-0.131∗∗∗
(0.030)
[5871]

Panel F: Conceal identifying characteristics
Total effect: conceals

Total effect: does not conceal

-0.035
(0.027)
[13302]
-0.108∗∗∗
(0.027)
[11999]

-0.079∗∗
(0.031)
[9927]
-0.147∗∗∗
(0.032)
[11293]

-0.053∗
(0.030)
[9828]
-0.129∗∗∗
(0.029)
[11209]

Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates for the effects following a scandal on different
partitions of reviewers. The pre- and post-periods are each 24 months. Regressions include firm,
industry x year-month, current employee, and employment status fixed effects. To account for the
partitioned characteristic, the following indicators are included in each panel respectively: junior
position, at headquarters, female, younger (ages 18–30), short tenure (at most two years), and
conceals job title or location. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Sample counts for scandal-hit
in the post-period are given in brackets. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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C.3

Elevated News Coverage

In this appendix, we demonstrate that elevated news coverage does not explain our
results. To do so, we contrast the effects of scandals with those of data breaches,
another type of negative, firm-specific shock that generates increased media attention. While breaches reflect poorly on firm management, they do not necessarily
involve misconduct or reveal information about firm culture. Our sample of such
events comes from Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, which defines a data breach as
a “security violation in which sensitive, protected or confidential data is copied,
transmitted, viewed, stolen or used by an unauthorized individual.” We restrict
attention to firms that experienced a loss of at least one million records between
2013 and 2018 and are well-covered on Glassdoor. The 27 breaches that fit the
criteria are listed in Table C.4.

93

We use data from Google Trends to validate that scandals and breaches generate
heightened news coverage. The web application provides daily scores reflecting the
relative search intensity for particular keywords within a specified date window.
Scores range from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the peak intensity over the period
of interest. For each scandal-hit and breach-hit firm in our sample, we pull the news
category trend score for a 60-day window centered around the event date. The
93

Two of our scandals are, in fact, data breaches. The Equifax hack was particularly damaging
to firm reputation due to its magnitude and the fact it was covered up by executives for several
months. The Sony breach was harmful despite the loss of comparatively few records, because
hackers leaked compromising emails written by executives.
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Table C.4: Summary of Breach Employer Samples
Event date

Employer

Description

CEO exits

Employer
reviews

Base
pay

Variable
pay

Benefits
reviews

October 04, 2013
December 13, 2013
January 10, 2014
January 25, 2014
May 21, 2014
August 18, 2014
August 28, 2014
September 02, 2014
October 20, 2014
February 05, 2015
March 17, 2015
May 20, 2015
July 17, 2015
October 01, 2015
May 17, 2016
June 13, 2016
August 03, 2016
September 22, 2016
September 07, 2017
October 12, 2017
March 30, 2018
April 01, 2018
April 01, 2018
April 20, 2018
June 28, 2018
October 01, 2018
November 30, 2018

Adobe
Target
Neiman Marcus
Michaels
eBay
Community Health Systems
J.P. Morgan
The Home Depot
Staples
Anthem
Premera Blue Cross
Carefirst
UCLA Health
Experian
LinkedIn
Twitter
Banner Health
Yahoo!
Equifax
T-Mobile
Under Armour
Lord & Taylor’s
Saks
SunTrust
adidas
Chegg
Marriott International

2.9m records
40.0m records
1.1m records
2.6m records
145.0m records
4.5m records
76.0m records
56.0m records
1.2m records
80.0m records
11.0m records
1.1m records
4.5m records
15.0m records
117.0m records
32.0m records
3.6m records
500.0m records
145.5m records
69.6m records
150.0m records
5.0m records
5.0m records
1.5m records
2.0m records
40.0m records
327.0m records

N
05/05/2014
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
09/26/2017
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

600
11,632
472
1,360
923
477
6,402
9,495
3,555
316
294
181
283
598
991
486
971
1,415
464
4,971
807
417
877
1,208
679
188
3,864

1,231
13,532
687
810
1,532
567
11,624
7,847
2,996
254
338
258
456
690
1,774
790
1,671
2,255
820
5,488
1,022
371
1,292
2,143
1,100
251
9,229

770
3,166
109
199
1,013
59
7,251
3,498
1,047
112
159
123
55
441
1,260
331
97
1,447
425
3,057
375
47
228
866
345
55
1,240

–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
332
162
286
479
166
1,667
251
120
272
417
225
73
1,283

Notes: This table describes each of the data breaches in the sample. The list comes from Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse and are restricted to hacks of at least one million individual records. Observation counts are provided in windows around event dates. For employer reviews, windows range
from 24 months before through 24 months after each event; for pay reports, four years before
through four years after; and for benefits reviews, three years before through three years after.

average score across firms for each event type are plotted in Figure C.1. The large
jumps when scandals and breaches become public confirm that both are salient,
unanticipated shocks that garner media attention.
Table C.5 reports results when we estimate the baseline rating and wage regressions on the sample of data breaches. The coefficient estimates are small and
insignificant across the set of outcomes derived from employee reviews, suggesting
that negative publicity does not necessarily cause declines in employee sentiment.
We also find no decrease in any of the compensation variables. It appears that
impropriety, not news coverage drives our results.
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Figure C.1: Google Trends Scores around Event Dates

Corporate Scandals

Data Breaches

Notes: These figures display equally-weighted average Google Trends news scores for firm names
in the 60-days around scandal and breach dates. Google Trends scores are normalized to range
from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the peak intensity over the queried time period.

Table C.5: Difference-in-Difference Results for Data Breaches
Employee reviews

Employee wages

Overall
rating

Culture
& values

Senior
mgmt.

Would refer
a friend

Base
pay

Variable
pay

Earns
VP

Benefits
rating

After breach

-0.043
(0.029)

-0.035
(0.037)

-0.055
(0.035)

-0.017
(0.013)

-0.001
(0.009)

-0.023
(0.036)

0.006
(0.007)

-0.021
(0.027)

Pre-breach mean
N
Breach firm N
Adjusted R2

3.45
4879723
53926
0.17

3.50
4119107
47092
0.17

3.01
4083763
46774
0.15

0.66
3847073
44487
0.14

10.89
4424839
53348
0.83

9.28
1155908
19584
0.64

0.49
4674366
58240
0.32

3.94
794574
5733
0.25

Notes: This table reports coefficients when Equations 3.3.1 and 3.4.1 are estimated on the sample
of data breaches. The control group and control variables are the same as in the benchmark
regressions for corporate scandals. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: *
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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C.4

Labor Productivity

The persistent decline in compensation after scandals suggests that misconduct may
negatively impact labor productivity. The loss of reputation after such events could,
for example, hurt sales by eroding relationships with clients. Alternatively, lower job
satisfaction could prompt employees to exert less effort (McGregor, 1960). While
we cannot distinguish between the various channels, we directly test the underlying
hypothesis using balance sheet data from Compustat. Formally, we estimate the
differences-in-differences regression

ykt = β · P ostScandalkt + λXkt + γk + γι(k)t + kt

(C.4.1)

where ykt is average labor productivity for firm k in quarter t, γk is a firm fixed effect,
γι(k)t is an industry-quarter fixed effect, Xkt is log assets, and P ostScandalkt is an
indicator equal to one if firm k faced a scandal prior to quarter t. The event window
extends from four years prior to four years after a scandal. The control group is
comprised of all firms in Compustat that experience neither a scandal nor breach.
Standard errors are again clustered by firm. We follow Cronqvist et al. (2009) and
define average labor productivity as the natural log of sales per employee. We also
test for changes in the number of total employees at the firm, though we note this
measure is only available at an annual frequency.
Results are presented in Table C.6. The estimate in Column 1 of Panel A
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indicates that average labor productivity drops by 9 percent in the years following
a scandal. The magnitude of the decline is similar when we consider only non-fraud
scandals, but the coefficient is significant only at the 10 percent level. The decrease
is also consistent with the reduction in variable compensation. As shown in Column,
we find no evidence of changes in the number of employees following scandals.
Table C.6: Firm-Level Outcomes Following Scandals

Corporate scandals

Corporate scandals
excluding fraud

Log sales
per worker

Log
employment

Log sales
per worker

Log
employment

After scandal

-0.086∗
(0.047)

0.104
(0.076)

-0.091∗∗
(0.045)

0.113
(0.087)

Pre-scandal mean
Dependent var. mean
Dependent var. std. dev.
Control firms
N
Scandal firm N
Adjusted R2

11.55
11.30
1.34
10426
275765
553
0.83

10.69
6.45
2.72
10522
77862
138
0.98

11.62
11.30
1.34
10426
275609
397
0.83

10.55
6.45
2.72
10522
77823
99
0.98

Notes: This table reports coefficients when Equation C.4.1 is estimated on the dependent variable
in each column heading. The event window spans from four years prior to four years after a scandal. The log sales-per-worker regressions are at the firm-quarter level, while the log employment
regressions are at the firm-year level. The independent variables are log assets and fixed effects
for firm and industry–year, where industry is based on six-digit GICS codes. Standard errors
are clustered by firm. One, two, and three stars denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively. The scandal-hit firms included in this analysis are: Apple, CBS, Carnival,
Equifax, Fox, Facebook, GlaxoSmithKline, Google, Guess?, Macy’s, Mylan Inc, Nissan, Sony,
Tesla, Toshiba, Valeant, Wells Fargo, Wynn Resorts, and lululemon.
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C.5

Scandals and Job Seeker Behavior

In this appendix, we study how facing a corporate scandal affects a firm’s ability
to attract job seekers. In addition to submitting reviews, users on Glassdoor can
search for and apply to jobs.94 The website’s platform presents job seekers with a
list of job openings based on their search criteria. A job posting being displayed
to a user constitutes an impression for that listing, regardless of whether the user
chooses to explore it further. If the user ultimately begins an application for the
vacancy, this constitutes an apply. We do not observe if users complete applications.
For each job listing, we calculate the total impressions and applies over a 72hour window beginning when the posting is first listed on Glassdoor. Each user
contributes at most once to a job listing’s totals.95 We restrict our sample to
active job postings by considering only listings with at least ten unique impressions.
We also exclude postings for which the metropolitan location of the vacancy is
unavailable and those made by firms with fewer than ten employer reviews prior
to the listing date. After imposing these filters, our sample consists of 9.60 million
listings from large employers. Search data are available from March 2017 through
94

Glassdoor aggregates job postings from online job boards, applicant tracking systems, and
company websites, capturing about 81 percent of total U.S. job openings as measured by the Job
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (Chamberlain and Zhao, 2019).
95
A user is a jobseeker with a registered profile, and can thus be identified across sessions. We
impose the 72-hour window in order to mitigate trends in search intensity over the life cycle of
a vacancy. For certain days, we are unable to calculate totals over a 72-hour window and must
resort to either a 48-hour or 24-hour window. We incorporate day-of-posting fixed effects in our
regressions in part to account for this issue.
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August 2019, which limits our sample to eight scandals.96
To test if scandals affect job seeker behavior, we estimate difference-in-differences
regressions with and apply rates (applies per hundred impressions) as the dependent
variables. The formal specification is

rijkmt =

X

βτ · ScandalF irmk{t∈τ } + γk + γι(k)jq(t) + γmq(t) + γt + ijkmt (C.5.1)

τ 6=2

where rijkmt is the apply rate for job listing i advertising job title j at firm k in
metro m posted on Glassdoor on calendar date t, γk is a firm fixed effect, γι(k)jq(t) is
an industry-job title-quarter fixed effect, γmq(t) is a metro-quarter fixed effect, γt is
a date-of-posting fixed effect, ScandalF irmk{t∈τ } is an indicator equal to one if firm
k experienced a scandal and calendar date t is in firm k’s event-time bin τ . The τ
subscripts correspond to two-month bins beginning four months prior and ending
twelve months following a scandal. The βτ coefficient estimates therefore measure
differences in apply rates relative to the omitted bin, τ = 2, which consists of the
two calendar months immediately preceding an event. In order to avoid undue
influence from less visible postings, we weight each job listing by its impression
count. The set of control firms consists of the 17,969 large employers with job
postings on Glassdoor that are in neither the corporate scandal nor data breach
96

The eight firms are: Apple (5289 / 259,000), CBS (6324 / 265,000), Equifax (2,342 / 71,000),
Facebook (1517 / 99,000), Google (3,617 / 246,000), Guess? (2,843 / 60,000), Tesla (6957 /
203,000), and Wynn Resorts (641 / 14,000). The figures in parentheses are, respectively, the total
job listings and unique impressions for each firm in the period four months prior to twelve months
after a scandal.
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samples. If scandals reduce interest in firms, the βτ coefficients will be negative in
the periods following an event.
Figure C.2 shows that application rates fall in the immediate aftermath of scandals. The point estimate of –0.172 in the event month represents a 20 percent
decrease relative to the mean apply rate of 0.87% in the reference period. While
the drop is large, the coefficients recover to their initial levels after six months.
While scandals may damage employee referral networks for a sustained period of
time, it does not appear to have a long-term affect on external job seekers. The
estimates in the pre-event bins are stable, suggesting that the assumption of parallel
trends underlying our analysis holds.
While suggestive, our findings should be taken with caution. Due to data limitations, we are only able to study a limited set of scandals. Further, job search
is not typically the primary function associated with Glassdoor. We consider the
relationship between misconduct and job seeker behavior to be an interesting topic
for further research.

C.6
C.6.1

Robustness Results
Control Sample Includes Small Firms

Given that scandal-hit firms are large and our identification strategy requires a
comparable set of control firms, we restrict our control sample to comparably large
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Figure C.2: Search Activity for Job Postings after Corporate Scandals

(a) Apply rate
Notes: The panels above display coefficients from Equation C.5.1 for apply rate within a 24-month
window around scandals. Horizontal dashes indicate a 95 percent confidence interval around each
point estimate. Regressions are weighted by each job posting’s impression total and include firm,
industry x job title x quarter, metro x quarter, and date-of-posting fixed effects. Each coefficient
is relative to the two months prior to the scandal. Standard errors are clustered by firm.

firms. However, we can re-estimate our baseline regressions with control samples
comprised of all employers so that the complete Glassdoor dataset is utilized. The
difference-in-difference estimates for our main outcomes using this alternate control sample, presented in table C.7, are consistent with those from our primary
specifications.
Table C.7: Robustness Results, Control Sample Comprised of All Firms
Employee reviews
Employee wages
Overall Culture
Senior Would refer Base Variable Earns Benefits
rating
rating & values mgmt.
a friend
pay
pay
VP
After scandal -0.061∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗
-0.022∗∗
-0.017 -0.108∗∗∗ -0.059∗ -0.039
(0.025) (0.028) (0.027)
(0.009)
(0.013) (0.035) (0.033) (0.054)

Notes: Sample for each specification includes all firms that experienced neither a scandal nor a
breach in the control sample. Each specification is identical to the one implemented in the main
text. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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C.6.2

Fixed-Sample Composition

We next show that our results are not driven by changes in sample composition
over time. We re-estimate each differences-in-differences regression, but set each
scandal firms’ sample share in the post-event period equal to it’s sample share in
the pre-event period. The results, presented in table C.8, are broadly unchanged
from our benchmark.
Table C.8: Weighted Difference-in-Differences Results
Employee reviews
Employee wages
Overall Culture
Senior Would refer Base Variable Earns Benefits
rating & values mgmt.
a friend
pay
pay
VP
rating
∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗
∗∗∗
∗
After scandal -0.066
-0.113
-0.091
-0.020
-0.012 -0.095
-0.047
-0.036
(0.026) (0.029) (0.028)
(0.009)
(0.012) (0.032) (0.027) (0.048)

Notes: This table reports the difference-in-differences coefficients for the dependent variable listed
in each column. Regressions are weighted such that each scandal firm’s share of the sample in the
post-event period is held constant at it’s pre-event share. Each regression specification uses the
same controls as those used in the benchmark. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Significance
levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

C.6.3

Stacked Events

First, for each scandal, we create a separate dataset that includes the observations
for that scandal firm and all of the control firms. Second, we append together all
of the separate datasets. We then aggregate across worker-level observations to the
level of our fixed effects within each dataset for ease of computation. For employer
reviews, we aggregate to the firm–month level. For employee wages, we aggregate
to the firm x industry-job-year level. (For computational feasibility, we exclude
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state-year level controls from the wage specifications.) For fringe benefits reviews,
we aggregate to the firm x industry-year level. We then implement our differencein-differences specification adding a fixed effect for each dataset. Reassuringly, the
stacked results, presented in Table C.9, exhibit similar results to our benchmark
estimates.
Table C.9: Stacked Difference-in-Difference Results for Corporate Scandals
Employee reviews

Employee wages

Overall
rating

Culture
& values

Senior
mgmt.

Would refer
a friend

Base
pay

Variable
pay

Earns
VP

Benefits
rating

After scandal

-0.068∗∗
(0.028)

-0.116∗∗∗
(0.031)

-0.096∗∗∗
(0.030)

-0.021∗∗
(0.010)

-0.013
(0.014)

-0.120∗∗∗
(0.034)

-0.043
(0.032)

-0.036
(0.061)

Pre-scandal mean
N
Scandal firm N

3.50
24814501
1043

3.37
22949130
1041

3.06
22864788
1040

0.65
22231874
1040

11.29
52920825
16777

9.91
14583623
7626

0.51
55112072
17619

3.90
1523396
107

Notes: This table reports the difference-in-differences coefficients for the dependent variable listed
in each column. Regressions include the fixed effects from the benchmark specifications in addition
to a fixed effect for each stacked scandal-hit firm specific dataset. Standard errors are clustered
by firm. Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

C.6.4

Leave-One-Out

Since our regressions are unweighted and employers are not equally represented in
the Glassdoor data, we seek to ensure that no one firm drives our findings. We reestimate the generalized differences-in-differences regressions for our main outcomes
of interest, but iteratively exclude one scandal-hit firm. The coefficients for each
remain negative, statistically significant, and deviate relatively little from the full
sample estimate regardless of which firm is excluded.
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Figure C.3: Leave-One-Out Coefficients for Reviewer Outcomes

(a) Overall rating

(b) Culture and values

(c) Senior management

(d) Would refer to a friend

(e) Variable pay

(f) Variable pay, low exp

Notes: These figures report the difference-in-difference coefficients when one scandal—as indicated by the position along the x-axis—is omitted in a rotating fashion. The employer numbers
correspond as follows: (1) Apple, (2) CBS, (3) Carnival, (4) Equifax, (5) FOX News, (6) Facebook, (7) GlaxoSmithKline, (8) Google, (9) Guess?, (10) Macy’s, (11) Mylan Inc, (12) Nissan,
(13) Samsung, (14) Sony, (15) Tesla, (16) Toshiba, (17) Uber, (18) United Airlines, (19) Valeant,
(20) Volkswagen, (21) Wells Fargo, (22) Wynn Resorts, and (23) lululemon. The solid horizontal
line reflects the coefficient from including all scandals. Horizontal dashes indicated a 95 percent
confidence interval around each point estimate. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
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C.7

Additional Figures for Chapter 3

Figure C.4: Average Employee Ratings and Responses for All Other Firms

Overall rating

Culture and values

Career opportunities

Senior management

Compensation and benefits

Work-life balance

Would refer a friend

Positive business outlook

Approve of CEO performance

Notes: These figures display the average rating among newly-submitted reviews each year-month
for firms that experienced neither a corporate scandal nor a data breach. The sample period is
from June 2012 through December 2020.
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Figure C.5: Employee Ratings around Scandal Dates, Additional Dynamic Results

Career opportunities

Compensation and benefits

Work-life balance

Positive business outlook

Notes: These figures display dynamic coefficients for the four other main dependent variables.
Horizontal dashes indicate a 95 percent confidence interval around each point estimate. Regressions include firm, job title, industry x year-month, state, current employee, and employment
status fixed effects. Each coefficient is relative to the two-month period prior to the scandal.
Standard errors are clustered by firm.

229

Figure C.6: Employee Reviews Submitted around Scandal Dates, Dynamic Effects

ln(reviews + 1)
Notes: The left panel displays coefficients from the dynamic version of Equation 3.3.1 using the one
plus the log of monthly firm review count as the dependent variable. We use 48-month windows
around event dates. Horizontal dashes indicate a 95 percent confidence interval around each point
estimate. Regressions include firm and industry x year-month fixed effects. Each coefficient is
relative to the two-month period prior to the event. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
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